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CONGRESS, THE COURT, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
THURSDAY, JANUARY 29,1998
HOUSE OF REPRESENrrATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

I

Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in Room
2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles Canady [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Charles T. Canady, Henry J. Hyde, Ed
Bryant, William L. Jenkins, Bob GoOdlatte, Bob Barr, Asa Hutchinson, Robert C. Scott, Maxine Waters, and Melvin L. Watt.
Staff present: John Ladd, Counsel; Keri Folmar, Chief Counsel;
Brett Shogren, Research Assistant; Michael Connally, Staff Assistant; Brian Woolfolk, Minority Staff; Julian Epstein, Minority Staff
Director, and Robert Carry, Counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CANADY

Mr. CANADY [presiding]. The subcommittee will be in order.
The subcommittee is holding thi.s hearing today to examine the
respective roles of the Congress and the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution. With the help of our witnesses today, we
will consider whether one branch of our Federal Government has
a monopoly on Constitutional interpretation.
I believe the framers of our Constitution expected the Congress
to play an important role in debating and legislating our constitutional issues. It is important to the CongreE;s to ask itself if deference to the Supreme Court is always the order of the day. We
have a responsibility to consider the circurnstances under which
the Congress 'should or should not defer to the Supreme Court in
making Constitutional interpretations. And we have the duty to ensure that the requirements of the Constitution are consistently recognized and honored in the legislative process.
While the exclusive focus of today's hearing is not the Court's
Boerne v. Flores decision of last term, that case does represent the
most recent expression of tension in an

ongoin~

relationship be-

tween the Congress and the Court. Despite the Cou.rt's holding in
Boerne, Justice Kennedy stated to the Court that, and I quote,
"When the Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibility, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed Judpnent of the meaning and force of the Constitution."
In light Of the result in Boerne, it is incumbent on Members of
Congress to retlect on the scope of our sphere of power and respon(1)
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sibilities so that we can exercise our duty, as Justice Kennedy put
it, "to make our own informed judgment on the meaning and force
of the Constitution."
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I now
recognize Mr. Scott for 5 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank. you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the opportunity we're taking to examine the relationship between Congress, the Court, and the Constitution. Constitutional tension between Congress and the judiciary is nothing new. The drafters of
the Constitution established three branches of -Government, all
with ~qual responsibilities, to protect and uphold the Constitution.
The strength of our system of Government is based on the interdependence of three separate but equal branches of Government.
The fact that from time-to-time the branches disagree is a tribute
to our democracy and in no way threatens the sovereignty of its
people. We should take pride in knowing that our vigorous system
of checks and balances not only protects us from external threats
at home and abroad, but also protects us from the greatest threat
ever imagined by our Founding Fathers, and that threat is ourselves.
I understand that there have been a number of proposals intended to minimize the healthy tension now existing between Congress and the courts. I am particularly concerned by the suggestion
by some that we should more frequently exercise our impeachment
powers to rid ourselves of the actions of activist judges who thwart
the will of the people, and we should investigate these judges, Mr.
Chairman.
I understand that in the 1996-97 term of the Supreme Court,
four of the seven acts of Congress reviewed were invalidated. Only
two justices voted to invalidate all seven of the acts of Congress
cOllsidered in the most recent term, taking every opportunity they
had to thwart the will of the people. There was another judge that
voted six out of seven times to thwart the will of the people, and
we should investigate and expose these justices for thwarting the
will of the people. And Mr. Chairman, we need to do some research
to find out who these justices are.
Mr. CANADY. WaitMr. SCOTT. Wait a minute, Mr. Chairman. My staff has already
supplied me with that information-seven out of seven; Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas-six out of seven; Chief Justice
Rehnquist. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, Mr.
Chairman, to see whether or not we would have been better off
without these activist judges on our Court. [Laughter.]
So I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling the hearing. I am particularly looking forward to hearing from Professor Devins, who is a professor
at William and Mary Marshall School of Law, which, depending on
the actions of the General Assembly tomorrow and the next day,
m~ be in or out of my district. [Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Scott. With the General Assembly
a such a matter today, I'm velW pleased that you were
able to
(Laughter.]
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Mr. SCOTT. I'm well-represented today in Richmond, you can be
sure.
Mr. CANADY. I'm sure you are.
We're very pleased to have a distinguished panel of Members to
start off the hearing today. We have four Members on this panel.
The first to testify will be the Honorable Ron Lewis. Congressman
Lewis represents the 2nd District of Kentucky and serves on both
the Agriculture and National Security Committees in the U.S.
House of Representatives.
Next we will hear from the Honorable John Hostettler. Representative Hostettler, who represents the 8th District of Indiana,
has recently published an articled entitled ''The Constitution's
Final Interpreter: We the People," in the Regent University Law
Review.
The Honorable Barney Frank will be the next to testify. A member of the House Judiciary Committee and former ranking member
of this subcommittee, Representative Frank has represented the
4th District of Massachusetts since 1981.
Finally, on our first panel, we will hear from the Honorable Tom
Campbell. Representative Campbell, who serves the people of the
15th District of California, has taught constitutional law at Stanford University.
.
Without objection, your written statements will be made a part
of the permanent record, and I would ask you to do your best to
summarize your testimony in no more than 5 minutes; we'll have
the light on. Unless some member of the subcommittee insists, we
won't stay strictly to the 5-minute rule, but as close as you could
come to that, we would appreciate it.
So with that we welcome you all, and I'll recognize Representative Lewis.
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STATEMENT OF LOUIS FISHER, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN SEPARATION OF POWERS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding these
hearings. I'm not aware of another time where a congressional
panel has held a hearing on a broad topic of what the role of Congress is in constitutional interpretation and how that role fits with
the President and with the courts.
As you mentioned in your opening statement, people today seem
to think that the Court has a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. That certainly could not be true for the early decades. Professor David Currie has written about this, as have others, to show
that the prominent constitutional decider in those early years was
Congress, with the President. The courts played very little role.
There were few decisions at that time from the courts to guide Congress, so it was up to the two branches, executive and legislative,
to decide.
In recent decades, probably the last 40 to 50 years, there has

been this tendency, both in the Supreme Court and with professors,

to read Court decisions as the ultimate and final word, with the

Court having some exclusive role on the meaning of the Constitution.
'
The Supreme Court frequently today cites language from
Marbury that it is emphatically the province and duty of the courts
to say what the law is; that is true. It's also emphatically the province and duty of Congress to say what the law is. It's emphatically
the province and duty of the President to say what the law is
through his veto power and through the President's responsibility
to enforce the law.
So that part of Marbury doesn't get you very far, and anyone who
at Marbury in 1803 would know that Chief Justice John Marnever made the claim that he had some exclusive roll in in ..
..~ft'fl'~....1n,a the Constitution. He knew politically at that time, after
elelctl(Jm in 1800, that the Court was not in a position to dictate
I'Wr,GrP branches.
AVVlJ_
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And in my testimony I have the letter that he sent to Justice
Chase saying that if Members of Congress disagree with a Court
decision, it's not necessary to roll out impeachment; rather, you

work through your regular legislative process, and we have a dialogue between the branches on shaping the meaning. The Marbury

decision is always taken out of context to say something that Marshall never meant.
Last year in the Harvard Law Review there was an article by
Professors Alexander and Schauer arguing that the Court should
be the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, and that that
would produce political stability. Neal Devins and I talked about

that article as to when in American history you could ever say that

the Court helped settle issues, transcendent or otherwise. Certainly
on slavery, on child labor-you can go down the list-where Court
decisions did not settle these issues, that it was left to the larger
political process.
Neal Devins and I did an article that will be in the Virginia Law
Review next month to say that all three branches participate in the
meaning of the Constitution; the States, as well and the general
public, as well, and that this larger dialogue is what creates political stability, not an exclusive role for the Court.
My statement talks about the role of Congress in three senses:
before the Court ever decides, when it decides that something in
constitutional, and when it decides that something is not constitutional. Before the Court decides, Members of Congress have a huge
role on many matters that either never get to the Court, or if they
get to the Court the Court ducks it on various grounds, various
thresholds. These are important matters. Many of the .issues are
the veto power, the pocket veto, covert spending, foreign affairs,
war powers, and so forth, that are basically left to Members of Congress-the commerce power, spending power.
Now when the Court does take a case and decides that something is constitutional, that's not the last word because it is simply
stated by the Court that if the other branches want to do this it's
okay by the Constitution, an example being McCulloch with the
U.S. Bank. The Court said it was constitutional. That did not prohibit President Jackson later, when a bill came to reauthorize the
bank, to say, "According to me, it's unconstitutional. I'm going to
.
veto it on that ground."
A contemporary issue is the independent counsel. Although that
was upheld by the Court in Morrison, if Members of Congress
wanted to say at the next reauthorization of the independent counsel that you have serious constitutional doubts, you don't have to
reauthorize; or if you do, and it gets to the President, the President
could veto it by saying that even though the Court says it doesn't
encroach that much OD executive power, I think it does and I'm
going to veto it on constitutional grOUIlds.
Another recent example: In 1986 the Supreme Court upheld the
Air Force regulation that prohibited members of the military from
wearing a yarmulke indoors while on duty, and Congress the next
year overturned that by statute, and that's the meaning of the CODstitution on how you balance military duties versus religious free-

dom#
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E~en when the Court finds unconstitutionality, Congress is a
partIcipant. I talk about the Boerne case, which I don't think is
persuasive; I think it's internally inconsistent. I think there is plenty of room for Congress to revisit the issue with new legislation.
And I conclude by saying that at certain times in our history
there is a basis for finality by the Supreme Court, the examples
being the Little Rock crisis, the Watergate tapes case. But by and
large, American history, I think, is very convincing that the reading of the Constitution is better left to the flow of considerations
by all three branches, by the States, and by the general public.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fisher follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LoUIS FISHER, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN SEPARATION OF
POWERS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
~1r. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the role of Congress in
interpreting the Constitution. To my knowledge, this is the flIst time that congressional hearings have been used for the purpose of understanding the contributions
made by legislators in shaping and protecting constitutional values. Too often, especially in recent years, it is assumed that the judiciary has a monopoly on constitutional interpretation and that Congress must defer to the courts.
The framers expected Congress to play a pivotal role in debating and legislating
on constitutional issues. Most of the important constitutional issues in the early decades were decided almost exclusively by Congress and the President. There were
few decisions by federal courts to guide the elected branches. The record of this
early period has been ably covered by David Currie in a number of law review articles, brought together in his book The Constitution in Congress (1997). As he explains in the concluding chapter, it was "in the legislative and executive branches,
not in the courts, that the original understanding of the Constitution was forged.»
Particularly in the twentieth century, scholars, judges, and sometimes Members
of Congress claim that the U.S. Supreme Court has the "last word" on the meaning
of the Constitution. Under this theory, if Congress disagrees with a Court ruling the
only alternative is to pass a constitutional amendment to overturn the Court. This
belief in judicial supremacy overlooks much of the flexibility and political considerations that characterize the relationship between the judiciary and other elements
of the political system: Congress, the President, the states, and the general public.
What About Marbury?
In recent decades, much has been made of the statement by Chief Justice John
Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison (1803), that it is "em~hatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Does that mean that the
Court alone delivers the "fmal word" on the meaning of the Constitution? According
to a unanimous ruling by the Court in the Little Rock crisis, Marbury "declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1956). That ~rinciple was reasserted
by the Court in the reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr (1962): "Deciding wheth..
er a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government, or whether action of that branch exceeds whatever authority
has been cOmmitted, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, ana
a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." Seven
years later, in the exclusion case of Adam Clayton Powell, the Court again referred
to itself as the "ultimate interpreter" of the COnstitution. Powell v. McCormack. 395
U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
These statements distort what Chief Justice Marshall decided in Marbury. While
it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is," ce
the same can be saia of Congress and the President. All three
branehes say
t the law is. The Court states what the law is on the day a decision comes down; the law may change later by actions taken by the elected
branehes. I will ~ft a number_ ~f prominent exampl~s of this institutional inte~lay.
In 1803, Man
did not think he was powerful enoup to g!ve orders to Conand. the Pre.ident. After the elections of 1800, with the Jeffersonians in conCon
the Pl'8lidency the Federalist Court was in no ~sition to dictate to the
he•. Mal'8uif realized that he could not u~Jlola the eonstituttonaUty of
13 or the Judiciary Act of 1789 and directSeeretary of State
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James Madison to deliver the commissions to the disappointed would-be judges.
President Thomas Jefferson and Madison would have ignored such an order. There
is no reason to think that Marshal! believed that the Court was supreme on matters
of constitutional interpretation.
This conclusion is bome out by the impeachment hearings of Judge Pickering and
Justice Chase. Marbury was decided on February 24, 1803. The House impeached
Pickering on March 2, 1803 and the Senate convicted him on March 12, 1804. As
soon as the House impeached Pickering, it tum.ed its guns on Chase. If that move
succeeded, Marshall had reason to believe he was next in line. With these threats
pressing upon the Court, Marshall wrote to Chase on January 23, 1804, suggesting
that Members of Congress did not have to impeach judges because they objected to
their judicial opinions. Instead, Congress could simply review and reverse objectionable decisions through the regular legislative process. Here is Marshall's language
in the letter to Chase:
I think. the modem doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed unsound by
the legislature would certainly better comport with the mildness of our character than [would] a removal of the Judge who has rendered them unknowing
of his fault.
The meaning of Marbury is placed in proper perspective when we recall that Marshall never again struck down a congressional statute during his long tenure on the
Bench, which lasted from 1801 to 1835. Instead, he pl~yed a consistently supportive
role in upholding congressional interpretations of the Constitution. In the years following Marbury, Marshall upheld the power of Congress to exercise the commerce
power, to create a U.S. Bank (even though no such power is expressly provided in
the Constitution), and to discharge other constitutional responsibilities. The judicial"l'Junctioned as a yea-saying, not a negative, branch.
The respect of the Court for congressional judgments is evident in some decisions
in the 1850s. In 1852, the Supreme Court held that the height of a bridge in Pennsylvania made it "a nuisance.' Congress responded with legislation that declared the
bridges at issue to be "lawful structures," and the Court then ruled that the bridges
were no longer unlawful obstructions. l In the second decision, Justices McLean,
Grier, and Wayne objected that Congress could not annul or vacate a court decree
and that the congressional statute was an exercise of judicial, not legislative, power.
Yet the Court has never adopted that position. As the Court noted in 1946: "whenever Congress' judgment has been uttered affirmatively to contradict the Court's
previously expressed view that specific action taken by the states in Congress' silence was forbidden by the commerce clause, this body has accommodated its previous judgment to Congress' expressed approval." 2
Settling Constitutional Issues
In the May 1997 issue of Harvard Law Review, Larry Alexander and Frederick
Schauer argue that the Supreme Court should be the exclusive and authoritative
interpreter of the Constitution. Although they caution that their study is not based
on historical precedents, they conclude that the Court is best situated to decide and
settle constitutional issues, particularly transcendent questions. They believe that
vesting such power in the courts would contribute to political stability.
Neal Devins and I talked about this article. We tried to recall a time when the
Court ever "settled" a constitutional issue, transcendent or otherwise. Certainly the
decision in Dred Scott did not settle the slavery issue. Judicial resistance, over a
period of almost forty years, to the use of the commerce power by Congress did not
settle the issue of national regulation. Eventually the Court gave way. Roe v. Wade
did not settle the abortion issue. In 1992, the Court jettisoned the trimester standard that had drawn criticism from many quarters. The decision in Furman v. Georgia (1972) to strike down death-penalty statutes in Georgia and Texas as cruel and
unusual did not settle that issue. Under heavy public pressure the Court later acknowledged that the death penalty, if accompamed by revised procedures, was constitutional.
lPen~lvanitJ v. Wheeling &c. Bridge Co., 13 How. (54 U.S.) 518 (1852); 10 Stat. 112, 16
(1852); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 421 (1856).
2 Prudentiallnll. Co. v. Benjamin, IJ26 U.S. 408, 425 (1946). In 1985, the Court said that when
Con.,es, "SO ChOOleS, state actions which it pJainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional
attack under the Commerce Clause." Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, FRS, 472 U.S.
159, 17-4 (1985). In a concurrence in 1995, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor noted: "if we invalidate a state law, Congtess can in etreet overtum our judgment." United States v. Lo,Pe%, 514
11JJ, 549, 580 (1995).
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Even for more popular decisions, such as the desegregation case of 1954, little was
settled by the Court's ruling. More than a decade later, a federal appellate court
noted: "A national effort, bringing to.sether Congress, the executive, and the judiciary: may he able to make meaningful the right of Negrt? children to equal educatIonal opportunities. The courts acting alone have failed.» 3 To deal with racism
an~ segregation, it was necessary for Congress and the President, with bipartisan
m.aJorities, to pass such statutes as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.
.
Devins and I concluded that judit::ial exclusivitr in constitutional lawmaking
would be contrary to American history I' the framers intent, and legal development.
We also believe that it would lead to political instability, not stability. Our response
to the Alexander-Schauer article will appear in the February 1998 issue of Virginia
Law Review.
To explain the breadth of congressional activity in interpreting the Constitution,
the following three sections discuss (1) how Congress resolves these issues before
the Court decides, (2) what it may do when the Court upholds the constitutionality
of a measure, and (3) what it may do when the Court decides that a measure is
unconstitutional. The meaning of the Constitution is not flXed by anyone branch,
but is rather that product of all three branches acting in concert with the states
and the public at large.
Before the Court Decides
Congress frequently must act on constitutional matters before there are useful
precedents from the courts. Many of the difficult issues related to the veto power,
the pocket veto, recess appointments, the incompatibility and ineligibility clauses,
war powers, covert operations, and other disputes are generally resolved by Congress with little input from the courts. 4
Occasionally these issues move toward the Supreme Court, but just as quickly
they are turned back by various threshold tests. In the 1970s1 covert funding of the
intelligence community was challenged as a violation of the Statement and Account
Clause. In 1974, the Court held that the litigant lacked standing to bring the suit.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166. That issue was left to Congress and the
President to decide. In 1987, when it appeared that the Court would decide the constitutionality of a pocket veto by President Reagan, the case was dismissed on
groWlds of mootness. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361. That issue, too, was pushed
back to elected officials to resolve. A variety of other doctrines-political questions,
ripeness, prudential considerations, nonjusticiability, and equitable discretion-are
used by the court to sidestep constitutional issues. The result is that a number of
constitutional issues are returned to the elected branches.
When the Court Upholds Constitutionality
When the Court decides that a congressional statute is constitutional, the controversy may remain open for different treatment by the legislative and executive
branches. For example, President Andrew Jackson received a bill in 1832 to recharter the United States Bank. Although the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)
had ruled that the bank was constitutional, Jackson vetoed the bill on the ground
that it was unconstitutional. His veto message said that he had taken an oath of
office to s~port the Constitution "as he understands it, and not as it is understood
by others. His position on the veto power has been followed by all subsequent
Presidents. Regardless of the constitutional decisions reached by Congress and the
courts, Presidents may independently analyze the constitutionality of bills presented
to them.
To take a contemporary example, Presidents Reagan and Clinton signed bills reauthorizing the office of independent counsel. The Court in Morrison v. Olson (1988)
upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute. Nevertheless, President Clinton or any future President has the independence to veto a reauthorization
bill on the ground that the office of independent counsel encroaches upon the executive power granted to the President by the Constitution. For that matter, Members
of Congress could decide at the next reauthorization stage that the office of independent counsel violates the Constitution. Morrison simply means that Congress
and the President may create the office if they want to. They may rethink and revisit the statute at any time.
3 United States v, Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom" East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. of Davis, 389 U.S. 840 (1967 (emphasis in
original),
"Louis Fisher, "Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts," 18 Pepperdine L.
Rev. 57 (1000); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President (4th
ed.I997).
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My attached CRS Report, "Congressional Checks on the Judiciary," contains a
number of other examples of Congress acting by statute to neutralize a constitutional decision by the Court. In 1986, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an
Air Force regulation that prohibited Captain Simcha Goldman from wearing his
yarmulke indoors while on Quty. The Court decided that the needs of the Air Force
outweighed Goldman's constitutional right to freely exercise his religion. Goldman
v. Weinbe,.ger, 475 U.S. 503. Within a year, Congress attached to a military authorization bill language permitting militaIy personnel to wear conservative, unobtrusiv~ religious apparel indoors, provided that it does not interfere with their military
duties. 101 Stat. 1086-87, sec. 508 (1987). The Court decided the conflict between
Air Force needs and religious freedom one way; Congress decided it the other way.
When the Court Finds Unconstitutionality
If the Court decides that a governmental action is unconstitutional, it is usually
more difficult for Congress and the President to challenge and override the judiciary. But even in this category there are examples of effective legislative and executive actions in responding to court rulings.
In his inaugural address in 1857, President James Buchanan announced that the
dispute over slavery in the territories "is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending,
and will, it is understood, be speedily and fmally settled." Two days later Chief Justice Taney handed down the Court's decision in Dred Scott, holding that Congress
could not prohibit slavery in the territories and that blacks were not citizens. That
decision was eventually overturned by the Civil War Amendments-the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-but before those amendments were ratified Congress and the President had already reversed Dred Scott. In 1862, Congress
passed legislation to prohibit slavery in the territories, 12 Stat. 432, and in that
same year Attorney General Bates released a long opinion which held that neither
color nor race could deny American blacks the right of citizenship. lOOp. Att'y Gen.
382 (1862).
In 1916, Congress relied on the commerce power to enact a child labor law. In
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.
A year later Congress passed new child labor legislation, this time relying on the
taxing power. Again the Court, in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., struck it down.
Congress passed a constitutional amendment in 1924 to give it the power to regulate child labor but ratification proved impossible. In 1938, Congress returned to the
commerce power to regulate child labor and this time the Court, unanimously,
upheld the statute. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
This record-from 1916 to 1941-was an exceptionally lengthy dialogue between
Congress and the Court, with the legislative branch eventually prevailing. The
Court later admitted that ''the history of judicial limitation of congressional power
over commerce, when exercised afllrmatively, has been more largely one of retreat
than of ultimate victory." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415 (1946).
The Court's decision last year in Boerne v. Flores, striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), raises a number of issues about judicial fmality.
In deciding that Congress had exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and hinting that the Court has the last
and rmal word in deciding the meaning of the Constitution, the Court nevertheless
left the door wide open for future congressional action. The reasoning and premises
in the decision are often unpersuasive and internally inconsistent. The Court invites
future congressional action by noting that there ''must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end." 117 lr.S. at 2164. Does that mean that adjustments to a redrafted bill
would pass muster? In comparing RFRA to the Voting Rights Act, the Court says
that RFRA's "legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bIgotry." Id. at 2169. Is that the problem?
If Congress, with rmdings, could identify recent examples of religious persecution,
would RFRA be constitutional?
My CRS report includes other examples, but I will end with a dispute in 1970.
The House Committee on Internal Security prepared a report on the honoraria
gl.ven to guest speakers at colleges and wliversities. The study included the names
of leftist or antiwar speakers and the amounts they received. The ACLU obtained
a copy of the galleys and asked a federal district court to enjoin their publication.
The court rulea that the report served no legislative purpose and was issued solely
for the sake of exposure or intimidation. It ordered the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents not tf) print the report ceor any portion, restatement or
facsimile thereof," with the possible exception of placing the report in the Congressional Record. Hentoffv.lchord, 318 F.Supp. 1175, 1183 (D.D.C. 1970).
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The House of Representatives passed a resolution tha~ told the courts, in essence,
step back. During the course of the debate, Members of Congress explained that
It was not the rractice of the House to print committee reports in the Record. Moreover, the judge s order "runs afoul not only of the speech and debate clause-article
I, section 6-of the Constitution, but obstructs the execution of other constitutional
commitments of the House as well, including article I, section 5, which authorizes
each House to determine the rules of its proceedings, and requires each House to
p~blish its proceedings." .'\f\cr the ~solutiC?n was passed by a large bipartisan margm (302 to 54), the report was pnnted Without any further interference from the
judiciary.
This collision between Congress and the judiciary was unusually abrupt. For the
most part, the legislative-judicial dialogue is more nuanced and subtle. In INS v.
Chadha (1983), the.Supreme Court struck down the "legislative veto" as unconstitutional. Congress no longer attempts to use one-House or two-House legislative vetoes to control the executive branch. On the other hand, it continues to use committee and subcommittee vetoes to monitor agency actions. 5
Conclusions
At certain points in our constitutional history, there has been a compelling need
for an authoritative and binding decision by the Supreme Court. The unanimous
ruling in Cooper v. Aaron (1958), signed by each Justice, was essential in dealing
with the Little Rock desegregation crisis. Another unanimous decision in United
States v. Nixon (1974) disposed of the confrontation between President Nixon and
the judiciary regarding the Watergate tapes. For the most part. however, court decisions are tentative and reversible like other political events.
There is no reason for Congress to defer automatically to the judiciary because
of ita supposed technical skills and political independence. !rfuch of constitutional
law depends on factf"mding and the balancing of competing values, areas in which
Congress justifiably can claim substantial expertise. Each decision by a court is subject to scrutiny by private citizens and public officials. What is "fmal" at one stage
of our political development may be reopened at some later date, leading to revisions, fresh interpretations, and reversals of Supreme Court doctrines. Members of
Congress have both the authority and the capability to participate constructively in
constitutional interpretation.
Through this process of interaction among the branches, all three institutions are
able to expose weaknesses, hold excesses in check, and gradually forge a consensus
on constitutional values. Also through this process, the public has an opportunity
to add a legitimacy and a meaning to what might otherwise be an alien and shortlived document. 6
~
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Congressional Checks on the Judiciary
SUMMARY

This report identifies the methods available to Congress to check the.
judieiary. The first part is devoted to checks embedded in the text or the
Constitution: statutes that derme the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
impeachment ofjudges, constitutional amendments, and limitations imposed on
the Court by the Case or Controversy standard. The second part examines the
claim of judicial supremacy on constitutional questions. The third focuses on
constraints that operate through the regular political and legislative processes.
Although it is conventional to view the judiciary-and especially the
Supreme Court-as the ultimate and final arbiter' on constitutional law,
numerous examples over two centuries suggest a more dynamic and less
hierarchical model. Faced with challenges from Congress and the President, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that it is not the only branch with the
authority and capacity to interpret the Constitution. Included within this
report are examples from a variety or constitutional disputes: the U.S. Bank,
the Independent Counsel, women's rights, financial privacy, reeess
appointments, religious freedom, slavery, child labor legislation, sedition,
congressional investigations, the commerce clause, criminal procedures, search
and seizure, enforcement or the Civil War Amendments, end sex discrimination.
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Congressional Checks on the Judiciary
This report identities the methods available to Congress to check the
federal courts. The first part oC the report is devoted to checks embedded in the
text of the Constitution: statutes that define the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, impeacbment of judges, constitutional amendments, and limitations
imposed on the Court by the Case or Controversty standard. The second part
examines the claim ofjudicia1supremacy on constitutional questions. The third
focu8e8 on constraints that op&rate through the regular political and legislative

processes.
Although it is conventional to view the judiciary~nd especially the
Supreme Court--aa the ultimate and final arbiter oC constitutional law,
numerous examples over two centuries suggest a more dynamic and lesa
hierarchical model. Throughout this period, Congress has disagreed with court
decisions and has pressed its own independent views on the meaning of the
Constitution, often with substantial effect. Similar challenges have ~"Ome Crom
Presidents, who assert their own right to reach independent and coequal
constitutional opinions. In this ebb and flow, all three branches strive Cor
ascendancy without ever attaining it. Repeatedly, the Court has recognized that
it is not th~ only branch with authority and capacity to interpret the
Constitution. The result is a judiciary that is regularly checked and guided by
the other branches.

I. Constitutional Ten
A. Withdrawing Jurisdiction
On a number of occasions, Congress has titreatened to withdraw the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals in such areas 88 abortion, school
busing, and school prayer. This strategy is based on language in Article m oC
the Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both 88
to law and fo;ct, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, 88 the
Congress shall make.· The Exceptions Clause, it is argued, gives Congress
plenary power to determine the Court's appellate jurisdiction. However, this
grant of power must be read in concert with other provisions in the
Constitution. An aggressive use of the Exceptions Clause would make an
exception the nile and deny citizens access to the Supreme Court to vindicate
constitutional rights. A broad interpretation would run counter to the basic
principles of constitutionalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances.
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In some early decisions, the Supreme Court recognized the power 01
, ,:"".ongr:ess to make exceptions and to regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction. l
The leading case for empowering Congress to withdraw appellate jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court came shortly after the Civil War. In 1868, Congress
withdrew the Court's jurisdiction to review circuit court judgments on habeas
, corpus actions. The clear purpose was to prevent the Court from deciding a case
on the constitutionfllity of the Reconstruction military government in the South,
even though the Court had already heard oral argument in the case. On
February 17, 1868, the Court dismissed the government's argument that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
318 (1868). The case was argued March 2, 3, 4, and 9. Before the Court could
meet in conference to decide the case, Congress passed legislation to nUllify the
plaintiff's relief under an act of February 5, 1867, which allowed a petition to
a federal circuit court for the writ of habeas corpus. The new legislation
provided that the portion of the 1867 statute that authorized an appeal from the
judgment of the circuit court to the Supreme Court, "or the exercise of any such
jurisdiction by said Supreme Court on appeals which bave been or may hereafter
be taken, be, and the same is, hereby repealed." 15 Stat. 44 (1868). The Court
unanimously upheld the l'epeal statute and dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
The Court retained access to Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1~89 to
review habeas corpus actions, but to rely on that authority in the faee of the
repeal statute invited a major collision with Congress. The House of
Representatives had already passed legislation to requil'e a two-thirds majority
of the Court to invalidate a federal gtatute, and some of the more assertive
Radicals wanted to abolish the Court.
During this same period, when the Court was very vulnerable, Congress
passed legislation to remove from federal and state courts their jurisdiction to
hear other cases arising from the Civil War. The legislation responded to the
Court's decision in & parte MilliglJ1J" 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866), holding that
military courts couJd not function in states where federal courts bad been open
and operating. Although cases were already pending with regard to the conduct
of U.S. officials during and immediately after the war, Congress gave indemnity
to all omcials who implemented presidential proclamations from March 4, 1861,
to June 30, 1866, with respect to martial law and military trials. The statute
provides: "And no civil ccurt of the United States, or of any State, or of. the
District of Columbia, or of any district or territory of the United States, shall
have or take jurisdiction or, or in any manner reverse any of the proceedings
bad or acts diPle 88 aforesaid ....• 14 Stat. 432, 433 (1867).

Shortly after McCardle, the Supremo Court decided a case which involved
congressional attempt to use the, appropriations power to nUllify the
President's power to pardon. The Court said that Congress had exceeded its
8

I WlICdrt v. DaUwtYt 8 DaD. 3' J (1796); Durousseau Y. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.)
306 (1810); 'Barry v. Mercein, 0 How. loa, 119 (1847); Daniels Y. Railroad Co., 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1866).
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authority, first by trying to limit a presidential power granted by the
Constitution, and second by preventing a presidential pardon or amnesty from
being admitted as evidence in court.' The intent of the statute was to strip the
Court of its jurisdiction over such eases. The Court agreed that the Exceptions
Clause gave Congreas the power to deny the right of appeal in a particular class
or C8.8e8, but it could not withhold appellate jurisdiction "as a means to an end"
if the end was forbidden under the Constitution. In this ease, the efl"ect of
withholding appellate jurisdiction was to prescribe impermissible rules of
decision for the judiciary in a pending case. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128, 146 (1872).
Cases decided after McCardle and· Klein have discussed the power of
Congress to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, provided that
other provisions of the Constitution are given due regard.2 The Court has
allowed Congress to limit the availability of certain judicial remedies, sueh 88
prohibiting district courts from issuing injunctions to control labor disputes or
the enforcement of price regulations. Laufv. E.G. Shinner It Co., 303 U.S. 323
(1938); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1942). Although Congress has
withdrawnjurisdietion from lower federal courts to adjudicate certain issues, the
exercise of that power -is subject to compliance with at least the requirements
of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress has the undoubted
po\Ver to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the
Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power 88 to deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private property
without just compensation." Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254,
257 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).

An appropriations bill enacted in 1989 raised a possible violation of Klein.
The bill stated that Congress determined and directed that the management oC
forests covered. by previous legislation was -adequate consideration for the
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements- that were the basis for two
pending lawsuits. The Ninth Circuit held that ilie language in the
appropriations bUI was unconstitutional under Klein beeauae it attempted to
direct courts to reach a particular decision, but a unanimous Supreme Court
disagreed, concluding that the language in the appropriations merely changed
the law underlying the litigation. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.s.
429 (1992).

A 1996 decision by the Supreme Court concerned a possible cballenge to the
Exceptions Clause. A congressiona1statute placed limits on prisoners who seek
to make successive habeas petitions to the Court. Such petitions must first be
approved by a three-judge panel. The Court unanimously upheld the statute.
Felker v. Turpin, 116 S.Ct. 2333 (1996).

:I United states v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 893, 899-400 (1908). See &leo The 'Tnmcis
Wright,- 106 U.S. 381, 386 (1881) and Kline v. Burke CoDat. Co., 280 U,S. 226, 284

(1922).
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B. Impeachment of Judles
The Constitution provides in Article n, Section 4, that the President, the
Vice President, "and all eivil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." Impeachment is done by majority vote in the HOU8e
of Representatives; cOD\-iction in the Senate requires a two-thirds :m.aJority.
The first federal judge subject to the impeaehment process was Judge John
Pickering, who was removed in 1805. Impeachment efforts against Justice
Samuel Chase (in 1805) and Judge James H. Peck (1830-31) failed. Judge West
H. Humphreys was impeached and removed from office in 1862. In the
twentieth century, an etTort to impeach Judge Charles Swayne failed in'1905,
Judge Robert W. Archbald was impeached and removed in 1913, Judge Harold
Louderback survived an impeaebment trial in 1933, and Judge Halsted L. Ritter
was impeached and removed in 1936. The three most recent impeachment
. efforts led to the removal of Judges Harry E. Claiborne (1986), Walter Nixon
(1989), and Alcee L. Hastings (1989).
Vanous grounds were cited for the impeachment of these juciges. Judge
Pickering was impeached and removed because of his handling of 8 case
involving the ship Eliza and because of alcoholism. In the trial of the Eliza,
Judge Pickering was accused of intoxication and the use of ofTell3ive language.
, or the four articles of impeachment presented to the Senate, three dealt with
Eliza. Article 1 described. the allegedly improper return of the ship and cargo
to the owner; Article 2 claimed that Pickering's return of the vessel was
contrary to the law and a deprivation of revenue to the United States; and
Article 3 charged that his refusal to allow an appeal derived from his "wickedly
meaning and intending to iqjure the revenue of the United States."s He was
convicted on all four artieles of impeachment;'
Much of the impetus behind the impeachment of Justice Chase reJated to
his intemperate, partisan, and arbitrary behavior while on the bench. He was
also charged, in his capacity as federal judge, with failing to comply with
Virginia state lows. The cbarges against Judge Peck concerned a single issue:
his decision to hold an individual in contempt of court and sentence him to jail.'
Seven artieles of impeachment were brought ~nst Judge Humphreys,
including failure to bold court, gross misconduct, and treason for organizing
armed rebellion against the United States. The unsuccessful charges against
Judge Swayne of Florida focused on making unlawfUl claims for expenses, living
in Delaware in defiance of federal law requiring judges to reside in their
districts, and punishing three men for contempt of court.

8 Eleanore Buslmell, Crima, FoUiu and Milrfortuna: "'Iu! Federal Impeaelrmmt
'J'riaz. 4lS-46 (1992).
4 Id. at 52.
l

, Id. at 80-61,93-96.
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Judge Archbald was impeached and removed on grounds of personal
corruption (using his office for personal profit). Judge Louderback was accused
of favoritiam in awarding receiverships to supervise ailing companies. None of
the five articles of impeachment came close to tbe two-thirds required in the
Senate. Judge Ritter, accused oC practicing law after he bad become a federal
judge, was impeacbed and removed.
The three impeachment trials of the 19808 concerned judges who had been
prosecuted for criminal conduct. Two of the judges were convicted: Clairbome
for tax evasion and Nixon for perjury. Judge Hastings, after being acquitted in .
a bribery ease, faced charges by ajudicial council that he had committed bribery
and should be removed from office. The Judicial Conference recommended to
the House of Representatives that Hastings be impeached.

c.

Constitutional Amendments

On four occasions, Congress bas used constitutional amendments to reverse
Supreme Court decisions. The Eleventh Amendment responded to Chisholmv.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which decided that a state could be sued in
federal court by a plaintiff from another state. To protect states from a flood
of costly citizen SUits, Congress passed a constitutional amendment which was
subsequently ratified to provide that "The J'ldicial power of the United States
shall not be' construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted. against one of the United States by Citizens of another State~ or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
The Fourteenth Amendment nullified the Supreme Court's decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford (1857), which beld that blacks as a class were not citizens
protected under the Constitution. Section 1 of the Amendment provides: "All
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and oCthe State wh.erein they reside."

The Sixteenth Amendment overruled Pollack v. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which struck down a federal income tax. Ratifiedjn

1916, the amendment gave Congreas the power "to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
The Twenty-sixth Amendment was. ratified in 1971 to overturn Oregon v.
MitcMU, 400 U.s. 112 (1970), a Supreme Court d~ision that had voided a
congressional effort to lower the minimum voting ag~ in state elections to 18.
Congre. sent a constitutional amendment to the states and, in record time,
three months later, a sumcient number of states ratified this language: "The
rightorcitiz8M aftha United States, who are eighteen years ofap or older, to
vote .hall Dot be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on
account ot age,"

.

Ull8ueceRful constitutional amendments can sometimes prod the Court to
addreH neglected _uee. In 1970, the House of Representatives 'paased the
Equal Ripta Amendment. After Senate action, the language sent to the states
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tor ratification read: "Equality of rights under the law shall _.)t be denied 01"
, abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." The ERA was
never ratified, but the debate on the amendment highlighted what many
legislators thought were inadequacies in judicial rulings. Congresswoman
Martha Griffiths, during debate in October 1971, said that the whole purpose
of the ERA was to tell the Supreme Court: "Wake up! This is the 20th century.
Before it is over, judge women 88 individual human beings." 117 Cong. Rec.
35323 (1971). A month later, the Court invalidated an Idaho law that preferred
men over women in administering estates. Reed v. Reed, 404 'U.S. 71 (1971).
The decision marked the first time in its history that the Court had struck down
sex discrimination on constitutional grounds.
In addition to constitutional amendments aimed at particular decisions,
there have been other proposals aimed at curbing the Court's strength by
imposing certain procedural requirements. These amendments have in every
instance been unsuccessful. Of recurring interest are the following: requiring
more than a 1lU\iority of Justices to etrike down a statute; subjecting the Court's
decisions to another tribunal, i:luch as the Senate or a judicial body consisting
of a judge from each state; submitting the Court's decisions to popular
referenda; allowing Congress by two-thirds vote to override a Court decision just
as it does a presidential veto; and making laws held unconstitutional by the
Court valid if reenacted by Congress.
Other proposed amendments are directed at the Court's tenure and
qualifications: allowing the removal of Supreme Court justices and other federal
judges by majority vote of each House of Congress; restricting the term of a
justice to a set number of years; having justices retire at the age of '75 years;
requiring direct election from the judicial districts; itemizing the qualifieations
ofjustices, such as requiring prior judicial service in the highest court of a state
or excluding anyone who has, within the preceding five years, served in the
executive or legislative branch; and vesting the appointment of Justices in
judges from the highest state courts.6

D. Case 01' Controversy Test
Article m limits judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." The case-orcontroversy standard restricts federal courts "to questions presented in an
adversary context and in a form. historically "iewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process.- Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). By finding
that a legal dispute is not a case or controversy, courts can push political
controversies back to the elected branches for resolution. In deciding that a
dispute is not 8 ease or controversy, judges can determine that a litigant does
not have standing to sue. By lowering the barrier for standing, courts can
encourage more lawsuits and risk collisions with other branches ot government.
Justice Powell warned that a relaxed standing poJicy would expand judicial

e Mau.rioe Culp, •A Survey of the Proposals to Limit or Deny the Power of Judicial
Review by the Supreme Court ot the United States: 4 Ind. L. J. 386 (1929); Shelden D.
EUiott, ·Court-Curbin, PIOJ)OIa1I in Con,gras,' 88 Notre Dame Lawyer 597, 606 (1958).
I,
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power: "It seems to be inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or. citizen
.standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level,
with a shift away from a democratic Corm oCgovemmenf:..- United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (concuning opinion).
Litigants able to establish standing may find their personal stake diluted
or eliminated by subsequent events" to the point that the case is moot and
therefore dismissed. If the judieiary is unprepared or unwilling to decide an
issue, perhaps to avoid a contlict with elected branches, mootness is one remedy.
In 1981. it appeared that the Supreme Court might have to decide the
constitutionality oC a pocket veto by President Reagan. Instead, the Court held
that the dispute was moot and therefore retumed the issue to Congress and the
President Cor possible resolution. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1981).

Just as a ease brought too late can be moot, a case brought too early may
not yet be ripe for judicial determination. A collision between certain Members
oC Congress and President Bush in .1990 over the war power was avoided by a
federal court on the ground that ·the issue was not ripe for adjudication.
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F .supp. 1141 <D.D.C. 1990).

E. PoUtical Questions
A

~umber

oC important constitutional questions are resolved wholly by

Congrps and the President because the Court regards them as ·political
questions" unsuited for the judiciary. Efforts to litigate certain issues are
unsuccessful if the Court decides that it is impolitic or inexpedient to· take
juriSdiction.
.
The Statement and Account Clause provides that wa regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shali be published
from time to time." U.S. Const., art, I, § 9, c1: 6. The purpose was to provide
citizens with a regular accounting of public spending. However, funding for the
Central Intelligence Agency and other parts of the intelligence community, with
an aggregate budget of about $30 billion, has not been made public since 1949.
In 1974, the Court declined an opportunity to decide the meaning oC this
eonmtutional p-tovision, holding that the litigant lacked standing to bring the
issue. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.s. 166 (1974). As a result, the
meaning or the Statement and Account Clause depends on whatever the
executive and legislative branches decide.

'!be Constitution prohibita Members of either House from holding any
other civil office. Called the Incompatibility Clause, the language provides that
~o Penon holding any OMee under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during hi. COntinuance in Offiee.·' U.S. Const., art. It § 6, cl. 2.
The Incompatibility Claus8has exiated lor more than two centuries without any
deiinition or application by federal courts. When the issue reached the Supreme
Court in 1974, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the
eu8. Schlesinger v. Relervlltl to Stop the ,War, 418 U.S. 209 (1974).
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The Constitution prohibits Members of Congreao ':"rom being ap!,ointed to
-any federal position whose salary has been increased during their term of office.
The constitutionallanguagfJ, called the Ineligibility Clause, provides that "No
Senator or Representative fJbali, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Offi,,:e under which the Authority of the United States,
which shan have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
increased during such time." U.S. Const., art. I, § 6, cl. 2. Interpretations of this
provision by Congress and the executive branch have far outweighed
contributions from the courts. Efforts to litigate the iesue have been
unsuccessful, either bec~.use the plaintiff lacked standing or because a court
decided not to decide. &, parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); McClure v. Carter,
513 F.Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981), afrd Bub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S.
1025 (1981).
Members of Cong7:ess have gone to court to contest military initiatives by
the President, but tht.)se efforts are regularly turned aside by federal jud~.
Throughout the Viet,.l8Dl War, such cases were regarded as political questions
to be resolved solely by the elected branches.7 By the time of the Reagan and
Bush years, federal judges offered other reasons to avoid decisions on such
disputes: the issue was moot; it was not ripe; plaintiffs lacked standing; a
variety of doctrinefJ on judicial prudence and "equitable discretion;" and a finding
of nonjusticiability because judicial resolution would require fact-finding better
done by Congre~.8 For the most part, constitutional questions of war and
peace are left trJ the legislative and executive branches.

II. The Issue of Judicial Supremacy
Particularly in the twentieth century, scholars, judges, and sometimes
Members of Congress claim that the U.S. Supreme Court bas the -last word" on
the meaning of the Constitution. Under this theory, if Congress disagrees with
a Court ruling the only alternative is to p9SS a constitutional amendment to
.overturn the Court. This claim of judicial supremaey overlooks much or the
flexibility and political considerations that characterize the relationship between
the judiciary and other elements of the political system; Congress, the President,
the states, and the geueral public.

'I E.g., LuNg v. McNamara, 373 F ~ 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Velve! v. JohnaoD, 287
F.Supp. 846 (D!KaDs. 1968); Berk v. Laird, 317 F.Supp. '115 (E.D. N.Y. 19'10); Orlando
v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); AtJee v. Laird, 347 F.Sapp. 689 (E.D. Pat 1972);
Gravel v. Laird, 347 F.Supp. '1 (D.D.C. 1972); DaCosta v. Laird, 471l.2d 1146 (?At Cir.
1978); aDd Mitchell v. lAIird, 488l.2d 811 (D.D.C. 1973).

• M~: Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985). ripeDEl88: DeUums
Bush, 762 F.Supp. 1141, 1149-62 <D.D.r.. 1990); standiDg: Doman v. U.S. Secretary
or Det..., 861 F.2'd 4SO (D.C. Cir. I~J, Judicial prudence and equitable discretion:
Lotn; v. BeapD. 678 r.supp. 388, 837-89 (D.D.C. 1987); CoDy8l'8 v. Reap.n. 578
r.Supp. 324 <D.D.C. 1984); ooDjuatieiabiUt;y: Crockett v. Reap.n, 558 F.Supp. 898. 898
(D.D.C. 1982); 81dlChe1..r.piDou v. Reagan, 588 r.supp. 696, eoo <D.D.C. 1988).
"I.
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There are many examples ofjudieial opinions being challenged aDd reversed
through means other than constitutional amendments. Congress regularly
overturns judicial rulings that involve statutory interpretations ("Statutory'
Reversals," treated in a subsequent section), but even when the Court renders
a constitutional interpretation there are many methods available to Congress to
counter the Court.

A. Judicial Posltio:Q.8 on FlDality
Justices of the Supreme Court have taken different p~sitions regarding the
titiality of Court decisions. Some see a decision 88 wholly binding on noDjudicial
parties, including Congress. Others leave room for a sharing of jurisdiction
among federal institutions over statutory and conatitutional questions.
Justice Robert H. Jackson once said: "We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are (mal." Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (1953). However, the record oC the last two centuries
demonstrates convincingly that the Supreme Court is neither infallible nor final.
Its decisions are regularly reshaped by other political institutions, both at the
nation&! and the state levels. In a speech, Jackson acknowledged the force of
politics and majority rule in the shaping of constitutional values:
... let us not deceive ourselves; long-sustained publie opinion does influence the
process of constitutional interpretation. Each new member of the ever..
changing pe1'8Onnel of our courts brings to his task the aa8UmptioDB and
accustomed thought of a later period. The praetical play of the forees of
politics is such that judicial power has often de1ayed but never permanently
defeated the persistent will of a substantiallDl\iority.9

To Justice Frankfurter, "the ultimate touebstone- of cOnstitutionality is :the
Constitution itself and 110t what we have said about it-" Graves v. New York ex
reI. O'Keefe, 806 U.S. 466, 491·92 (1939). Before joining the Court, he put the
point more bluntly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt: "People have been taught
to believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it i.e not they who speak. but .the
Constitution, whereas, of course, in 80 many vital cases, it is they who speak and
not the Constitution.ltlO
Chief Justice Earl Warren cautioned against an ovetteliance on the courts
Cor the protection of constitutional rights. In an article in 1962 he spoke with
regret about Hirobayashi v. United Statu, 320 U.s. 81 (1943), in which the
Court unanimously upheld a curfew order directed against more than 100,000
Japanese-Americans, about tw~thirds of them naturally born United States
citizens. Warren said that the "fact that the Court rules in a case like

• Robert H. JacUoD, -:Maintaining Our :Freedom&: The Bole of the Judiciary,"
deUveJed to the American Bar Asaoclation, BoatoD, :Ma.., August 24, 1963; reprinted in
Wltll 8pe«:hu, No. 24, Vol. XIX, p. 761 (October 1, 1963).
.
10

(1967).

Max Preeclman, anno.;
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Hirabaya,tlhi that a given program is constituw· .naI, does not neees8arilyanswer
the question whether, in a broader sense, it actualJy is." k l Warren, -rile Bill
of Rights and the Military,- 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 193 (1962). The Co\irt's
failure to invalidate 8 governmental action did not, by itself, mean that
constitutional standards had been followed. Warren emphasized that in a
democratie society, "it is still the Legislature and the elected Executive who have
the primary responsibility for fashioning and executing polley consistent with
the Constitution." Id. at 202. He even warned against depending two much on
Congress and the President: "[T]be day-to-day job of upholding the Cor..stitution
really lies elsewhere. It rests, realistically, on the shoulders of every ei~en.·

Id.

At certairipoints in our constitutional history, there has been a compelling
need for an authoritative and binding decision by the Supreme Court. The
unanimous ruling in 1958, signed by each justice, was essential in dealing with
the Little Rock desegregation crisis. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.8. 1 (1958).
. Another unanimous decision in 1974 disposed of the confrontation between
President Nixon and the judiciary regarding the Watergate tapes. United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For the most part, however, court decisions are
tentative and reversible like other political events.
On February 19, 1997, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on the
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which Congress
enacted in 1993 in response to Employment Di.r.sion v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). Justice O'Connor asked one of the attorneys: "Do you agree that
Congre8& can't overruletbe court's interpretation of the Constitution?" The
attorney replied: "We agree." 65 LW 3579. Examples will be provided in this
paper where Congress does, in effect, overrule the court's interpretation of the
Constitution.

B. The "Binding Precedent" of Marbury
The Supreme Coun's 1803 opinion in Marbury v. MadL-ffOn is the most
famous case for the proposition that the Court is supreme OD \:!)nstitutional
questions. Chief Justice John Marshall stated that it is "emphatics!!y the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is: 6 U.8. (1
Cr.) 137, 177 (1803). When this statement is placed in context, both legal and
political, there is le88 sweep to Marshall's words than contemporary authors
often impJy. Nonetheless, Marbury is often cited by the Court as evidence that
it alone delivers the "fmal word" on the meaning of the CoDStitution. According
to a 1958 decision, Marbury "declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution: Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The Court reasserted this principle in 1962:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether action of that branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation md a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of thq Constitution." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.s. 186, 211 (1962). In a
1969 decision, the Court referred to itself as the "ultimate interpreter" of the
Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
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"Ultimate interpreter" does not mean exclusive interpreter. The courts
expect other branches of govermnent to interpret the Constituti~n in their
initial deliberations. As the Court noted - m. 19'14: -In the - performance of
888igned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially
interpret the COllstitution, and the interpretation ot its powers by any branch
is due great respect from the others." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.,8. 683, 703
(1974).
The meaning of Ma.rbury has been debated in recent confirmation hearings
Cor Supreme Court justices. In 1986, when Justice William H. Rehnquist
appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee 88 nominee for Chief Justice7
Senator Arlen Specter iaquired about the "inding precedent" of Marbury. He
asked Rehnquist whether the Court "is the tinal arbiter, the final decision maker
otwhat the Constitution meaDS." Rehnquist replied: WUnquestionably." Spect3r
pursued the point. If the Court ruled on a legal issue, would the President and

Congress "have a responsibility to observe the decisions of the Supreme Court
or the United States on a constitutione! matter?" Rehnquist answered: "Yes, I
think they do." "Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rebnquist," hearings
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99tb Cong., 2nd Sess. 187 (1986).
The same question, put to Supreme Court nominees Antonio Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, yielded different and more
measured responses. In his 1986 confirmation hearings, Scalia was asked by
Senator Strom Thurmond: "Do you agree that Marbury requires the President
and Congress to always adhere to the Court-s interpretation oC the
Constitution?" Conceding that the case was one oCthe tlgreat pillars of American
law,· Scalia hesitated to say whether "in DO instance can either ot the other
branche8 call into question the action or the Supreme Court." "Nomination of
Judge Antonin Scalia," hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2nd Se88. 33 (1986). In this exchange, Scalia declined to state that
the Court is the exclusive, final authority on constit-.1tional questions.
A year later, Senator Specter and his colleagues on the committee listened
to Anthony Kennedy challenge the Dotion ofjudicial supremaey. In 1982, while
serving as a federal appellate judge in the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy had already
expreased his view that other brancbes of government play major roles in
interpreting the Constitution. He stated at that time: WAs I have pointed out,
the Constitution, in some of its most critical aspects, is what the political
hrmches of the government have made it, whether the judiciary approves or
Dot." "Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States," bearings before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1987).
At the hearings in 1987, Kennedy explained to the committee that in such
areas 88 separation of powers, the omce of the presidency, the commerce clause,
and federalism, the meaning
the Constitution depends largely on the
judgmenta at the executive and legislative branches, not the Court. Although
be agreed that Supreme Court decisions are the law of the land and must be
obeyed, he W81, "somewhat reluctaDt to say that, in all circumstances each
legislator is immediately bound by the tull circumstances of a Supreme Court

or
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decree." Id. at 221-22. He gave the i" !lowing example. If the Supreme Court
were to llverrule New YorA Times v. Sullivan, exposing newspapers Cully to libel
.suits, Kennedy said that legislators should challenge the Court: "I think you
could stand up on the floor of the U.S. Senate and 88y I am introducing this
legislation because in my view the Supl'eme Court of the United States is 180
degrees wrong under the Constitution." Id. at 222-23.
In her nomination hearings in 1993, Ruth Bader Ginsburg told the Senate
Judiciary Committee that Justices "do not guard constitutional rights alone.
Courts share that profound responsibility with Congress, the President, the
States, and the people. Constant realization of a more perfect Union, the
Constitution's aspiration, requires the widest, broadest, deepest participation on
matters of government and government policy." "Nomination of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme ColL.--t of the United States,·
hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, l03rd Cong., 1st Sess.
50 (1993).
· c~

The Scope and Reach of Marbury

No specific language in the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the
power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress or the President. Several
delegates at the constitutional convention at Philadelphia spoke in favor of
judicial review when invoked against st¢e laws. State actionS inconsistent with
the U.S. Constitution "would clearly not be valid," said Gouverneur Morris, and
judges "would consider them as null "void." 2 The Records of the Federal
Convention 92 (Max Farrand 00. 1937).
tludicial review over Congress and the President, as coequal branches, is
much more difficult to establish. The Court would need power to strike down
congressional legislation that threatened the integrity or existence of the
judiciary. Such actions oC self-defense were part of the system of cheeks and
balances and separation of powers. Beyond those justifications, the picture was
unclear.
From 1789 to 1803, several precedents SUggesk"'Cl a broader role for judicial
review when applied to congressional and presidential actions. A statute
enacted in 1792 required federal judges to serve as commissioners on claims
settlement. Since their decisions could be set aside by the Secretary of War,
judges were essentially issuing ·advisory opinions· and serving in a subordinate
capacity to executive officials.
Before the Court could rule on the
constitutionality of the statute, Congress repealed the otTending seetiona and
removed the Secretary's authority to veto decisions rendered by federal
judges.ll

In 1796, the Court upheld a carriage tax passed by Congress. Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). If the Court had the power to uphold
II 1 Stat. 243-46 (1792); Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DaD.) 409 (1792); 1 Stat. 324-25
(1793).
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a congressional statute, presumably it had the power to strike one down.
Justices of the Court remained uncertain about their authority to invalidate
congressional statutes. Justice Chase, writing in this. case, said it was
unnecessary -01 this time, for me to determine, whether this court,
constitutionally POB8e88eS the power to declare an act of Congress void •.• but if
the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but
in a very cleo,. case.ft Id. at 175 (emphasis in original). As late as 1800, the
Court was still \Insure about its authority to invalidate an set of Congress.
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800).
Chief Justice Marshall's decision in MtJrbury represents what many regard

as the definitive basis for judicial review over congressional and presidential
actioos. But Marshall's· opinion stands for a much more modest claim. He
stated that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to. say what the law is.ft 6 U.s. (1 Cr.) at 177. So it is, but Congress and the
President are also empowered under the Constitution to "say what the law is.Marshall's statement can stand only Cor the proposition that the Court is
respoosible for stating what it thinks a statute means, after which Congress
may enact another law to override the Court's interpretation. The Court state.
what the law is on the day the decision comes down; the law may change later.
Several examples of this institutional interplay will be identified in this report.
It is evident that Marshall did not think he was powerful enough in 1803
to give orders to Congress and the President. He realized that he could not
uphold the constitutionality of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and direct
Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commissions to the disappointed
would-be judges. President Thomas Jefferson and Madison would have ignored
such an order. 12 Everyone Jmew that, including Marshall. As Chief Justice
Warren Burger noted, "The Court could stand hard blows, but not ridicule, and
the ale houses would rock with hilarious laughter- had Marshall issued a
mandamus that the Jefferson administration ignored.-18
Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that Marshall believed that the
Court was supreme on constitutional interpretation. The impeachment hearings
of Judge Pickering and Justice Chase add to these doubts. Marbury was issued
on February 24, 1803. The House impeached Pickering on March 2, 1803 and
the Senate convicted him on March 12, 1804. As soon 88 -the House impeached
Pickering, it turned its guns on Chase. If that move succeeded, Marsball had
reason to believe he was next in line.

With these threats presaing upon the Court, Marshall wrote to Chase on
January 23, 1864, suggesting that Members of Congreaa did not have to impeacb
J2 2 Oeorp L. HasJd.... Het'bart A. JohDaOD, HUID"1 of tIut Supreme Court of tIut
Unit«l 8~ 185 (1981); 8 Albert J. Bevaridp, The life of,John, ManluJll 126-27

(1919).
I. WarreD E. BUJ'88ft ..". Doctrine or Judicial Review: Mr. !IarahaJl, Mr. JetT8I'mD,
ad 1&. MaIbur.Y: iD Vkw. Ftom 1M &nd& 14-·(M'ark Cannon & David'O'BrieD ada.

1986).
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judges because they objectee;. • l their judicial opinions. Instead, Congress could
simply review and reverse objectionable decisions through the regular legislative
process. Here is ~1ar8ha1I'slanguage in a letter to Chase:
I think the m.odern doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate
jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed
unsound by the legislature would certaiD.Jy better comport with the mlldneaa
of our cbaracter than [would] a removal of the Judge who has rendered them.
unknow.ing of his fault.]4

The use of impeachment to punish the Court for issuing unsound decisions
bas precedent dating back to such prominent works as Federalist No. 81, in
which Alexander Hamilton denied that there was great danger of the judiciary
encroaching upon executive authority. Congress bad adequate checks to rein in
an overactive Court:
[T]he inference is greatly fortified by the consideration of the important
constitutional check wbichthe power of instituting impeachments in one part
of the legislative body, and of determining upon them in the other, would give
to that body upon the members of the judicial department. 'nUs is alone a
romplete security. There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of
deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the
united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was poaBesae II
of the means of punishing their presumption, by degrading them. from their
. stations. Iii

As to the scope and reach of Marbury, it is highly significant that Marshall
never again struck down a congressional statute during his long tenure. lasting
to 1885. Instead, he played a consistently supportive roJe in upholding
congressional power. After Marbury, Marshall upheld the power of Congress to
exercise its commerce power, to create a U.S. Bank, and to discharge other
constitutional responsibilities, whether express or implied, without being secondguessed by the Court. The judiciary functioned as a yea-saying. not a negative,
branch. As Professor Walter Murphy has written, Tor his part, Marshall in
Marbury never claimed ajudicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation, nor
did he allege judicial supremacy, only authority to interpret the Constitution in
cases before the Court.tllS

14

3 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John. MorshoJl177 (1919).

J6

The.Federalist l)()8..O9 (BeJijamin Fletcher Wright ed. 196!) .

Walter Murphy, "Why Ma.r6ury MattenJ,w 1 Constitution 62, 68 (1989). For an
tha. wncludes that Marbury did not veat in the Court the fiDal authority to
interpret the CoDStitution, see Robert Clinton, Jla.t6u.ry v. MtJdUon. and Judicial Review
(1989), Another detailed critique Marshall's reasoning in Mtriury is by William W.
Van AJatyDe, wA Critieal Guide to MGtbul"1 v. MotliMm: 1969 Duke L.l. 1.
•1
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lB. PoHtical and Legislative Pressures ..
Other than the eheckS ezpreaely stated in the Constitution, Cederal courts
are subject to constraints that arise through the regular functioning oC the
political system. These limitations operate not only when courts sustain the
constitutionality oC a statute but when they declare it to be invalid.

A. When the Court Upholds Coll8tltutionaliiy
When the Court decides that a congressional statute or a presidential action
is constitutional, the controversy may remain open for different treatments by
the legislative and executive branches.

u.s.

Bank. In 1832, President Andrew Jackson received a bill to
recharter the United States Bank. Several Presidents before him and previous
Congresses bad decided that the bank was constitutional. In McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819), the Supreme Court ruled that the
bank was constitutional. Nevertheless, Jackson vetoed the bill on the ground
that it was unconstitutional. In his veto message, he aaid that he bad tal.ten an
oath of office to support the Constitution "88 he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others. The opinion DC juJges, he said,
II

has no more authority over CoDgNBB than the opinion of Congress bad over

the judges, and on that point the President is ind.epend.e1lt of both. The
authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control
the Co~ or the Executive when ading in their legislative capacities, but
to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. 17

Jackson's position on the veto power has been followed by all subsequent
Presidents. Regardless oCthe constitutional decisions reached by Congress and
the courts, Presidents may independently analyze the constitutionality of bills
presented to them.

Independent Coul&tlel. Presidents Reagan and Clinton signed
legislation creating and reauthorizing the office oC independent counsel. In
Mo11"i8on v. Olllon, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Supreme Court uphelci the
conatitutionality of the independent counsel statute. Despite those actions,
President Clinton or any future President retains the independence to veto a
reauthorization bill on the ground that the office DC independent counsel
encroaches upon the executive power granted to the President by the
Constitution. Similarly, Congress could decide at the nen reauthorization mage
that the office oC independent counsel violates the Constitution. The bolding oC
Morrison simply means that Congress and the President are at liberty to create
this office if they want to. Both brancbes retain an independent capacity to
rethink the constitutionality c~ the statute.

1'1 8 A Compilation of the 14. . . . and Ptipen 0{ the P1widen.ttI 1145 (James D.
lUchard8oD. ed. 1897).
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Women'. m.,,;lt•• In 1873, the Supreme Court held that denying women
the right to practice law was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of privileges and immunities. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (l6 Wall.)
130 (1873). State courts reached similar conclusions in rejecting the efforts of
women to practice law. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875). In 1878, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed a bill to remove legal disabilities that prevented
women from practicing law. When asked whether the question had ever been
brought before the Supreme Court, Congre88Dl8D. Roderick Butler replied: "It
has; and they have decided that as the law now stands women eannot be
admitted." 7 Congo Rec. l285. The bili passed the House by a margin of 169 to
87.
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill adversely, arguing that
the Supreme Court and every other federal eourt are authorized to make their
own rules regulating the admission of persons to practice, "so that there is now
no obstacle of law whatever to the admission of women to practice in those
courts." 7 Congo Roo. 1821. Senator Joseph MeDonald eoneeded that the Court
might change ita rules to permit women to praetiee before it, "but as it does not
seem inclined to do so, I do not think it i8 wrong for us to prescribe in this ease
a rule fo~ the Supreme Court,," 8 Cong. Bee. 1083. Senator George Hoar
rejected the argument that the Supreme Court should be left alone to decide by
its own rules who may practice before it: "Now, with the greatest respeet for
that tribunal, I conceive that the law-making and not the law-expoundingpower
in this Government ought to determine the question what class of citizens shall
be clothed with the office of the advocate." Id. at 1084. The bill passed the
Senate, 39 to 20. As enacted into law, the bill provided that any woman 'Who
shall have been a member of the bar of the highest court of any State or
Territory or of the S~preme Court of the District of Columbia for the space of
three years, and shall have maintained a good standing before sueh court, and
who shall be a person of good moral character, 8hall, on motion, and the
production of sueh reeord, be admitted to praetiee before the Supreme Court of
the United States."' 20 Stat. 292 (1879).

Fi7UJncial Pri~. In 1972, agents from the Treasury Department's
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau presented grandjury subpoenas to two
banks in which a suspect maintained accounts. Without advising the depositor
that subpoenas had been served, the banks supplied the government with
microfilms of cheeks, deposit slips, and other records. The Supreme Court held
that a Fourth Amendment interest could not be vindicated in court by
challenging such 8 subpoena. The Court treated the materials 88 busineB8
l'eeords of a bank, not private papers or a person. United States v. Miller, 425
U.s. 435, 438 (1976).
Congress responded by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.
92 Stat. 3617 (1978). Congressman Charles Whalen explained that the primary
purpose orthe statute was to prevent warrantless government searches ofbank
81.''' ;redit recorda that reveal the nature of one'. private atTairs. The
Government should not bave access wexcept with the knowledge of the subject
individual or else with· the supervision of the courta.- 124 Cong. Ree. 33810
(1978). CoDgressman JOM Rou1881ot remarked about the re.pol18ibility of
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Congress to redress the shortcomings of the Court's decision: -Another standing
to challenge the release of information in a court of law is provided for in
section 1110, which, 88 a practical matter, reverses the holding in the Miller
case." Id. at 33836. In essence, certain safeguards to Fourth Amendment rights
that were unavailable because of the Supreme Court's decision were DOW
secured by congressional action.

Reeea Appointnumta. Another example of independent legislative and
executive analysis comes from the field of recess appointments. The President's
constitutional authority to make rece88 appointments to the federal courts "W88
upheld by the Second Circuit in 1962 and the Ninth Circuit in 1986.18
Although this practice was upheld in the courts, Congress had expreued
opposition to these appointments. In 1960, the Senate adopted a resolution
objecting to reeess appointments to the courts, and the House Judiciary
Committee conducted a study oCthia type nC appointment. Both Houses pointed
to serious constitutional issues: circumvention of the Senate's role in confirmiDg
regular appointments; judges serving in a recess capacity without the
independence of a liretime appointment; and litigants forced to argue
before a part-time rederaljudge. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Confli.c1albl!ttn!II!D
Congress and the President 43-45 (4th ed. 1997). Because of opposi .
practice, no President since Eisenhower has used the recess appointm
to place someone on the Supreme Court, and no President since Carter ~•.....,.;~
the power to place someone on the lower courts. Similar to the in,d ellmdellt
counsel issue, the courts have told the political branches that they
recess appo~tees on the federal courts if they want to, but if the bnmldJil!ll
constitutional doubts about the practice they can rely on the D!'i~1J"
confirmation process Cor lifetime appointments. The political bran
chosen to do the latter.
ReligioUII Freedom. In 1986, the Supreme Court decided a
involving Captain Simcba Goldman, who was told by the Air Force that bl:':1:rr:::;;tJ
not wear his yarmulke indoors while on duty. The Court u
constitutionality of the Air Force regulation, reasoning that the reguJl8C:::D::! .• _
necessary for military discipline, unity, and order. Goldb-um v. Weil'lbeD!l!!t
U.S. 503 (1986). In effect, Air Force needs outweighed Goldman's free e.I!!tClllI!
of religion. Within a year, Congress attached to a military autbort'za::::z:m
language permitting military personnel to wear conservative, u
religious apparel indoors, provided that it does not interfere with their'-c::t~uy
duties. 101 Stat. 1086-87, sec. 508 (1987). The debate in the Hou
Senate demonstrated that Members of Congress were capable of SDIIdjZDI£
cODstitutiOnal rights and giving greater protection to individuals
available from the Supreme Court.
1

1.

United States v. Alloc:c:o, 306 F.2d 7M (2d eire 1962), cert. denied, 371 U
(1963); United State. Y. Woodley, 751 F .2cll008 (9th Cir. 1986), cen. denied,
1048 (1986).
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B. Wh...

~e

Court FInds UncoDStitutionailty

If'the Court decides that a govermnental action is unconstitutional, it is
usually more difficult for Congress and the President to contest the judiciary.
Congress frequently rewrites legislation to redress deficiencies found by the
courts. But even in this category there are examples of effective legislative and
executive challenges to court rulings.

Sla'IJftI'Y- In his inaugural address in 1857, President James Buchanan
announced that the dispute over slavery in the territories "is a judicial question,
which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before
whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally
settled. To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully
submit, whatever this may be.· Two days later Chief Justice Taney handed
down the Court's decision, holding that Congress could not prohibit slavery in
the territories and that blacks were not U.S. citizens. Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (9 How.) 393 (1857).
Several years earlier, in a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Taney bad
cautioned that any judgment issued by the Court was subject to review by
society and other political institutions. The Court's opinion "upon the
construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is
supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should
hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is
supported. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting).
.
Far from settling the matter and providing the "final word" on the slavery
issue, the Court's decision in 1857 split the country. During the debates of
1858, Senator Stephen A. Douglas supported Dred Scott while his opponent,
Abraham Lincoln, a·ecepted the decib~on only as it affected the particular
litigants. However, he rejected the larger policy questions decided by the Court,
including the issues of slavery in the tenitories and citizenship to blacks. He
considered those parts of the decision a nullity, to be left to political resolution
outside the courts. 2 Collect::.iI Works of Abraham Lincoln 516 (Roy Basler ed.
1953).
Lincoln regarded the Court as a coequal, not a superior, branch of
govemment. In his inaugural address in 1861, he denied that constitutional
questions could be settled solely by the Court. If govermnent policy on "vital
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fIXed" by the Court, "the
people will bave ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically
resigned their Government into the hands or that eminent tribunal."I.
Dred Scot: W'u overturned by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
. Amendments, whicb were ratified from 1865 to 1870. Even before those

l8 7 A Compilation of tM MelI8Q8l18 and Papers of 1M Pmitkntll 8210 (Jamal D.
RfcluudsoD ed. 1897).
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amendments were considered and ratified, Congress and the executive branch
bad already taken action to repudiate the main tenets of the decision. Congress
passed legislation in 1862 to probibit slavery in the territories. 12 Stat. 432.
If Supreme Court decisions on constitutional matters can be overturned only by
,constitutional amendments, it .would seem that someone during the
congressional debate would have objected to overturning Dred Scott by statute.
However, the decision was not even mentioned. Members of Congress never
doubted their constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the territories and
proceeded to announce their independent interpretation, with or without the
Court.
Also in 1862, Attomey General Bates released a long opinion in which he
held that neither color nor race could deny American blacks the right of
citizenship. He pointed out that "freemen of all colors- had voted in some of the
states. The idea of denying citizenship on the ground of color was received by
other nations "with incredulity, if not disgust." The Constitution was -silent
about race as it is about color." With regard to Drecl Scott, he said that the case,
"as it stands of record, does not determine, nor purport to determine," the
question of blacks to be citizens. What Chief J ustice Taney said about
citizenship was pure dicta and ·of no authority as a judicial decision." Bates
concluded: "[Tlhe free man of color, ... if born in the United States, is a citizen
of the United States." 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 413 (1862) (emphasis in original).

Child Labor Legi8lation. In passing the first child labor law in 1916,
Cangress relied on the commerce power. The Supreme Court held that statute
to be unconstitutional. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). The
~ owing year Congress passed legislation again to regulate child labor, this
time relying on its power to tax. When the constituti
ity of this legislation
.sed the Court that
was challenged in court, Solicitor General Beck
congressional statutes should be struck down onl when "an invincible,
irreconcilable, and indubitable repugnancy develops
n a statute and the
C
itutioD." 21 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the
U 'ted S tes: Constitutional Law 51 (emphasis in original). He further stated:
WYnT-aiOD is general---end I believe that it is a m'
ievous one-that the
u::.tClaJ'Y has an unlim.ited power to nullifY a law if . incidental effect is in
of the governrr.ental sphe~ of the enacting
." Id. at 62. It was an
etrOD!Ot15 idea"
t the Court is the "sole guard! and protector of our
OI11It1%;u.t]'lOnal form of government," for that bel ier wo
lead to an impairment
grees
the people of "what may be
ed the constitutional
COE. .em~." Id.
• Beck's importunings were ign
. The Court struck
labor law as well. Bailey v. Drezel Furniture Co., 259
~ , _"

point Congress passed a constitutional amendment in 1924 to give
to
te child labor. 66 Congo Rec. 7295, 10142 (1924). By 1937,
the
36 states had ratified the a
ent, and there was
ua..;'t:Q:_ of
the ad~itional states. After a
collision between the
o:.lIEl'Jmd the
branches throughout the 1930s, Congress retumed to the
it included a child labor pro . .un in the Fair Labor
. 52 Stat. 1067. The issue was taken to the Supreme
Dle :,P DlR!'

46
Cltvrt, which unanimously upheld the child labor section. Uniteo. States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
This record-from 1916 to 1941-was an exceptionally lengthy dialogue
between Congress and the Court, with the legislative branch eventually
prevailing. The Court later admitted that "the history of judicial limitation of
congressional power over commerce, when exercised affirmatively, has been more
largely one of retreat than oCultimate victory." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408,415 (1946). Justice Owen Roberts, who served on the Court from
1930 to 1945 and witnessed many oC the confrontations between the judiciary
and the political branches, commented on the expansion of national power over
economic conditions: "Looking back, it is difficult, to see how the Court could
have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the
country-for what in etTeet was a unified economy." Owen J. Roberts, The
Court and the Constitution 61 (1951).

Sedition. In 1956, the Supreme Court invalidated a state sedition law
because the Smith Act, passed by Congress, regulated the same subject. The
Court concluded that it had been the intent of Congress to occupy the whole
field of sedition. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
The author of the Smith Act, Congressman Howard W. Smith, immediately
denied that he bad ever intended the result reached by the Court. In fact, even
before the Court decided the question, he criticized the holding of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania that the Smith Act preempted state efforts to regulate
sedition. 101 Cong. Rae. 143 (1955). He introduced a bill to prohibit the courts
from construing a congressional statute "as indicating an intent on the part of
Congress to occupy a field in which such act operates, to the exclusion of all
State laws on the same subject matter, unless such act contains an express
provision to that effect." Id. at 31 m.R. 3], 142.
Congressional commIttees reported legislation to permit concurrent
jurisdiction by the federal government and the states in the areas of sedition and
subversion. The legislation would also have prohibited courts from using intent
or implication to decide questions of Cederal preemption over state activities.
These bills were never enacted.20 However, Smith's bill was debated at length
on the House floor in 1958. 104 Congo Rec. 13844-65, 13993-4023, 14138-62
(1958). He explained that the purpose of his bill was to say to the Supreme
Court: "Do not undertake to read the minds of the Congress; we, in the
Congress, think ourselves more capable of knowing our minds than the Supreme
Court.... We ere telling you that when we get ready to repeal a State law or
preempt a field, we will say BO and we will not leave it to the Supreme Court to
guess whether we are or not." Id. at 14139·40. His bill passed the House of
Representatives by the vote 0(241 to 155. Id. at 14162. The measure was never
taken up on the Senate floor •

., H.Rept. 2576, 84th Coo,., 2nd Seal. (1956); S.Rapt. 2117, 84th Cong., 2nd Seas.
(1966); S.Rapt. 22SO, 84th Cong., 2nd Sees. (1966); H.Rept. 1878, 80th Cong., 2nd Seea.
(1968).
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In 1969, these bills were again under consideration.21 Shortly before the
legislation was debated by the House, the Court "distinguished" ita 1956 decision
and held that a state could investigate subversive activities against itself. To
this
ot state and federal sedition laws could coexist. Upbaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959). See also Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.s. 388 (1960). The Court's
modifieation in 1959 satisfied congressional critica, who thought the preemption
doctrine announced in 1956 intruded. upon state sovereignty, and put an end to
the ooafrontation between the judicial and congressional branches.

COIIIJNNu,lUJl InrJe8tigatiolU. In 1970, the House Committee on
Internal Security prepared a report on "Limited Survey of Honoraria Given
Guest Speakers for Engagements at Colleges and Universities." The study
included the names of leftist or antiwar speakers and the amounts they received.
The ACLU obtained a copy of the gPlleys and asked for an injunction. District
Judge GMell ruled that the report served no legislative purpose and was issued
IOlely
the sake of exposure or intimidation. He ordered the Public Printer
and t Superintendent of Documents not to print the report "or any portion,
resta
nt or facsimile thereof," with the possible exceptioD of placing the
report ' the Congressional Record. Hentoffv. Ichord, 318 F.Supp.1175, 1183
(DD.C. 1970). Gesell claimed that "the authority of a congressional committee
to pu
and distribute a report at public expense is not unlimited but is
albj
to judicial review in the light of the circumstances presented." Id. at
1181.
December 14, 1970, the House of Representatives passed a resolution
the courts, in essence, to step back. During the course of the debate,
of Congress ezplained tha.t it was not the practice of the House to
i==S.C
::auUDlOttee report..:; in the CongrelJ3ional Record. 116 Cong. Ree. 41368
oreover, Judge Gesell's order wruns afoul not only of the speech and
uae-article I, section 6--of the Constitution, but obstructs the
t!D!Iadmn of other constitutional commitments of the House as well, including
eection 5, which authorizes each House to determine the rules of its
p:xl'-!!C:Il&8" and requires each House to publish its proceedings." Id.

."I!D
c:.1t-.CI'*I

resolution stated that the Dew committee report was a "restatement"
•OUI one and ordered the Public Printer and the Superintendent of
lb:::..-.:t8 to print and distribute it. With an eye toward Judge Gesell and
o:I~.:w~ might stand in the way, the resolution provided that all persons "are
fc::fIII~':1Ildvised, ordered, and el\ioined to refrain from molesting, intimidating,
ca......1. arresting, imprisoning, or punishing any person_because of his
"~_IO· in" publishing the report. H. Res. 1306, 9lst ,Cong., 2nd Seu. 18
e resolution passed by a large bipartisan margin of 302 to 54. 116
. 41373 (1970). The report was , printed without any further.
i:DII......~ from the judiciary. H.Rept. 1732, 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).

D

• ~...,...~, 86th CoDl-, lit s... (1969); 106 Cong. Bee. 11486-608, 11625-87,
lJ:i58. (1869).
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. c.

JudiclallDvltati0D8

During the 19308 and 19408, after Congre88 and the Court had clashed on
a tax issue, the Supreme Court invited Congress. to pass legislation and
challenge previous rulings: "There is no reason to doubt that this Court may fall
into error as may other branches of the Government. Nothing in the history or
attitude of this Court should give rise to legislative embarrassment if in the
performance of its duty a legisla,t-ive body feels impelled to enact laws which may
require the Court to reexamine its previous judgment or doctrine: Helvering
v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,400-01 (1948). The Court explained that it is less able
than other branches lito extricate itself from error,- because it can reconsider n
matter -only when it is again properly brought before it as a case or
controversy." Id. at 401. By overruling itself, the Court admits its ability on an
earlier occasion to commit error. "Congress and the courts," said Justice Stone,
"both unhappily may falter or be mistaken in the performance of their
constitutional duty." United States v. Butler, 297 U.s. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J't
dissenting).

Commerce Clouse. In 1890, the Supreme Court ruled that a state's
prohibition of intoxicating liquors could not be applied to "original packages" or
kegs. Only after the original package was broken into smeller packages could
the state exercise control. 'I'he Court qualified its opinion by saying that the
states could not exclude incoming articles "without congressional permission."
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, l20 (1890). Within a matter of months, Congress
considered legislation to overturn the decision. During debate, Senator George
Edmunds said that the Opin!ODS of the Supreme Court regarding Congress "are
of no more value to us than ours are to it. We are just as independent of the
Supreme Court of the United States 88 it is of us, and every judge will admit it."
If Members of Congress concluded that the Court had made an error "are we to
stop and say that is the end of the law and the mission of civilization in the
United States for that reason? I take it not." Further consideration by the
Court might produce a different result: "as they have often done, it may be their
mission next year to change their opinion and say that the rule ought to be the
other way." 21 Congo Rac. 4964 (1890).
Congress quickly overturned the Court's decision by passing legislation that
made intoxicating liquors, upon their arrival in a stata or territory, subject. to
the police powers -to the same extent and in the same manner as though such
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not
be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages
or otherwise.tt 26 Stat. 313 (1890). A year later the Court upheld the
constitutionality of this !Jtatute. In 18 Rahrer~ 140 U.S. 546 (1891).

The give-and-take between Congress and the judiciary is illustrated by
another commerce ease" In 1869, the Supreme Court held that states, rather
than Conp'e., could regulate illsur8,nce because it was Dot a "transaction of
commerce." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869). 'nlat holding, along with 150
yean or preeedentt, W88 overturned in 1944 when the Court interpr ~ted the
transaction or iDlUraDce business across state lines as interstate commerce
.ubjeet to congressional regulation. The Court said that Congress had Dot
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intended .to exempt the insurance business from the Sherman Antitrust Act.
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.s. 533 (1944).
The 1944 decision sent a mixed message as to whether the resolution of this
dispute lay solely with the Court or whether Congress could intervene with new
legislation. The Court said that the -real answer before us is to be found in the
Commerce Clause itself and in some of the great eases which interpret it,
implying that the matter was judicial in nature. Id. at 549. And yet the ruling
was conditioned on the -absence of Congressional aetion" and was placed in the
context of "the continued absence of conflicting Congressional action: Id. at
548, 549. Evidently, the "real answer" d\"!l9nded on what Congress decided to
do. If exceptions were to be written into the Sherman Act, "they must come
from the CollgreS8~ not this Court.1t Id. at 561. Congress quickly passed the
McCarren Act, authorizing states to regulate insurance, and the Court
unanimously upheld the statut8. 69 Stat. 33 (1945); Prudential Ina. Co. v.
Beqjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
It

Crimi1lD1. ProceduretJ. A 1957 decision by the Supreme Court involved
aecess by defendants to government fues bearing on their trial. On the basis of
statements by two informers for the FBI, the government prosecuted Clinton
Jencks for failing to state that he was a member of the Communist party. He
asked that the FBI reports be turned over to the trial judge Cor examination to
detennine whether they had value !n impeaching the statements of the two
informers. The Supreme Court went beyond Jencks' request by ordering the
government to produce Cor his illspection all FBI reports "touching the events
and activities" at issue in the trial. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668
(1957). The Court specifically rejected. the option of producing government
documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevance and materiality.
Id. at 669.
In their concurrence, Justices Burton and Harlan believed that Jencks was
only entitled to have the records submitted to the trial judge. A dissent by
Justice Clark, agreeing that the documents should be delivered only to the trial
judge, encouraged Congress to act: "Unless the Congress changes the rule
announced by the Court today, those intelligence agencies oC our Government
engaged in law enforcement may as well close up shop, for the Court bas openEK!
their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman holiday for
rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national secrets:

The Court announced its decision on June 3, 1957. Both Houses of
Congress quickly held hearings and reported remedial legislation. The Jencks
Bill passed the Senate by voice vote on August 26 and pused the House on
August 27 by a vote of 361 to 17. The conference report was adopted with huge
maVoritiea: 74 to 2 in the Senate and 315 to zero ~n the House. The bill became
law on September 2, 1967. The statute provides that in any federal criminal
prosecution, no statement or report in the possession of the government ·which
.was made by a Government witness or prospective Gov.emmentwitneas (other
than the dorendant> to an agent of the· Government shall be the 8ubject oC
subpena, discovery, or inspection unless said witness has testified on direct
examination in the trial ot the ~." If a witness testifies, statements may be
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delivered to the defendant for examination and use unless the United States
claims that the statement contaiDS irrelevant. ,tter, in which case the
statement shall be i118p8Cted by the court in ~ra.. The judge may ucise
irrelevant portions of the statement betore submitting it to the defendant. 71
Stat. 595 (1957).
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
responded to three controversial decisions by the Supreme Court on criminal
procedures. The first held that 81J.8pects must be taken before a magistrate for
arraignment as quickly as possible. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454
(1957). Admissions obtained from suspects during illegal detainment could not
be used against them. The Court made room for congressional involvement by
basing its decision partly on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure enacted
by Congress. The decision thus allowed Congress to enter the arena and modify
the rules. Congress did 80: Title II established six hours as a reasonable period
before arraignment.
In the second ease, the Court beld that confessions by criminal suspects
eould' not be used unless the suspects had been informed of their rights by law
enforcement offieers. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Whether the
DU\iority opinion was based on constitutional principles or statutory rules of
evidence was unclear. The Court referred to a number of constitutional issues
but also referred to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and invited
Congress to contribute its own handiwork. Id. at 463, 467. Congress did so
again: 'Title n allowed for the admissibility of confessions if voluntarily given.
Trial judges would determine the issue of voluntariness after taking into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the confession; including five
elements identified by Congress. 18 U.s.C. 3501.
In the third case, the Court decided that iC an accused was denied the right

to counsel during a poJice lineup, the identification would be inadmissible unless
the in-court identifications had an independent source or the introduction of the
evidence would be barmless error. United States v~ Wade, 388 U.s. 218 (1967).
The Court said that "legislative or othe..- regulations, such as those developed by
the local police departments, [might] eliminate the risks of abuse and
unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings,. but that ·neither Congress nor
the Federal authoriti. have aeen fit to provide a solution." Id. at 239. Title n
provided that eyewitness testimony .-ould be admissible as evidence in any
criminal prosecution, regardless oCwhether the accused bad an attorney present
at the lineup. 18 U.S.C. 3502.

Search and Seizure. In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled that law
enforcement officials could obtain a warrant and enter the premises of a
newspaper to conduct a search for evidence regarding another party. Zurcher
v. Stanton! Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The Court'. approval of third-party
searches and the threat to a free preBS triggered nationwide protests and
conp'e8lional haarinp. The Court, in fact, had invited Congress to act if it
considered the Court's deei8ioD too restrictive on free pre88 riihts. Tb Court
stated that notbin, in the Fourth Amendment prevented legislative or executive
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efforts to establish "nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses oCthe
search warrant procedure." Id. at 567. '

Apparently the word "noneonstitutional" was an efTort to permit the
participation of Congress and the President without jeopardizing the Court's
supposed monopoly on constitutional questions. Yet Congress had to do
precisely what the Court had done: balance the interests oC law enf'oreement
against free press. Legislation in 1980 limited newsroom searehes by requiring,
with certain exceptions, a subpoena instead of the more intrusive warrant. 94
Stat. 1879 (1980). If a newspaper or anyone with a First Amendment interest
is required by subpoena to respond, they BUlTlJnder only the requested
document. Law enforcement officials do not enter their space t.o begin a general
search through files, wastepaper baskets, and other sources.

ReligioUII Freedom. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause permits a state to prohibit sacramental peyote use by Native
American Indians and to deny unemployment beneiits to persons discharged for
such use. State law could prohibit the possession and use of a drug even if it
incidentally prohibits a religious practice, provided that the state law is neutral
and generally applicable to all indi".iduals. Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).

Under this test, there was no need for the state to show a compelling
interest or to use the least restric+..ive meaos, standards that the Court bad
adopted in earlier cases. Could Congress enter the tie,..J and. passlegislatioD that
would give religions greater protection than the Court offered? In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Scalia seemed to invite other branches to protect rights
left unguarded by the courts:
Values that are protected agaiut government interf'erenoe through
enshrinement in the Bill of RiPts are not thereby banished from the political
process. Just as a society that belie'W!B in the negative protection accorded to
the preaa by the First Amendment is likely to euact Jaws that atfirmativ8J.y
foster the dissemination of the printed word, 80 also a society that believes in
the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be spected to be
lOlici.tous of that value in italegiaJation as well. Id. at 890.

In 1993, the House Judiciary Committee, voting 35 to 0, reported a bill to
create a "statutory right" to require the compelling governmental interest teet
in easel in which the Cree uercise of religion has been ]}1.1rdened by a law of
general applicability. H.Rept. 103-88. l03rd Cong., 1st Sees. 1-2 (1993) .. The bill
passed the House under suspension of the rules, which requires a two-thirds
'DU\iority. 139Cong. Bee. H2856-2S63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993). The Senate
Judiciary Committee, by a vote oC 15 to 1, reported the bill Cor floor
considerati~n. S.Rept.l03-11, 103rd Cong., 1st Sese. 2 (1993). On final passage,
tbe bill passed 97, to 2. 139 Cong. R8c. 814351-14368 (dailyed. October 26,
1993); id. at 814461-14468 (daily ed. October 27, 1993). As eDaCted, tbe
Religious Free~om Restoration Act (RFRA) provides that governments mq
aubltantially burden a persciu'. religious exercia8 only if tbey demoDSb'ate 8

compellin, interest and

UI8

the least reStrictive meaDS or furthering that
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interest. 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). A year later, Congress passed legislation to
permit the use of peyote by Native Amer;
during religious ceremonies. 108
Stat. 3125 (1994).
In the years following enactment ofB.FB.A. numerous courts m.ve examined
the constitutionality of the statute. Early in 1995, a district court in Texas held
RFRA to be uDconstitutional, relying OD language from Marbury that it is
"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 8t\y what the
law is." The district court concluded that Congress eannot enact legislation that
has the effect of overturning a Supreme Court decision. Flores v. City of
Boerne, 877 F.Supp. 355, 357 (W.o. Tex.1995). This decision was overturned
a year later by the Fifth Circuit, which said that the executive and legislative
branches -also have both the right and duty to interpret the constitution.1t
Flores v. City of Bourne, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352, 1356 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth
Circuit found nothing unusual about Congress protecting constitutional rights
to a greater degree than the Supreme Court. For example, the Circuit noted
that in 1959 the Supreme Court upheld literacy tests in voting elections; the
.Voting Rights Aet of 1965 prohibited the tests. Id. at la~ (citing Lassiter v.
Northhampton County Bel. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1969». While it is the
judiciary's duty to say what the law is, "that duty is not exclusive." Id. at 1363.
Other branches participate in the debate over constitutional values. This case
is now before the Supreme Court and a decision on the constitutionality of
RFRA is expected by June.

D. Enforcement of Civil War Amendments
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments give Congress the
power to enforce the amendments "by appropriate legislation.1t The creative and
constructive task of giving meaning and life to these amendments thus lies
largely with Congress.

In 1966, the Supreme Court reviewed the power or Congress to prohibit
New York's requirement for literacy in English as a condition for voting.
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had provided that no person who
had completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rico, with the language of instruction
other than English, could be denied the right to vote in any eJection because of
an inability to read or write in English. The Court regarded section 4(e) as a
·proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,646 (1966). FaetfindingwBB
a legislative, not a judicial, responsibility: "It was f()r Congress, as the branch
that made t,lrls judgment, to assess lUld weigh the various conflieting
considerations .... It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these
ractors." Id. at 653.
lt

In 1980 the Court commented on the competenee of Congress to protect
.equal protection rights: "It is fundamental that in DO organ of govemment, state
or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with r'ltnp1tten' ., and autl 'rity
to enCorce equal protection guarantees.- Fullilove v. Klutzniek, 448 U.S. 448,
483 (1980). If there is a collision between the immunity accorded states under
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the Eleventh Amendment and the power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, the congreSIJional statute prevails.- Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1978).
Congress bas ample powers under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court baa deCerred to congressional interpretations 80 long 88 Congress uael
"any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting." South CaroliDa v. Katzenbacb, 383 U.S. 301, 324
(1966). Congress is -chiefly responsible" Cor implementing the rights created in
the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 327. Congress may prohibit practices that "in
and of themselves" do not violate the Fifteenth Amendment "so long as the
prohibitioD8 attacking racial discrimination in voting are 'appropriate' ...:
Rome Y. United States, 446 U.8.156, 171 (1980).

In 1980, a plurality of the Court held that states are prohibited omy from
purposefully discriminating against the voting rights ofblacb. Abridgement of
voting rights had to be intentional, not incidental. Mobile Y. Bolden, 446 U.S.
65 (1980). Congress responded by amending the Voting Rights Act to allow
plaintiffs to show discrimination se;lely on the ef{ect8 of a voting plan. The
Court applied this new test to invalidate districtingplans in North Carolina that
had tbe effect of diluting the black vote whether or not intended by the state.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

E. Statutory Reversals
It is the practice of courts not to pass on the constitutionality of a statute
if it can be construed solely on statutory grou:.tds. United States v. Clark, 445
u.s. 23, 27 (1980). Justice Brandeis described a series of rules under which the
Supreme Court "has avoided passing upon a large part of the constitutional
questiona pressed upon it for decision," Ashwander Y. TVA, 297 U.s. 288, 346
(1936) (Brandeis, J., coneumng). "It is well settled that if a case may be decided
on either statutory or constitutional grounds, [the] Court, for BOund
jurisprudential reasons, will inquire first into the statutory queetion." Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,306·07 (1980). This judicial strategy allows the courts
to dispose of issues on ~tatutory grounds in the midst of obvious eonstltutional
questions. Instead of attempting to fIX constitutional doctrine, the judiciary
enters into a dialogue with the otber branches concerning the intent of prior
statutes.

Ses Dl.scrlml'lUllion. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
prohibited sex discrimination in any education program or activity that received
federal financial assistance. After the Reagan administration issued statements
indicating that its interpretation of Title IX was not 88 broad as previous
administrations, the House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of
414 to 8, opposing the administration's position. The resolution stated the
18DS8 of the Houee that Title IX and regulations issued purauan-t to the title
~.hould not be amended or altered -in any manner which will lessen the
comprehensive coverage of such statute in eliminating gender discrimination
tbrouFout the American educational system." The resolution, of course, was
Dot legally binding, but it wu adopted because the Supreme Court was about
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to hear oral argument on a case regarding Title IX. Congressman Paul Simon
noted.: "[By] paseingthis resolut··:: be House can send the Court a signal that
we believe that no institution showd be allowed to discriminate on the basis of
sex if it receives Federal fuDds." 129 Cong. Bee. 33105 (1983).

The issue before the Court was whether Title IX. required federal funds to
be terminated only Cor specific programs in which discrimination 0CCUI'8 or for
the entire educational institution.
The Court adopted the narrow
interpretation. Grove City College v. BeU, 465 U ..S. 444 (1984). Within four
months the House oCRepresentatives, by a vote of 375 to 32, passed legislation
to amend not only Title IX but also three other statutes to adopt broad coverage
of the antidiscrimination provisions. 130 Cong. Bee. 18880 (1984). The Senate
resisted action that year, and subsequent efforts were complicated by questions
oC church-state and abortion. Finally, in 1988, Congress was able to Corge a
compromise. President Reagan vetoed the measure, but both Houses overrode
the veto to enact the broader coverage for civil rights that had been rejected by
the Court. 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
Also in 1988, Congress passed two other statutes to reverse the Supreme
Court. In one decision, the Court ruled that federal employees could be sued for
common law torts committed on the job. They were not entitled to absolute
immunity from lawsuit. However, the Court remarked: ·Congress is in the beat
position to provide guidance for the complex and often highly empirical inquiry
into whether absolute immunity is warranted in a particular context.· WestCall
v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292,300 (1988). Congress passed legislation to overturn this
decision by protecting federal employees from personal liability ror common law
torts committed within the scope of their employment. The statute provides the
il\iured person with a remedy against the United States government. Thus,
compensation would come from the u.s. Treasury, not the employee'.
pocketbook. 102 Stat. 4568 (1988).
The other statutory reversal in 1988 concerned a Supreme Court decision
that accepted the definition of the Veterans Administration that alcoholism
results from "willful misconduct- rather than from a disease. For those who
regarded the decision 88 enoneous, the Court advised them that their arguments
would be "better presented to Congress than to the courts.- Traynor v. Turnage,
484 U.S. 535 (1988). Legislation enacted by Congress recognized that veterans
seeking education or rehabilitation would not be denied those benefits under the
willful-misconduct standard. 102 Stat. 4110, § 109 (1988).
Congress has resorted to statutory reversals with greater frequency iD
recent years.- A single statute-the Civil Rights Act of 1991-overtumed or
modified nine Supreme Court decisions. 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).28 In 1995, the
Supreme Court held that a statute criminalizing talse statements -in any matter
~ William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Overriding SUpl'8Dl8 Court Statutory Interpretation
DecisioDS," 101 Yale L. J. 331 (1991).
28 For detailB on the statute and the Court decisione that were overruled or modified,
see IAuis Fisher, American CoMlilutiolUll Law 1055-66 (1996).
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within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" did
not apply to false statements made in judicial proceedings. Hubbard v. United
States, 115 S.Ct. 1754 (1995). In 80 holding, the Court overruled an earlier case
that bad applied the statute to a former Member of Congress who had made a
false statement to· the Disbursing Office of the House of Representatives.
Congre88 responded to Hubbard by drafting legislation to reinstate criminal
penalties for making false statement to Congress. The new law makes it a crime
to make false statements to an official in any of the three branches of
government. 110 Stat. 3459 (1996).

F. The Role of Custom
Congressional and executive practiees over a number of years have been
instrumental in ruting the meaning of the Constitution. In 1803, faced with a
challenge to constitutionality of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court
stated that "practice, and acquiescenee under it, for a number of years,
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary
interpretation of the most forcible nature: Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.s. (I Cr.) 299,
309 (1808).
In upholding the President's power to remove executive offieials, the Court
in 1903 based its ruling largely on the "universal practice of the government for
over a century: Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.s. 311, 316 (1903).
Presidential action in which Congress acquiesced ean become a justification for
the exercise of power. Presidential decisions in withdrawing public lands from
private use can, over a period of years, ·clearly indicate that the long-continued
practice, -known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption
that the withdrawals had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a
recognized administrative power of the Executive in the management of the
public lands." United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1915). The
cumulative force of these customs has helped to transform the Constitution over
time.

In the Steel Seizure Case of 1952, cballenging the seizure of steel mills by
President Truman during the Korean War, several justices spoke about the force
of custom in shaping constitutional law. Justice Jaebon identified three
scenarios for presidential power. The President was in the strongest position
when he acted pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, and
in the weakest position when taking measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress. The President's legal position was especially
interesting when Congress neither grants nor denies power:
WIleD the PreeideDt .....-ts in abaeDce of either a coDgl'tBliODal grant or
denial of autho~t.l, he can reJy upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilisht in which he ad Ccmgr.s IDII7 haw CODCUr.r8J1t authority,
01' in which ita distribution is UDC8I'taiD. Theretore, eongressioaal inertia,
iDdifferenoe or quieeCeDce may aOmetimes. - !l practical matter, en8lM, iCDot
invite, meuurea on independent p1'88ideatiallWp""aiNJity. Ia this area, aDy
actual tat of power is 1ikely to depend on the iJilperativat of 8V8I1ts and
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contemporary imponoerabl_ rather than on abstract theories of law.
Younptown Co. v. S.
'f', 343 U.S. 579, 635-S'1 (1952).

In other words, the constitutionality of aD action is sometimes determined
not by analyzing the words or intent of the Constitution but rather the political
contu:t in which a President acts. In this same case, Justice Frankfurter also
explored the impact oC custom and practice on presidential power. Legislative
and executive power were not defined purely on the basis of textual grants. The
behavior of each branch added meaning to constitutional power:
Deeply imbedded traditional ways of ccm.ducting government cannot supplant
the Constitution or legisiatioD, bat they giw meaning to the wolds of a te:l.t
or supply them. It is an inadmissibly D8JTOW CODCeption of American
coDStitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a systematic,
unbmkeu, uecutive practice, long pursued to the lmowIedge of the Congress
and never before questioned, enpged in by Presidents who have also SWOrD
to uphold the ConstitutioJi, making as it weN such eerci8e of poww part of
the structure of our government, may be treated 88 a gloss on -executive
Power- vested in the PrMident by § 1 of Art. D. Id. at 61()"11.

The thrust of these remarks bas been tempered by other statements.
Justice Frankfurter earlier noted: "illegality cannot attain legitimacy through
practice." Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.s. 517, 524 (1940).
Professor Gerhard Casper has written that wunconstitutional practices cannot
become legitimate by the mere lapse of time.wit

Gerhard Casper, "Constitutional Constraints on the Conduet of Foreign and
No~udicial Model,- -U-U. Chi...... Rev.4&.., 479 (1976). See also
Michael J. GJeDDOD, "The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Power Disputes,· 84
24

Defenee PoHcy: A

B.U.L. Rev. 109 (1984).
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Mr. CANADY. Thank you. Professor Currie.
STATEMENT OF DAVID P. CURRIE, EDWARD H.
GUISHED SERVICE PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY 0
SCHOOL OF LAW

Mr. CURRIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
of the committee. I welcome the opportunity to share
mittee my thoughts about this important subject. I've
ing for a long time about constitutional interpretation ,
courts and in other branches of the Federal Government.
of
My thesis is quite straightforward. I believe that each br
the Federal Government, as well as each branch of the S e Governments, has an equal and independent obligation to . terpret
and to obey the Constitution. The question of constit ut" onal interpretation is also the question of constitutional enforcement,
the
question of how these "paper barriers," as Madison once d
. d
them, that are found in the Constitution are to be enforced. and
how we are to ensure that they are to be respected is a questi n
that has agitated the framers and has agitated the rest of us d III
to the present day.
ss introAnd James Madison, when he as a Member of Co
duced the Bill of Rights in the House of Representati - in 1789,
identified three checks that were designed to help enforce the Constitution. The first check was the conscience of the em rs of
Congress; that is to say, having sworn to uphold the Co itution,
they would be expected to respect their oath and th us to respect
the Constitution itself.
The second check was judicial review. The courts wo d vie ~ it
as one of their special responsibilities to enforce the Constitution
in case another branch of Government should ever exceed its
power.
Third, the final check, and perhaps the most important of all,
was the check of the voters. The people themselves wo
exercise
a check on actions that exceeded the constitutional po er-s of one
or another branch of Government by refusing to re-elect embers
of Congress or Presidents or State officials who abused their authority.
The judicial check to which Madison alluded was, of co e, C firmed by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison. Judicial review, as Chiel Justice Marshall said in that case, is an essen ' ,
an indispensable element in a system of checks and balances to
help ensure that other branches of Government not exceed
ir
constitutional authority. There's not a word in Marbury v.
n
suggesting that judicial review is the sole check on unconstitu . nal
action, that the court is the only branch of Government with the
power to interpret the Constitution.
President. Jackson-and this has been mentioned already several
times today-identified another check when he vetoed the bill to
extend the charter of the Second National Bank because he found
it to be unconstitutional, even though the Supreme Court had said
Congress had the power to establish a national bank. Because the
President, too, has sworn to uphold the Constitution, the President,
too, has an independent obligation to enforce the Constitution, and
therefore he cannot accept the Supreme Court's determination that
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Congress has constitutional authority. If he believes a bill to be unconstitutional, the President has an independent obligation to veto
the bill.
And the same is of course true of the Congress. Members of Congress have also sworn to support the Constitution, and whenever
a bill is introduced in Congress, the first obligation of every Member is to ask the question, Do we have the power to pass this bill?
And that, of course, is a question involving an interpretation of the
Constitution. As Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts said on the floor of the House in 1791, "The whole business
of legislation is a practical construction of the powers of the legislature."
And thus each branch, independently, has an obligation to interpret and to obey the Constitution. No branch has the power to bind
another branch in the interpretation of the Constitution, and thus
we have a triple security for the enforcement of the Constitution.
I've gone so far in my study of the extrajudicial interpretation of
the Constitution during the first 12 years of our history under the
1789 Constitution, as to suggest that the original understanding of
our Constitution was forged not so much in the courts as in Congress and in the executive branch.
I come now to the issue of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. I think that statute was wholly justified insofar as it operates
as a congressional check on Federal action which in the view of
Congress would violate the Constitution.That is to say, insofar as
the statute is a refusal to authorize Federal agencies to do what
Congress believes would violate the Constitution, I think Congress
is wholly within its rights.
I think that the statute is also justified as an expression of
Congress's disagreement with the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause insofar as it acts as a limitation on the powers of
the States. But the next question is, What is the respect that is
owed by the Court to Congress's interpretation of the Constitution
as reflected in that statute? It seems to me that the answer has
to be that the Court is no more bound by Congress's interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause than Congress is bound by the interpretation of the Comt.
The same principle that says that Congress has to make up its
own mind about the meaning of the Constitution says the same
thing for the Court. And that's essentially what the Supreme Court
said in the Flores case: We must interpret the Free Exercise Clause
for ourselves, because we have the constitutional obligation to respect the Constitution and we cannot permit Congress to exceed its
powers.
I see I'm out of time. I have more that I could say.
Mr. CANADY. If you could sum up in another minute or two.
Mr. CURRIE. Some scholars have suggested-thank you, Mr.
Chairman-that the Court in the Flores case should have gone beyond simply saying Congress has no power to bind us as to the in-

terpretation of the Constitution, that the Court should have re-examined its own precedent in light of Congress's contrary opinion,
and therefore maybe taken a different view as to the meaning of

the Free Exercise Clause.
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. k the difficulty with that argument is that the Coun 'as
ed to do that in Flores. The Court was not asked to ov
cedent in the light of Congress's contrary interpreta .
ked to accept the statute as having already ove
decision, and that, I think, Congress had no power t o do.
final question is, hen the Court is finally asked to
its prior decisions- the Smith case in particular-int e"""""'-ori, .,.,.
- ree Exercise Clause~ in the light of Congress's contrary in erion as reflected i.e. the Religious Freedom Restor ati
_ ct,
degree of deference should be paid by the Court t o C
. . . - ---r etation?
d that reminds me ~ uf course, of the long debate between
Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black during the 1940's. fit
ly sixties over th e degree of judicial restraint, the rt ......
nce to other br~nes. I'm sure there are members
,..".....,'~ ;;· ttee who recall J .lstice Frankfurter's dissent in the .;l"I
-~Y' ..Ll
S alute case where _e said it's really not for the Court 0 5
. te its opinion for r e on able decisions by other branch, :::._,
ofar as the inte
t ation of the First Amendment ~
~i , I think it's fair
say that that extreme view of judi .
to the views of ' er branches has been rejected,
e Court, but also y a large number of scholars. An the Court is right not to take Justice Frankfurter's .--.".,~..--...
use the enforceme
of the Con~titution requires
b
ch take an indepe
n t view of the meaning of the
ti .
Only if each branch d s that can we ensure maximum
for the rights of the citizen and for the rights of the State's
are, of course, involved henever Congress attempts to limit
a uthority as it did in
e Religious Freedom Restoratio
you very much.
e prepared statem t of Mr. Currie follows:]
. or
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Supreme Court's recen: decision in City of Boerne v FlOl?S,l w .
Congress's attempt to
efme the religious freedom guaranteed ~=s:
5
by the fourteenth arne
ent, has called attention once more to
t::=~ss
ql
. n of the respective roles of Congress and of the courts as interpre
Constitution. As a longtime udent of constitutional interpretation in
branches of the Government. ! welcome the opportunity to share with this '-"'Wo.o...-;:....
tee my t hinking on this impo
t subject.
I begin with the obligatory od to Marbury v Madison. 2 I believe
M rshall was right that co
ave an obligation to determine the COIns1;lj-t:c!l=::::::lia.tit
of federal statutes they are a
to apply, and not simply because they
es required to obey the C
titution. As Marshall argued, I am COIl
'cia! review is an essential element in the constitutional system of ~!I:irS
baJanc:es-designed, as Hamil
said in The Federalist, to help keep the
within the limits of its autho ' .3
. does not m,e an that
-courts have a monopoly on constitutional _,""""",1~
t' .
embers of Congress, '
all federal and state officers, are bo
to support the Constitu n.4 Thus, whenever a bill is introduced,
o
her of the House or Senate must inquire whether or not Congress h
d

n.'
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enact it; and thus Congress is continu a] - 'ngag in interpreting the Constitution.
So, of course, is the President. And th~ great al of con stitutional law is made
outside the courts, by the legislative ana e.' cutive ~anches of government .
. Congressional debates and executive . _ rs are replete with examples of legislative and executive interpretation of the 0 titu' . Few constitutional difficulties
with proposed legislation escape the eyE'5 of vigilant opponents, and the quality of
argument is often extraordinarily high . b .3 great many instances congressional debates during the early years brought out ~ .. the constitutional argumen ts that anyone has been able to think of aince. In - .y cases e continue to rely exclusively
on legislative or executive precedents, ~ r fie i
have never been resolved by
the courts. The original understandin 0 the
titution , I recently conclud£-d
after an intensive study of the first tv.-€.' _\ ':' years of its operation, was forged not
in the courts but in the legislative and e c'..ltive
ches. 5
The interesting question is therefore not \,-h o h . wer to interpret the Constitution but whose view prevails in case of onllic _ What h appens when different
branches of government, each acting w ithin ItS p . r sphere of authority, disagree
as to what the Constitution means? I d o no . beli
this question can be answered
by a simple invocation of the shibbolet h hat the
's a re the ultimate guardians
of the Constitution.
There are times when other gove
__1 actors are plainly obliged to accept judicial decisions. Judicial power to deci · _ ....... :,e · _ . s authority to render a judgment that binds the parties. Thus, whe....... _~lden R005e'Velt contemplated disobeying an anticipated judicial decision requ:__ .' the
'el"Il.IlleD.t to pay bondb~lders in
g<r>ld,6 he challenged the very essence Or U i~.' ial
er. S
a course could be deatur righ.! of revolution; it was not
fended, if at all, only as an exercise of
consistent with the Constitution.
It does not follow that other branches .... - :..
d in all cases by judicial interpretations of the Constitution. The example!: ._ :amiliar. President Jackson vetoed a
new che.. ier for the Bank of the United ~~ -l:- _ after the Supreme Court had upheld
congresf , , ql power to establish it;7 P n-- t Je . . . . erson pardoned those convicted
under tLI.,.'\;dition Act on constitution
_ "2Jlds that had been rejected by the
courts. B l ~ , v~ ~ Jackson and Jefferson wer
- . ~ witb their rights. Neither did anything that ...uterfered with the power of _. 'Qurts to rt'nder binding judgments in
particular cases; the pardon power is a:. _ .press lunita " on that principle, and
it essentially allows the winning party '
. ive a judgment in its favor. Nor was
either Jefferson's or Jackson's action in
- ent with Marbury's principle that the
courts must have power to prevent other
:1ches rom exceeding their powers. On
the contrary, Jefferson and Jackson's ac
. rovided an a.dditional check that furnished even greater security for the righ 0 .he states
the people. Indeed what
these two Presidents did illustrates the
' . our CGns
. nal separation of powers: No measure can be carried out to t
riment of
people or the states unless all three branches agree that it is co
·tional,
These are the easy cases. More compl
t he questi
posed by Abraham Lincoln's attitude toward the Dred Scott
!d by (}Qvernor Faubus's actions with
respect to school segregation after Brown u' rd of Edurotion . The poles of opinion
on these issues are starkly delineated. '
suggested
t although he would not
attempt to set Scott free in defiance of - : upreme's order he would vote
in Cooper v Aaron said
for a new prohibition of slavery in the te~ -1 S. 9 The C
Faubus was bound by Brown because it
""t e law of
land." 10
At one level Lincoln seems to me to
. been nght and the Supreme Court
wrong. The judgments in Scott and in
bcund nly the parties. Courta have
no power to resolve general questions of
t utio
" terpretation; their only authority is to decide the concrete controve
,fore t
. Faubus, of course, was defying not only the principles announced ' ~ ~ Iwn but also a decree entered against
him by a lower federal court; that was e
.1 , on the principle of the above discussion of the Gold Clause question, to jus . ndemn.ing his action. But Lincoln disclaimed any intention of subverting the .
eat in Scott; h e merely denied that
it restricted his freedom to decide for hi::::.. . w hetber prospect ive legislation along
the same lines would be constitutional.
4

·
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1
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cafo, 1997).
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Professor Wechsler has shown the limits of this line of thinking. It is true that
one does not undennine the Court's judgment-and therefore its power to defmitively resolve the case-by retusing to follow its reasoning in enacting future laws.
But if one believes (as I do, and as Hamilton and Marshall argued) that judicial review is an essential part of our system of checks and balances, this cannot be a complete answer. For th.at system cannot function if every school district in the United
States insists on continuing to segregate its schools by race until the Supreme Court
tells it not to. So long as (and as soon as) there is reason to think the Court might
overrule its decision, a legislator or administrator who was not a party to the case
may be justified in doing what the Court has ordered others not to do, for otherwise
the Court could never correct its mistakes. Unlike res judicata, stare decisis is not
an inflexible command. But once it is clear that the Court will not change its mind,
I think Professor Wechsler is right that the Court's view must be accepted; for otherwise it cannot effectively perform its crucial task of helping to keep other
branches of government within their legitimate authority.11
This brings me to the current controversy over the Smith decision,12 the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) ,13 and the Supreme Court's response in City of
Boerne v Flores. 14 Highly respected colleagues have written to criticize the Flores
decision; 15 I have written to praise it. IS Let me explain my position.
The Court's acceptance in Smith of Professor Kurland's view 17 that the free exercise clause did not require that reli~ous individuals be exempted from generally applicable laws was highly controversial. Though certainly not without support in earlier cases, it was (despite contrary arguments in the Court's opinion) squarely opposed to the Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject, in Wisconsin v
Yoder.IS Congress disagreed with the Court's new interpretation, and said so in
RFRA: Henceforth the adverse impact of even a facially neutral law on religious exercise could be justified only by a compelling interest. 19
That was a plausible interpretation of the Constitution, and Congress was entitled
to make it. Congress was not a party to the Smith litigation, and it made no effort
to set aside the judgment itself. It merely declared a rule to govern future cases.
Moreover, one could not confidently say that the Court had said its last word on
the subject. The decision was rendered by a bare majority; it effectively overruled
recent precedent; it had been roundly though far from una\'l.imously criticized ever
since; it had been rendered without the benefit of Congress's views as to the meaning of the constitutional provision. In short, Congress was entitled to believe there
was a reasonable chance the Court might reconsider its position in light of a well
considered, reasonable, and nearly unanimous contrary legislative interpretation.
But of course the Court was no more bound by Congress's interpretation than
Congress was by that of the Court in Smith. The same argument that proves that
Congress is entitled to construe the Constitution for it.self applies equally to the
Court. And that was what the Court said in effect in Flores: Congress has authority
to enforce the fourteenth amendment but not to amend it, and the Court is not
bound by Congress's interpretation of its provisions.
Insofar as RFRA represented a self-denying interpretation of Congress's own
power to enact laws im~inging on religious freedom, it was squarely supported by
Jefferson's and Jackson s actions in reading their own powers more narrowly than
the courts had understood them. Whatever the Court says, Congress may not enact
laws it believes to be unconstitutional. Nothing in the Flores opinion casts doubt on
the legitimacy of RFRA as the exercise of a congressional check on congressional action. But it was somethin~ else again to expect the Court to accept Congress's interpretation of the free exercIse clause in passing upon the validity of state law.
Should the Court in Flores be criticized for having rejected the congressional reading of religious freedom without reexamining the issue on the merits? Should it, in
such a reexamination, have afforded some degree of deference to the views of a coordinate branch on which the framers of the fourteenth amendment expressly conferred the principal role in enforcing its provisions? One would not expect the Court
to invalidate the clauses of the War Powers Resolution that purport to derme the
division between presidential and congressional authority simply because Congress's
11 Herbert

Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum L Rev 1001, 1008 (1965).
12Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990).
13 107 Stat 1488 (1993), 42 USC §§ 2000bb et seq.
14117 SCt 2157 (1997).
15 E.g., Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flo-

reB, 111 Harv L Rev 153 (1997).
16 David
17Phili~

P. Currie, RFRA (forthcoming in Wm & Mary L Rev (1998».
B. Kurland, Religion and the Law (Chicago, 1978).
18 406 US 205 (1972).
19 42 USC § 2000b})'1.
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interpretation does not bind the Court; one would expect Congress's understanding

to be taken seriously in the Court's resolution of the dispute.

That the Court did not do this in Flores may have something to do with the way
the issue was presented. The Court was not asked to overrule Smith; it was asked
to accept the fact that Congress had already done so. Even Justice O'Connor, who
~anted to use the case as a vehicle for reexamining Smith, urged only that that
issue be briefed by the parties. 2o Congress and its defenders seemed to be arguing
for something more than that the legislative interpretation should be considered;
the case seemed to turn on whether the special authorization t.o enforce the amendment gave Congress rather than the Court the fmal say when the question arose
in a judi~ia1 PTC?Ceedi?g. The Court seems to me clearly right that it did not. 21
If the issue is plainly phrased in some future case, I would expect the Court to
take Congress's intarpretation into account in determining whether or not to adhere
to its Smith decision. If it does, it will have to address the question of what degree
of deference to give to Congress's position. And that, it seems to me, boils down to
the familiar dispute over judicial restraint that has raged since the Constitution was
adopted, and which is best exemplified by tht! long duel between Justices Frankfurter and Black. 22
Frankfurter, as illustrated by his famous dissent in the second flag-salute case,23
argued that to avoid excessive judicial interference the courts should generally defer
to reasonable interpretations of the Constitution by other branches of government.
The Court took this position in the fourteenth amendment context in an alternative
holding in Katzenbach v Morgan, deferring to Congress's "reasonable" conclusion
that requiring Puerto Rican voters to be literate in English offended the equal protection clause. 24 Justice Black's position, in ~ontrast, was that true judicial restraint
consisted in refusing to invent limitations on government that could not fairly be
traced to the Constitution itself; what the Constitution required should be strictly
enforced. 25
At least in the area of first amendment freedoms, Justice Frankfurter's approach
has not stood the test of time; no Justice on the present Court takes such a restricted view of the Court's authority in such cases. Justice Black's position, I believe, is also more consistent with the purposes of judicial review. Congress's views
are entitled to consideration and respect when the Court is called upon to construe
the Constitution. Arguments made m Congress must be taken seriously on their
merits, and the fact that Congress has accepted a given interpretation is additional
evidence in its favor. But the Court must ultimately decide for itself what the Constitution requires, not accept someone else's view just because it is "reasonable." For
only by exercising independent judgment in constitutional interpretation can the
courts effectively help to ensure, as the Constitution contemplates, that other
branches of government not exceed the limits of their authority. And that seems to
have been the position taken in Flores. For the Court made clear that it thought
there was no occasion to afford the congressional interpretation of the first amendment the degree of deference suggested by the alternative basis of decision in Morgan. 26
The Court in Flores similarly insisted on the right to make its own determination
with regard to the unrelated question whether RFRA could be justifled as a prophylactic measure to prevent undetectable evasions of the free exercise clause as the
Court had construed it in Smith, by analogy to the flat ban on literacy tests for voters upheld in Oregon v Mitchell. 27 The Court found no such problem of evasion in
Flores and so rejected this argument as well. 28 In construing Congress's authority
to enforce the fourteenth amendment by "appropriate legislation" to require "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adapted to that end," 29 the Court gave notice once again that it took its responsibility for judicial review seriously in the field of federalism as well as in that
of individual rights, as the theory of the Marbury case seems to require. 3o
SCt at 2176 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Contrast US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 10, which gives Congress authority to "defllle" as well as
to punish piracies and felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations.
12 See David P. Currie, The New Deal Court in the 194ms: Its Constitutional Legacy, 1997
J Sup_Ct Hist 87.
23West Virginia Bd of Educ v Barnette, 319 US 624, 648-49 (1943).
24 384 US 641, 656 (1966).
2& See, C.2., Adamson v California, 332 US 46 (1947).
26 117 SC't at 2168.
27 400 US 112 (19'10). See also South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301 (1966).
28 117 Set at 2169.
29Id at 2164. See ulso id at 2169,2170, 2171.
JOef. United State.if v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995); Printz v United States, 117 SCt 2365 (1997).
20 117
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In short, in my view the Constitution contemplates multiple checks to prevent
anyone exercising public authority from infringing its provisions. Executive officers
~d Members of Congress have an independent obligation to obey the Constitution
Itself; they are not bound by a judicial conclusion that a particular action is within
their authority. For the same reason, the courts are not bound by either executive
or legislative interpretation of provisions whose construction is not committed to ultimate determination by the political branches.a1 For the cou.;:ts too were meant to
serve as an indispensable element in our system of checks and balances. Respect
for judicial authority requires not only that other governmental actors comply witn
Judgments in cases to which they are parties. It also requires that, when it is clear
that the 3upreme Court will not recede from its position, other branches acquiesce
in judicial opinions limiting their powers. Finally, the central importance of judicial
review as a check on other branches requires that the courts exercise independent
judgment in determining the constitutionality of legislative and executive action,
giving respectful consideration but not undl~e deference to the views of ·,he interested branch.

Mr.

CANADY.

Thank you, Professor. Professor Devins.

STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS, GOODRICH PROFESSOR OF
LAW, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
Mr. DEVINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to
thank the committee for inviting me to testify this morning.
My statement makes two points. One is that Congress has a
long, proud history of countermanding the Supreme Court when it
disagrees with the Court. That history has been alluded to by several of the witnesses. It includes Con.gress' rejection of Dred Scott,
its rejection of Hammer v. Dagenhardt, which was a case saying
that Congress was without authority under the Commerce Clause
to regulate child labor.
It applies to the 1964 Civil Rights Act's public accommodation
provision, which was legislation enacted after the Supreme Court
had said almost a century before in a civil rights case that Congress could not enact a public accommodation provision. And it continues today with busing, abortion, religious freedom, flag burning,
voting rights, legislative veto, and Federalism.
These are all instances where Congress has been willing to tell
the Court that it thinks its interpretation of the Constitution is
wrong, and I don't really think there's anything in City of Boerne
v. Flores to fundamentally challenge Congress' power to disagree
with the Court.
Flores is a very important case, of course, but it doesn't call into
question Congress's power to use its spending authority, to condi-

tion the spending of Federal dollars. It doesn't speak to Congress's

authority under the Commerce Clause. It doesn't speak to
Congress's power over Federal programs-something that Prcfessor
Currie alluded to before. Even with respect to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vis-a-vis the States, Flores doesn't challenge

Congress's ability to remedy actions by the States that it considers

unconstitutional. An eXaIIlple of this would be voting rights legisla-

tion passed in 1982 in response to City of Mobile v. Bolden.

So I don't really think there's much doubt that Congress has the
power to disagree with the Court, and there's no doubt that the
history of con~essiona1 action is one in which Congress often does
disagree with the Court.
91 Contrut
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. ~at I'd like to focus in on in my testimony this morning is why
It. IS that the Constitution is improved by Congress's disagreeing
wIth the Court. Constitutional decisionmaking, in my view, is improved when all branches of Government engage in a dialogue
which, of course, includes disagreements among the branches.
And to start with, I'd like to quote from the confirmation hearings of Justice Kennedy, the author of Boerne, and Justice Ginsburg. At his confirmation hearing, Justice Kennedy testified that
lawmakers, quote "would be fulfilling their duty by limiting the effects of Supreme Court decisions they consider wrong. "-very interesting coming from the author of Boerne v. Flores.
Justice Ginsburg, at her confirmation hearings, states that
"courts do not guard constitutional rights alone. Courts share that
responsibility with Congress, the President, the States, and the
people." I think Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg were aware of
what I consider to be a fairly obvious truth, and that is that by
challenging the Court, Congress often improves the quality of constitutional decisionmaking. By challenging the Court, Congress
makes the Constitution more durable, more vital. Let me explain
why I say this. Much of it has to do with how courts are different
from policymakers, structurally different from policymakers.
First off, courts are reactive. Courts don't look for cases. Occasionally people accuse them of doing so, but courts have to have a
case presented to them, and, as a result, if the Court makes a mistake in an earlier case, the only chance it can reconsider its decision is for there to be a new set of facts which calls into question
the decision in the first case.
So for the Court to conclude that it made a mistake when saying
that Congress was without auth<'rity under the Commerce Clause
to prohibit child labor, Congress again needed to pass new child
labor legislation, and that's precisely what happened. In Hammer
v. Dagenhardt, the Court said it's unconstitutional for Congress to
regulate child labor, but Congress again passed a child labor statute and eventually, in United States v. Darby, the Court concluded
that Congress had that power.
Another example, a more controversial example, is abortion. In
1992, the Casey court overturned the trimester test in Roe v. Wade.
The only way in which the Court could have that opportunity was
for elected Government to express its disapproval of Roe. If everyone simply followed Roe, there would never be a chance for the
Court to say, "Hold on, the trimester test is unsound medically unsound," politically unsound, and so on and so forth. So, a court is
reactive.
Another structural deficiency which limits what the Court can do
is that the Court relies on presentations to it by specific parties at
a specific moment in time. The Court can not hold a hearing bringing in all interested individuals. No, the Court is stuck, if you will,
with the people who bring the case before it, and they don't necessarily present the Court with complete information. Also, the
Court makes a decision at a particular moment in time; facts
change, circumstances change. A decision that makes sense in
1988, say Morrison v. Olson and the independent counsel statute,
may not make decision in 1998.
1
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And because of these changed circumstances, it's important for
elected Government again to express its disapproval of what the
Court has done. It gives the Court the opportunity not just to reconsider what it has done, it also gives the Court additional information, information unavailable [..<j it when it made its original decision.
I see my time is up. If I can just summarize, please?
Mr. CANADY. Please; please continue.
Mr. DEVINS. Okay; thank you, sir.
Well, one last substantive point before my conclusion and that is
that vlhen Congress disagrees with the Court, we tend to focus in
on ~nstances where, ultimately, the Court may overturn itself, rewrite its doctrine. In other words, as Professor Currie suggested,
the RFRA was an attempt to get the Court to reconsider employment Division v. Smith. Likewise child labor legislation in the
1930's was an attempt to get the Court to reconsider Hammer v.
Dagenhardt.
But it's often the case that when Congress disagrees with the
Court, it's on an issue that the Court will not revisit again, and it's
particularly important f01 Congress to challenge Court decisionmaking in instances where the issue will not be revisited by the
Court.
So, for example, it may be that the Court will not revisit Morrison v. Olson, the independent counsel decision, and it may be ultimately only for Congress to conclude that that decision was wrong
by refusing to reauthorize the independent counsel. And it's very
important that Congress perform that function, because if it does
not, those bad decisions will remain on the books.
So, for all these reasons, I am very much convinced that the Constitution is more durable, more vital, more important to the Nation
when Congress disagrees with it. It gives the Court a chance to update its thinking. It also gives Congress a chance to enact laws
when the Court will not revisit the issue.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Devins follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS, GooDRICH PROFESSOR OF
WILLIAM AND MARY

LAw, COLLEGE OF

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Congress's role in interpreting the Constitution. My remarks will both call attention to the ways in which
Congress can express its disapproval of Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution and argue that such expressions of disagreement are necessary to "protect
and defend" the Constituti9n.
The text and design of the Constitution as well as the historical record underscore
the pervasive role that elected officials play in shaping constitutional values. Nevertheless, nearly two hundred years after Marbury v. Madison, the question ofwhether Supreme Court rulings bind elected officials remains controversial. In a YVashington Post survey, for example, six out of ten respondents thought the Supreme Court
the ultimate constitutional interpreter. In reporting this survey, the Post simply
noted that those respondents were "correct."
'rhis view, that constitutional truth derives solely from nine individuals (or a majority of them) sitting on the Supreme Court, has, on occasion, been embraced by
the Court itself. Witness City of Boerne v. Flores, a 1997 decision which considered
Congress's power to "overrUle" a Supreme Court decision. CitinJ Marbury, the
Boerne Court declared that "[t]he power to interpret the ConstitutIon in a case or
controversy remains in the Judiciary." Similarly, in its 1992 decision reaffuming
abortion J'irmts-Planned Parentlwod v. Casey-the Court claimed authority to resolve the a60rtion dispute, calling on "the contending sides of a national controversy
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to end their national division by accepting" "the Court's interpretation of the Constitution."
Decisions like Casey and Boerne are rare, however. Backed into a eomer by elected government challenges to judicial decisionmaking, the Justices claimed authority
to settle transcendent values. l For the most part, the Justices adhere to a philosophy that is much more modest, circumspect, and nuanced. Anthony Kennedy (the
author of Boerne), for example, has testified before Congress that lawmakers "would
be fulfilling [their] duty" oy limiting the effects of Supreme Court decisions that
th~ think are "wrong under the Constitution." 2
The historical record provides overwhelming evidence that other parts of ~overn
ment challenge the Court's constitutional reasoning and that the Court is influenced
by these challenges as well as the broader social currents which surround it. The
Court may be the ultimate interpreter in a particular case, rut not always the larger issue of what the case is a part. Congress, the White House, government agencies, interest groups, the general public and the states all play critical roles in shaping constitutional values. As noted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg a year before her appointment to the Supreme Court, judges "play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape legal doctrine . . . they participate in a dialogue with
other organs of government, and with the people as well."3
CUNGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Congress participates in constitutional decisionmaking at all phases of the lawmaking process, from the enactment of legislation and approval of constitutional
amendments to the oversight of government departments and agencies. In recent
decades, Congress also has participated in litigation both in its own name and
through briefs flIed by individual members. Through the Senate's power to conflrm
judicial nominees, mon~ver, Congress plays an integral role in defl.1""ling the composition of the federal judiciary.
Elected government's most direct link to judicial decisionmaking is the overtly political process of selecting and approving federal judges. Accordingly, battles over
Supreme Court nominations reveal that the president and Senate both recognize
that the best way to shape outputs (Court rulings) is to control inputs (i.e., to control who sits on the Court). In particular, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee "have learned to shape the constitutional dialogue in the confirmation hearings
to make clear to nominees that a willingness to profess belief in some threshold constitutional "'alues is a&rerequisite for the joh."4 Beginning with the 1981 nomination of Sandra Day 0' onnor, ''these threshold values have included a commitment
to the existence of . . . the right to privacy and respect for stare decisis." 5
Congressional influence over constitutional interpretation through the confIrmation of judges is only the tip of an iceberg. Before legislation is enacted, Congress
often undertakes a constitutional review of the measure. This review may occur in
a number of different ways. First, committee and subcommittee staff members as
well as House or Senate members themselves may assess the bill's constitutionality.
Second, a number of congressional offices may be called upon to assist in this review. The Congressional Research Service, the offices of legislative counsel to the
House and to the Senate, and the General Accounting Office all can assist in reviewing constit.utional questions. Third, through formalized legislative hearings and informal requests, constitutional scholars, Justice Department officials and other government officials, and interest groups share their views of a measure's constitutionality with members and their staffs.
Consider, for example, the pivotal role played by the House Judiciary Committee
in the Supreme Court's approval of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition of discrimination by restaurants, hotels, and other public accommodations. In the wake
of hearings raising grave doubts about whether Congress had the authority to
ground this public accommodations provision in the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee, Congress invoked its commerce power as an alternative basis
for this prc.vision. Because the statute was framed this way, the Supreme Court was
1 For a detailing of the defensive nature of Court invocations of judicial supremacy, see Neal
Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming, F'eb 1998). I have attached a copy of this article to my testimony.
~Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st.
Sess. 222-23 (1987).
3 Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992).
4 Stephen J. Wermeil, Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 121, 122 (Autumn 1993).
.
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able to uphold the measure on commerce grounds without ever having to consider
the Fourteenth Amendment issue. Had Congress relied exclusively on its authority
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantp.e, the case, of
course, would not have been decided on commerce grounds and might well have
come out the other way.
Aside from framing issues for judicial resolution, Congress and its members also
participate in the litigation process. Sometimes the Supreme Court invites the
H~use, the Senate, or individual members of Congress to present an amicus curiae
(fnend of the court) brief and participate in oral arguments. AmiCU& curiae briefs,
most notably in abortion and sep~tion-of-powers disputes, also have been flIed at
the initiative of the Senate, the House, and their individual members. For example,
a coalition of more than two hundred members of Congress flIed an amicus brief
in Harris v. McRae, defending the right of Congress to fund or to refrain from funding abortions as it sees fit. Finally, Congress participates as a party to litigation
when the Justice Department refuses to defend a statute's constitutionality. In cases
involving the constitutionality of the bankruptcy court and the legislative veto, for
example, Congress defended the constitutionality of its handiwork.
Once thE~ Supreme Court decides a case, Congress may make use of a wide variety
of powers to signal its approval or disapproval of the decision. When Congress
agrees with the Court, it may afftrmatively assist in the implementation of a Court
decision. For example, in response to Southern resistance, Congress took bold steps
to make Brown v. Board of Education a reality. In 1964 it prohibited segregated
school systems from receiving federal aid {Title vn and authorized the Department
of justice to file desegregation lawsuits. More significant, the implementation of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, coupled with the issuance and
enforcement of Title VI guidelines, marked a significant shift in federal powers over
state education systems. These federal efforts proved critical in ending dual school
systems. More actual desegregation took place the year after these legislative programs took effect than in the decade following Brown.
Congress, moreover, may also enact legislation at the Court's behest. In 1978 the
Court, while upholding the constitutionality of third-party searches of newspapers
in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, invited legislative efforts to establish ''nonconstitutional protections against lWssible abuses of the search warrant procedure." Congress L:ccepted this invitatIon. Concluding that "the search warrant procedure in
itself does not sufficiently protect the press and other innocent parties" and that the
Zurcher decision had "thrown into doubt'" "a longstanding principle of constitutional
jurisprudence," Congress prohibited such newspaper searches in 1980.6
WHEN CONGRESS AND THE COURT DISAGREE

Starting with the First Congress, Congress has proven itself willing to act in the
face of contradictory Supreme Court precedent. During the debate in 1789 on the
President's removal power, for example, James Madison saw no reason to defer to
the judiciary on the constitutionality of what Congress was about to do. While acknowledgin:j that ''the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary," he begged to know on what ground "~kJ:ne department draws from the
Constitution greater powers than another in m . g out the limits of the powers
of the several departments." 7
In response to Dred Scott, Congress passed a bill prohibiting slavery in the territories. 8 Disagreeing with the Court's 1918 ruling that the commerce power could not
be used to regulate child labor, Congress two decades later again based child labor
legislation on the Commerce Clause.9 Public accommodations protections contained
in the 1964 Civil Rights Act similarly followed in the wake of a Supreme Court d~i
sion rejecting such protections. lo More recently, lawmakers have challenged Court
rulings on abortion, busing, flag burning, religious freedom, voting rights, and the
legislative veto. I I
Congressional disagreement with the Court takes many forms. At one extreme,
Congress simply disregards a Court decision it finds unworkable. Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, invalidating the legislative veto, is such a case.
In the twelve years after Chadha, 1983-1995, well over three hundred legislative
veto provisions were enacted into law. The reason for such widespread disobedience
6Staggers Rail Act of 1980,94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
71 Annals of Congress 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
8Ad of June 19, 1862, col11, 12 Stat. 432.
9 Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060.
JOTitle II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 78 Stat. 241, 243.
JJ See generally Louis Fisher & Neal Devins. Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (2d ed.
1996).
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of Chadha is that "[n]either Congress nor the executive branch wants the static
model of government offered by the Court." 12
Congress may also seek to nullify Court rulings by amending the Constitution.
While constitutional amendment proposals are almost always unsuccessful, these
proposals nevertheless may drive Judicial decisionmaking. For example, in response
to the Court's failure to invalidate iender-based decisionmaking, Congress approved
and sent to the states for ratificatIon a proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
prohibiting the abridgement of "equality of rights. . . on account of sex." These efforts prompted the Court to reconsider its approach to gender decision-making, and
m the early 1970s Supreme Court decision-making became "fully compatible with
arguments made by leading mainstream ERA proponents in such documents as congressional committee reports and hearings records on the ERA, and in testimony in
the Congressional Record by leading ERA sponsors." 13 Ironically. the ultimate defeat of the ERA is sometimes attributed to the Court's general adoption of the
amendment's principles.
Another area where Congress has been successful is in countering Supreme Court
decisionmaking that does not protect rights that Congress thinks should be protected. Two recent examples stand out. After the Supreme Court upheld, in Goldman v. Weinberger, an air force regulation forbidding an Orthodox Jew's wearing
of a yarmulke indoors while on duty, Congress enacted legislation overturning this
regulation. 14 More strikingly, Congress significant! expanded voting rights protections through its 1982 amendments to the Vot'
'ghts Act. The bill was a direct
outgrowth of the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolden~ in which the Court
required proof of discriminatory intent as a basis for voting rights litigation. Concluding that the "intent test focuses on the wrong question and places an unacceptable burden upon plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases," 15 Congress cleared the
way for impact·based proofs of discrimination,
Congress, fmally, has sought to limit the reach of Court decisions that protect
rights in ways that Congress thinks are inappropriate, Following Roe v. \Vade, Congress l'evealed its hostility to expansive abortion rights through funding restrictions.
Congress likewise made effective use of its power of the purse in limiting school busing.
City of Boerne v, Flores, invalidating legislative efforts to define the content of
First Amendment religious liberty protections, does not call into question Congress's
broad authority to limit the effect of Supreme Court decisions. ls To begin with.
Boerne says nothing about Congress's authority to control federal programs or its
power to place conditions on the receipt of federal funds (including the denial of federal funding to disfavored activities). 1t10reover. while specifying that Congress?s authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to "legislation which deters
or remedies constitutional violations/' the Court acknowledged that "the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that
make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern." Correspondingly, in recognizing that "Congress must have wide latitude in determining" whether corrective legislation is, in fact, remedial. Boerne acknowledged Congress's power
to engage the Court in constitutional dialogues.
THE LAST WORD DEBATE REVISITED

Congressional practice as well as the design and text of the Constitution all suggest that the overriding value promoted by the framers was a system of checks and
balances, with each branch asserting its own powers and protecting its own prerogatives. Furthermore, constitutional dialogues between the courts and elected government often result in more vibrant and durable constitutional interpretation. In particular, a fmal interpretive authority of the Constitution will make our most fundamental text stagnant and irrelevant, rather than preserve and honor it. Lou Fisher and I develop this point in a forthcoming article. Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, which I am attaching to this statement, In our view, the Constitution
becomes more relevant and more stable when all branches and levels of government
do battle with one another.
12!.<ouis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated. It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273,
292 (Autumn 1993).
13 Leslie Goldstein, The ERA and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1 Law and Political Studies 145
(1987). See also Jane Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 47 (1989).
14 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 101 Stat. 1019, 1087
(1987).
15S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 13 (1982).
16 For 1L"l elaboration of why I think Boerne is of limited reach. see Neal Devins. How Not
to Chal1enge the Court. 39 Wm. & Mal:' L.Rev. (forthcoming 1998).
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Courts and elected officials should both be activists in shaping governmental policy, in large measure, because judges and politicians sometimes react differently to
social and political forces. Congress, for example, focuses its "energy mostly on the
claims of large populous interests, or on the claims of the wealthy and the powerful,
since that tends to be the best route to re-election.» 17 Courts, in contrast, are less
affected by these pressures, for judges possess life tenure. Accordingly, because special interest group pressures affect courts and elected officials in different ways, a
government-·~vide decisionmaking process encourages a full-ranging consideration of
the costs and benefits of different policy outcomes.
This politicization of constitutional discourse. while contributing to partisan
value-laden constitutional interpretation, is better than the alternatives-legislative
or judicial supremacy. Legislative supremacy, as Marbury recognized, would blur
the line separating the Constitution from ordinary laws. Moreover, subject to the
pressures of reelection, "legislatures are too likely to get caught up in the passions
of the moment, be they flag burning, alleged communists in the State Department,
to the need to really sock it to various types of criminal defendants." 18 For progressives and conservatives alike, lawmakers' propensity to do that which is politically
expedient makes legislative supremacy unpalatable.
Judicial exclusivity, like legislative supremacy, creates more problems than it
solves. ''When technologies are changing rapidly, when facts or values are unclear
and when democracy is in a state of moral flux, courts [with limited factfmding capacity and inability to respond quickly to changing circumstances] should recognize
that they may not have the best or fmal answers."19 Moreover, lacking the powers
of purse and sword, as Casey recognized, the Court's authority is necessarily tied
to "the people's acceptance for the Judiciary." The Court is well aware of this: for
example, Justice Owen Roberts, whose alleged "switch in time" saved the Lochner
Court from Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, acknowledged that "IlJooking back, it is
difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform
standards throughout the country." 20
To be sure, those who believe that Congress is not "ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values" 21 may question the practicality of this dynamic decisionmaking model. Populist constitutional
interpretation, however, serves as an important foil for the Court. In so doing, elected government interpretation makes the Constitution more relevant and more durable.
The saga of abortion rights underscores the appropriately interactive nature of
constitutional decisionmaking. 22 Roe v. Wade served as a critical trigger to judicial
recognition of abortion rights, overcoming politically potent pro-life interests that
have always stood in the way of populist abortion reform. Roe also prompted the
elected branches of government into action. From 1973 to 1989, 306 abortion-restricting measures were passed by forty-eight states. In 1992, after two decades of
elected government resistance as well as the appointment of new Supreme Court
Justices, the Court responded to these pressures and returned much of the abortion
issue to the states. Repudiating Roe's stringent trimester test in favor of a more deferential "undue burden" standard, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, while reafimning
''the central holding of Roe ," signalled the Court's increasing willingness to uphold
state regulation of abortion.
Without question, to a pro-choice advocate, Casey's balance sells out important interests of women, and, to a pro-lifer, it permits moral outrages to continue. But
there is no realistic alternative to Casey's balancing act. The political upheaval that
followed (and still follows) Roe reveals the unworkability of a strident pro-choice jurisprudence. But a jurisprudence allowing the prohibition of abortion is equally unworkable. In the years before Roe, when nontheraputic abortions were prohibited in
nearly every state, abortions were both less safe and almost as common as they are
today_ tntimately, abortion is too divisive for either pro-choice or pro-life absolutism
to rule the day_ Absent the constitutional dialogue that followed Roe, however, the
politically unworkable trimester standard would have remained in place.
17 Steven G. Calabresi~ Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 269,273 (1993).
18Id.
19 Cass Sunstein, Supreme Caution: Once Again the High Court Takes Only Small Steps,
Wash. Post, July 6, 1997 at C-l.
20 Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution 61 (1951).
21 Owen Fiss, The Fonns of Justice, 93 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 10 (1979).
22For a detailed treatment of this point, see Neal Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values:
Elected Government, the Supreme Court, and the Abortion Debate (1996).
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CONCLUSION

Congress must not shy away from its responsibil:ty to interpret the Constitution

~d, when necessary, challenge the Court. Delegations of constitutional responsibilIty to th~ courts throu$:h ex:pedited review provisions or suggestions that Court in-

terpretations are deimltive both weaken the Congress and the Constitution.23 Our
systt:m of government, as Justice Ginsburg rightly observed at their conf"mnation
heanng, is one where courts "do not guard constitutional rights alone. Courts share
that ~sponsibility with Congress, the President, the states, and the people."24
. 'rhis process of "ambition counteracting ambition" is central to our system of div.lded tI0vernment. By empow.e~g "we the people" through their elected representatives, It also make the ConstitutIOn more vital, more durable, and more democratic.

Mr. CANADY. Okay; thank you, Professor Devins. Professor
Kinkopf.
STATEMENT OF NEIL KINKOPF, VISITING ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL
Mr. KINKOPF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the com-

mittee. It's a real honor to appear before you today and a particular
privilege to appear on such a distinguished panel.
The relationship between Congress and the Court with respect to
constitutional interpretation calls to mind Justice Jackson's observation that the Constitution "enjoins upon the branches of the Federal Government separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity." We've heard a lot of discussion this morning about the
separateness and the independence of the roles of the branches in
interpreting the Constitution.
I would like to focus on the interdependence and reciprocity. In
particular, I would like to focus on the deference that the Court
owes to Congress's constitutional interpretations contained in legislation and in the legislative record that supports that legislation.
There is no broadly-applicable rule to determine whether, or even
to what extent, the Court owes deference to Congress. It depends
on the context and content of particular legislation and the legislative record. For example, the Court will extend differing levels of
deference depending on whether legislation draws classifications
based on race, based on gender, or based on, say, age. I want to
discuss the deference that the Court owes to congressional constitutional interpretation in the ccntext of separation of powers and the
structure of the Federal Government.
I think first it would be useful to recall the two fundamental purposes underlying the structure of the Federal Government. First,
because the framers feared that large concentrations of unchecked
power are subject almost inevitably to abuse, the Constitution separates the Government into three branches and makes each branch
the primary guardian of its own constitutional role, arming it constitutionally with checking powers on the others.
Second, the Constitution sought to create a viable and effective
national Government, particularly in light of its experience under
23 For a critical examination of Congress's employment of an expedited judicial review provision in 1996 item veto legislation, see Neal Devins and Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. ~yrd and the Modem Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrom;ations, 86 000. L.J. 351 (t997).
24 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. 50
(l993).
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the Articles of Confederation. The power to establish the procedures, structures, and mechanisms of that effective self-government
is granted primarily to the Congress.
Now there's tension that arises between these two structural
purposes, particularly when Congress legislates in a way that is
perceived to undermine the separateness of the branches. The
Court has resolved that tension largely by according great deference to Congress's constitutional judgment that a given measure
will be effective and will not subvert the constitutional separation
of powers.
In granting that deference, the Court places a great deal of emphasis on the initial judgment not to rely on parchment barriers
between the branches, but rather to defer to each branch's ability
to act as the primary guardian of its own role.
One might view the Court's precedents in this area as according
slightly less preference when the branch affected by a given piece
of legislation is the judiciary itself. I don't that's cynical on the part
of the Court, if in fact that's the case, but rather it's because the
Court's check from the Constitution is judicial review. And so, it is
in accord with its role as the primary guardian-its duty as the
primary guardian of its own constitutional role-that the Court
would perhaps grant slightly less deference where a given statute
affects the judiciary.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Boerne stands in contrast
to this approach. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was supported by an extensive legislative recorj in support of Congress's
judgment that RFRA \vas constitutional. And the Supreme Court
recognized that the Boerne case was one that fundamentally involved separation of powers. They were concerned about whether
Congress had actually sought to exercise the judicial power.
I believe that in striking down RFRA, the Supreme Court may
well have been insufficiently deferential to Congress's constitutional judgment. I think the Boerne court's failure to be sufficiently
deferential can be traced to the fact that although the Court recognized the separation of powers setting for its decision, it didn't recognize the precedents that it could have looked to for guidance as
to just how deferential it should have been.
But it also brings us to a second point-and I notice my time has
expired-Mr. CANADY. You may continue.
Mr. KINKOPF [continuing]. :aut if I can get to the second point,
which is that Congress can help the Court be deferential. In particular, Congress can make findings that demonstrate that it recognizes the barriers and boundaries to its own powers, which is what
particularly motivated the Court in Boerne and in a number of
other recent cases, particularly I'm thinking of the Lopez decision
striking down the Gun..Free School Zones Act.
The Court has been particularly concerned wIth making sure
that Congress stays within its enumerated powers, and it views it
as perhaps its most important function-to make sure that the
Congress does that. If Congress establishes a legislative record that
identifies the boundaries of its power and that makes findings that
demonstrate that the legislation it has enacted is drawn with respect to those boundaries, keeping those boundaries on its power
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in mind, then the Court has indicated that it will accord great deference to Congress's constitutional judgments.
And in both Boerne and Lopez, the Court expressed its concern
that it couldn't find that in the legislative record. Now in the
Boerne case that's understandable, because there was disagreement
between the Congress and the Court about where the boundary on
that power was, whether the power under section 5 was simply
preventive and remedial, or whether it included some sort of substantive component.
But I think the more general point still holds, and that is that
in the case where it's unclear that Congress has acted within the
scope of its powers, the Court will look to the legislative record,
and if Congress has established a legislative record that both identifies the barriers on its power and the ways in which the particular enactment stay within respect of those boundaries, the Court
will, in fact, defer to Congress's constitutional judgments.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kinkopf follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEIL KINKOPF, VISITING AssISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAw,
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY LAw ScHOOL

. It is an honor to be invited to give testimony before this subcommittee and to appear on such a distinguished panel. The topic of today's hearing, "Congress, the
Court, and the Constitution" calls to mind Justice Jackson's observation on the relationship between the branches of the federal government. The Constit1.:.tion, he said,
"enjoins upon [the] branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 1 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Boerne v. Flores,2 affords en ex·
cellent opportunity for examining both the separateness and the interdependence of
constitutional interpretation by the courts and by Congress. I will have a few words
to say about the separateness and independence of congressional constitutional interpretation, but I want to concentrate on the interdependence and reciprocity of judicial and congressional constitutional interpretation. In particular, I will examine
the level of deference that the courts owe to Congress's constitutional judgments.
I will begin by discussing the level of deference due Congress~s constitutional judgments in separation of powers cases generally. This discussion will set the stage for
examining the level of deference that was due and that was actually accorded in
Boerne. I will then draw from this examination observations about how Congress
can help the Courts defer to Congress's constitutional judgments. I arrive at two
conclusions, First, where it is unclear whether Congress has acU'd within the scope
of one of its enumerated powers, the Court will be deferential to Congress's judgment that it has acted within that power, but the extent of the deference will be
greater-and perhaps determinatively so-where Congress has made fmdings that
indicate Congress is aware of the nature and limits of the enumerated power it is
exercising and has drafted its legislation in recognition of and conformance to those
limits. Second, where there is concern that Congress has actually exercised the
power of another branch, the legislative history should specifically address this concern and explain how Congress has sought to avoid stepping beyond the legislative
sphere and has indulged interbranch comity with respect to the executive or judiciary.
After this discussion of the interdependence between Congress and the Courts, I
will tum to their independenca and review some of the benefits that derive from
congressional non-acquiescence in Supreme Court doctrine. This discussion draws
on analogous executive branch approach to non-acquiescence. I conclude that there
are important benefits to be derived from Congress exercising an independent interpretive role, even where its interpretation conflicts with the Supreme Court's.

:a Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579.635 (952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2117 3. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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I. INTERDEPENDENCE: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
JUDGMENTS

A. The General Separation of Powers Context
There is in fact no single level of deference that the courts do or should accord
Congress's constitutional judgments. Instead, me level of deference due a congressional constitutional judgment depends on the subject matter of the legislation
under review and the specific power under which Congress is acting as well as the
c,?ntext and content of the specific legislation. So, for example, the courts will accord
~ering levels of deference to Congress's constitutional judgments in connection
WIth legislation that draws racial classifications, gender-based classifications, and
age-based classifications. Because many of the recent cases that have starkly posed
the question of deference, including Boerne, have arisen in the context of separation
of powers, 3 I will confme my inquiry to the level of deference that the judici~ owes
Congress's constitutional judgments regarding the allocation and exercise of the federal government's power.
Even under the heading "separation of powers," the level of judicial deference due
Congress's constitutional determinations will vary. It is helpful to remember the
purposes that the constitutional structure of the federal government is designed to
serve. The Constitution structures the federal government to achieve two fundamental purposes. First, it safeguards the liberty of the governed by dividing the federal
government into three branches and assigning each a distinct role in the exercise
of federal power. 4 The framers accepted the premise that large concentrations of unchecked power were peculiarly subject to abuse and so divided the constitutional
powers of the federal government into three branches and subjected each branch in
the exercise of its power to checking or limiting power vested in the others. 5 The
natural ambition of each branch would lead it to prevent the others from encroaching upon its constitutionally assigned sphere. 6 Under this design, then, each branch
is to be the primary guardian of its own constitutional role. Second, the Constitution's framers were determined to create a viable and effective national government
to replace what they regarded as the embarrassing spectacle of ineffectual national
government under the Articles of Confederation.7 The Constitution assigns Congress
the function of establishing effective forms of national self-government and grants
Congress broad powers to structure the federal government primarily through the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 8 Congress establishes the structure of the ex~cutive
and judicial branches. Within that structure it orders and arranges the powers and
duties of each by establishing departments and agencies 9 and the subunits and bureaus of each, as well as by creating all offices and defIning their duties and powers
and the limits on those duties and powers. Congress also prescribes the procedures
officials must follow in exercising federal pciwer and the conditions on which that
power may be exercised. In sum, while the Constitution creates the executive and
judicial branches, Congress gives each its form and content, according to its j udg3 The Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine of separation of powers to resolve a large number of recent controversies. see. e.g.• Printz v. United States. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Edmond
v. United States. 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997); Clinton v. Jones. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997 ); Loving v.
United States. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Co.• 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
including at least one caSE where the litigants apparently did not realize the doctrine was implicated. See Lebron v. National Passenger Railroad C9rp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
4See. e.g., Loving v. United States. 116 S. CL 1737, 1743 (1996); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm
Co .• 115 S. Ct. 1447. 1463 (1995) (Breyer. J .• concurring); Metropolitan Washington Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise. 501 U.S. 25?. 272 (1991); Young v. United
States ex reI. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 824 (1987); Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714.
730 (1986); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634-35 (1952) (Jackson. J .•
concurring); THE FEDERALIST No. 47. at 302-03 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter. ed. 1961).
5 See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-49.51.
6THE FEDERALIST No. 51. at 337 (Edward Mead Earle. ed. 1976)
7 See. e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter. ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, at 321 (Madison). The Court has repeatedly identifie4 effective self-government as an
important policy derived from. and to be applied in questions regarding. the constitutional structure of the federal Bovemment. See. e.g .• Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361. 381 (1989);
Buckley v. United States, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam); Panama Refg Co. v. Ryan. 293
U.S. 388,421 (1935); Union Bridge Co. v. United States. 27 S. Ct. 367. 374 (1907) Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 24 S. Ct. 349,355 (1904); Field v. Clark, 12 S. Ct. 495,505 (1892).
8 U.S. Const. Art. I. § 8 cl. 17. On Congress's broad authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, see M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 WheaL) 316 (1819). The Constitution specifically
confers significant latitude in Congress to structure the federal judiciary in Article III. See U.S.
Const. Art. III, §§ 1, 2.
9In the case of the judiciary. it creates and structures the various article III courts and the
agencies and offices that support those courts, such as the Administrative Office of United
States Courts and magistrate judgeships.
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ment as to which forms will be most effective within the constraints of the Constitution's text and structure. 10
It is occasionally asserted that Congress has exercised its Necessary and Proper
Clause power in a way that impermissibly encroaches upon one of the other
branches by enacting legislation t11at interferes with the ability of one of the other
b.ranches to perform its functions. 11 The two fundamental purposes of the Constitution's structure thus often come into tension. Rather than establishing a system of
specific, categorical rules to resolve this tension, the Supreme Court has interpreted
this division to be "governed according to common sense and the inherent neceEsities of the governmental co-ordination." 12 Indeed, the Supreme Court has fashioned a standard that, in both formulation and application, is extremely deferential
to the Congress's judgment that the resulting arrangement of federal power will
comport with the constitutional system of sepa1."ation of powers. Thus, the Court will
fmd Congress impermissibly to have interfered with one of the other branches only
if its enactment "prevents the [other b]ranch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions." 13 Even then, a statute that does so is unconstitutional only if
its impact is not justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
Congress's constitutional authority.l4
The Court has used this same general separation of powers formulation whether
Congress is asserted to have interfered with the executive branch or with on the
judicial branch. 15 The Court's application of this formulation has been only slightly
less deferential where a statute is asserted to have interfered with the judiciary as
compared with asserted interference with the executive. IS In Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor,l7 the Supreme Court held that Congress could authorize
a non-Article III court to decide a state common ~aw cause of action if raised as a
counterclaim in a proceeding that is otherwise validly before the tribunal. Generally,
such tribunals are authorized to hear regulatory or administrative claims but the
Supreme Court has held that Article III prohibits Congress from assigning them authority to hear causes of action that are within the core of Article III jurisdiction.
State common law causes of action are at the core of Article III's jurisdiction. In
Schor, the Court allowed a non-Article III tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over a
contract dispute, a classic state CGmmon law cause of action, that was raised as a
counterclaim in a proceeding initiated to resolve an administrative claim. While the
Court recognized that such claims implicate the core of the judicial power, it was
extremely deferential to Congress's constitutional conclusion that allowing the
CFTC to hear such disputes as counterclaims would not subvert the role of the judiciary or the constitutional balance of power. In particular, the Court deferred to
Congress's judgment that counterclaim jurisdiction was important to the CFTC's effective operation, pronouncing that the le~slation's "primary focus was on making
effective a specific regulatory scheme. . . . 18
This approach allows Congress to fulfill its constitutional role of arranging and
ordering the exercise of federal power through the forms it deems to be most effective and to maintain the constitutional balance of power, while preserving to each
branch the role of primary guardian of its constitutional sphere. It is in view of this
latter role that we fmd justification for the Court's somewhat less deferential appli10 On the importance of effective self-government as a constitutional value. see GERHARD CASPER. SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD (1997); Peter M. Shane. Independent Policy making and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis. 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596
(1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of ARencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch. 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
11 I mean to distinguish those cases where Congress has impermissi
andized itself by
subject to its conassigning non-legislative power to itself. one of its committees. or an
trol See. e.g., Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). I discuss this anti-aggrandizement principle infra.
12J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
13 Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
141d.
15 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 3tH, 393 (1S89); CFTC v. Schor. 478 U.S. 833,
851 (1986) (emphasizing minimal I?ractical effect on the judiciary and importance of asserted
encroachment to challenged legislatIve scheme).
IGWhile the Court has typically ~pheld statutes against the assertion that they impermissibly
encroach upon the judiciary, see Schor; Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985), the
Court has occasionally struck down a statute on the grounds of encroachment on the judiciary.
see Schor. 478 U.S. at 851-52 (characterizing Northern Pil'-eline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Haybum's Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dan.) 408 (1792». In contrast, the
Court has never struck down a statute as an encroachment on the executive branch.
17 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
18 478 U.S. at 855; see also Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568,594 (1985). Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (applying test in the context of asserted interference with
the executive branch).
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cation of the general separation of powers principle to cases involving possible encroachments on the judicial branch as compared with the executive branch. In the
former, the Court acts as guardian of its own role, while in the latter the Court
steps back and allows the executive branch to guard itself. It bears emphasizing,
however, that the Court is only slightly less deferential to Congress's judgments in
cases involving asserted encroachment on the judiciary. The Court's deference in
these cases demonstrates the significance it places on Congress's function of establishing effective mechanisms of governance and its respect for Congress's constitutional judgment that the mechanisms it selects will not undermine the separation
of powers.
A related question derives from the constitutional division of power: Congress may
exercise only the legislative power. Any attempt by Congress to exercise judicial or
executive power, whether itself or through one of its committees or agents, is unconstitutional. 19 This much is uncontroversial. The difficult case arises when, in response to an assertion that a statute represents an exercise of a non-legislative
power, Congress can plausibly point to an expressly enumerated power as authority
for its statute. Put another way, how do we determine whether Congress, under the
guise of an enumerated power, has actually exercised an executive or judicial
power? At least one of the framers, James Madison, recognized this concern and
wrote:
The legislative department['s] . . . constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility,
mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it
makes on the coordinate departments. It is not infrequently a matter of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will,
or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere.20
Recalling the constitutional commitment to effective self-government and recognizing that the Constitution impresses upon each branch the duty to act as primary guardian of its own constitutional role and grants each branch powers to fulfIll
that duty, Congress should expect great deference to its determination that a given
piece of legislation represents a necessary and proper exercise of one of its constitutionally enumerated powers. 21 Indeed, James Madison made the above-quoted observation in the context of arguing that the only effective means of keeping Congress within the legislative sphere would be through each branch acting to preserve
its constitutional role rather than through rigid and formalistic "parchment barriers."
While Madison was prescient in foreseeing this controversy, it has only rarely materialized. The question whether Ifgislation is within Congress's enumerated power,
or whether it is properly seen as an exercise of a non-legislative power has most
often involved concern that Congress has exercised an executive power, particularly
the appointment power. The Constitution establishes a clear division of labor with
respect to creating and filling federal offices. The Constitution assigns Congress the
power to create offices and assigns the President primary responsibility for filling
them. 22 This clear line separating the power to create offices from the power to appoint officers is breached when Congress adds duties to an existing office. While
Congress plainly has authority to defme and redefme offices, there is concern that
in addi.'1g duties to an existing office with a known occupant, Congress will ha ·,e
essentially created a new office and chosen the officer to fill the "new" office. 23 It
was on this ground that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act was ruled unconstitutional. 24
19 See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington .Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Bowsher. 478 U.S. at 727; Itlyers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52 (1926).
20THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 323 (Madison) (Edward Mead Earle, ed. 1976).
21 See, e.g., M'Culioch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22The Appointments Clause requires the President to obtain the Senate's advice and consent
and allows Congress, in establishing inferior offices, to provide for appointment by the President, a court of law, or a department head without Senate confirmation. However one characterizes the President's role, what is clear :s that the Constitution specifically and intentionally
withheld the power to fill offices from Congress. The framers were concerned placing the power
to create offices and the power to fill them in the same hands would lead to abuse.
23 A closely related issue would arise if legislation were to abolish an office and recreate it.
In this case, the issue would be whether Congress had exercised the executive removal power
undet" the guise of its structural ~wer under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
2. Until J.989 the savings and loan, or thrift, industry was regulated by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. FIRREA abolished
Continued
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As the framers anticipated, these controversies are typically resolved between the
Congress and the executive branch without involving the judiciary. Nevertheless,
the courts have had occasion to fashion a standard, known as the Shoemaker doctrine, to govern this controversy. As with the approach to separation of powers generally, the Shoemaker doctrine is. in both formulation and application, extremely
deferential to Congress. It requires only that the new duties be germane to the office's pre-existing duties. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that any
commissioned military officer could be detailed to act as a military judge without
a formal constitutional appointment because the duties of a military judge are sufficiently germane to the duties of any commissioned officer of thf') armed forces. 25 A
compa~son of the duties of a Second Lieutenant on a naval supply ship, for example, With the duties of a military judge demonstrates just how deferential the
Court's application of the germaneness requirement can be.
B. Deference in Boerne
~ast term, the case of Boerne v. Flores 26 presented the question of how to address
thiS controversy when legislation is attacked as an exercise of the judicial power,
rather than the executive power. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine
whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was a valid exercise of
Congress's broad authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or instead represented congressional exercise of the judicial power. 27 Consistent with the
Court's approach to separation of powers generally, as discussed above, and in recognition of the important constitutional values supporting that approach, the Court
should have employed a deferential standard similar to the Shoemaker germaneness
requirement and have applied that standard with slightly greater scrutiny, which
is to say with slightly less deference, than the Court accords in the Shoemaker context. In fact, this is precisely what the Court purported to do.
In formulating the governing standard, the Court virtually paraphrased the Shoemaker germaneness re'luirement. It held that "[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between Congress's enumerated power and the "means adopted to
that end." 28 In the same breath, the Court expressed its considerable deference for
Congress's judgment, ''the line between m.easures that" are within and without
Congress's authority "is not easy to disceIn, and Congress must have wide latitude
in determinins where it lies . . . ." 29 Despite the articulated standard and expressed intentIon to accord substantial deference to Congress's constitutional judgment that the enactment of RFRA was within its enumerated powers, the Court
ruled the Act unconstitutional on the ground that RFRA was not within Congress's
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress had compiled an impressive and extensive legislative record detailing
the injuries that it sought to remedy through RFRA and the need for legislation to
remedy those injuries. 30 I believe that the Court articulated an appropriately deferential standard by which to review whether RFRA was within Congress's enumerated power to enact but that, in light of the extensive legislative fmdings and conclusions, the Court was insufficiently deferential in applying that standard to
Congress's constitutional judgment that RFRA was within its authority. Why, then,
was the Court insufficiently deferential to Congress's determination? Part of the
blame obviously rests with the Court. The Court failed to locate its analysis within
the broader separation of powers context or even within the more specific context
of cases, like Shoemaker and Weiss, that examine whether Congress has actuaily
exercised the power of another branch or has remained within its enumerated powers. Had it explored this context, it would have found further support for the "conthese entities and replaced them with the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Savings Association Insurance Fund. OTS differed from FHLBB primarily in that it would be headed by an individual director, rather than a three-member board. FIRREA provided that the chainnan of the
board of the FHLBB would serve as the initial director of OTS. See Olympic Fed. Sav. & Loon
v. Director, Office of Thrift Supel"visioll, 732 F. Supp. 1183 <D.D.C. 1990).
25 Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994).
26 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
271 do not mean to suggest that this determination turns on Congress's motive. In the Shoemaker context, for example, Congress may not add extraneous duties to an office, regardless of
its motive for doing so. Compare Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 759 (suggesting that where the legislation
adds the new duties not to a specific office but to a large class of offices, gennaneness may be
required only if there is evidence that the legislation is motivated by a congressional attempt
to exercise the appointment power). It is, in that sense, an objective standard. If Congress adds
non·germane duties to an existing office, it has exercised the appointment power, whether it
subjectively meant to or not.
281d. at 2164.

291d.

30See, (or example, the extensive history cited by Boerne itself. [d. at 2169.
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gruence and proportionality" standard it articulated, but would also have garnered
concrete guidance on how to apply that standard. 31 This would have indicated using
Shoemaker and Weiss as a baseline against which to assess the level of deference
due Congress's fmdings and conclusion, and should have alerted the Court that the
level reflected in its decision was inadequate.
Nevertheless, Congress has the means to provide the Court a basis for appropriate deference to Congress's constitutional judgments. The Constitution embodies
the fundamental judgment that the federal government is a limited government of
expressly enumerated powers. Although the line between actions that fall within
these powers and outside of them is not always clear, the line "exists and must be
observed."32 The Court takes very seriously its role in ensuring that Congress does
not either itself take action or authorize other federal action that is beyond these
enumerated powers, and may in fact view this as its most important function. 33 One
might ask why the Court should require Congress to make such fmdings expressly.
Surely Congress's judgment that a given piece of legislation is within its constitutional power to enact is implicit in its enactment. In the vast majority of cases, the
Court accepts Congress's implicit judgment. \\1bere it is clear to the Court that the
enactment is within Congress's authority, it requires no express corroboration. It is
where the Court cannot perceive how the enactment respects the constitutional limits on Congress's authority that it looks to Congress for an explanation in the form
of fmdings and a legislative record. First, this exercise ensures that Congress recognizes the same limits on its power that the Court perceives and that Congress has
drawn its legislation to conform to those limits. Second, there is reason to doubt
that Congress considers the constitutionality of each provision of each piece of legislation it enacts and therefore to question whether enactment carries an implicit congressional determination of constitutionality. For example, Congress has enacted
hundreds of legislative vetoes since the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional
in EN'S v. Chadha. 34 There is no indication that Congress pauses to consider the
constitutionality of these provisions before enacting them. It is understandable,
therefore, that the Court may have some doubt as to whether Congress actually considers the constitutionality of each provision it enacts. If Congress has not, to what
is the Court to defer?
In Boerne the Court examined the legislative record for evidence that Congress
recognized the extent and limits on its Section 5 power and had drafted RFRA with
those limits in mind. The Court noted that the record lacked evidence of "animus
or hostility to the burdened religious practices" and was not directed to the issue
of the intent underlying generally applicable state laws and local ordinances. More
important, the legislative record did not attempt, in the view of the Court, to demonstrate a congruence and proportion between the operative provisions of RFRA and
the Congress's power under Section 5 to remedy or prevent violations of individual
constitutional rights. In this connection, the Court emphasized RFRA's "universal
coverage" and, at least by implication, the legislative record's failure to consider
whether a different standard might be appropriate in different contexts, such as
prison management as opposed to state employment as opposed to zoning regulation. 3s Finally, the legislative record included significant indication that RFRA was
in fact designed to exercise the judicial power by overruling the Supreme Court's

-----An analogy may be illuminating. Merely articulating the strict scrutiny standard, which re31

quires that legislative means be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest, does
not fully capture strictness with which that standard is applied. This can be seen most clearly
by examining the practical application of the standard in the Court's precedents. Similarly, a
full appreciation for the deference due Congress is most clearly seen from the deference actually
accorded in separation of powers cases involving the judiciary. such as Schor, as compared with
those involving the executive, such as Morrison. as well as those involving concern that Congress has exercised the power of another branch, such as Shoemaker and Weiss.
32Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
33See id. at 2162 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803»; see also United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
34 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See Louis Fisher, The Legislatiue Veto: Invalidated It Survives, 56 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 273,288 (1993).
36 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
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decision in Oregon v. Smith. 36 It is, at least conceivably, within Congress's ability
to remedy each of these shortcomings in the legislative record. 37
A second case is instructive, United States v. Lopez. This case raised the question
whether Congress had acted within the scope of its power under the Commerce
Clause. 38 Congress had enacted a statute making it a federal offense to possess a
gun in a school zone. T'ae question presented was, in shorthand, whether tlie JlC?ssession of a gun in a school zone is an "activity . . . that substantially affect[s] interstate commerce." There, the Court did not perceive the substantial effect and so
looked for legislative fmdings in order that it might defer t.o Congress, but found
them lacking.39
This review of Boerne and Lopez yields two observations. First, where it is unclear
whether Congress has acted within the scope of one of its enumerated powers, the
Court will be d.eferential to Congress's judgment that it has acted within that power,
but the extent of the deference will be greater-and perhaps determinatively sowhere Congress has made fmdings that indicate CongJ."ess is aware of the nature
and limits of the enumerated power it is exercising and has drafted its legislaticn
in recognition of and conformance to those limitS.40 Put another way, the courts will
defer to Congress's interpretation of its own constitutional authority, such as under
the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, when there is an
interpretation to defer to. Second, where there is cnncern that Congress has actually
exercised the power of another branch, the legislative history should specifically address this concern and explain how Congress has sought to avoid stepping beyond
the legislative sphere and has indulged interbranch comity with respect to the executive or judiciary, as the case may be.
II. CONGRESS'S INDEPENDENT ROLE IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

While Boerne demonstrates that the Court will extend broad deference to
Congress's constitutional judgment, reflected in a well-developed legislative record,
that it has drafted legislation that remains within the boundaries of enumerated
congressional authority, Boerne also indicates that the Court will not defer to
Congress's determination on the logically prior question: precisely where those
boundaries are drawn. Nevertheless, there are important benefits t.o be derived from
Congress expressing, including as the declared basis for legislation, its own constitutional interpretation. First, where Congress adheres to a constitutional interpretation that is at odds with the Court's precedents and legislates on that basis, it gives
the Court an opportunity to reconsider and overrule its precedents. Once again,
Boerne is instructive. Each of the three dissenting justices urged the Court to use
RFRA as an occasion to revisit and overrule its decision in Smith.41 A less dramatic
consequence than overruling a precedent or line of precedents, Congress's adherence
to its own constitutional interpretation may give the Court an opportunity to develop its doctrine within the confmes of existing precedent or to consider constitu36 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Boerne Court began its analysis by observing that "Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court·s decision in . . . Smith."" 117 S. Ct. at 2160. The
findings and purposes set forth in RFRA support the Court's view. These findings include statements that may be taken to assert the meaning of religious liberty protected under the first
amendment, criticize Smith, and articulate a different constitutional standard for assessing
First Amendment claims than the Court had fashioned in Smith. See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a) &
(b). The Court appears to have adopted this understanding of RFRA. 117 S. Ct. at 2161 ("Many
[members of Congress] criticized the Court's reasoning thY} Smith]. and this disagreement resulted in the passage of RFRA. ").
37 I do not mean to say Congress can necessarily. or easily, satisfy the Court. The legislative
record that Congress compiled to support enactment of RFRA included an understandable deficiency; it did not recognize that Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was limited to remedial and preventive action. This deficiency is understandable because,
until the Court decided Boerne, the Court had not articulated. that limitation. It is now possible
for Co>ngress torevisit the question of how to remedy and prevent religious discrimination with
these limitations in mind and to draft a bill suppor..ed by a legislative record that reflects
Congre~s's constitutional judgm~nt that the measure wil~ remed~ ~d ~revent religious. discrimination m ways that are proportIonal to and congruent WIth the lilDltatlOns of Congress s author~
ity under Section 5. The Boerne opinion demonstrates that the Court will regard such the constitutional judgment contained in such a legislative record with great deference.
38 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39 See 115 S. Ct. at 1632. But see id. at 1659-61 (Breyer. J., dissenting).
40See PhilipP. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996) (reviewing the benefits
of requiring legislative findings to determine whether Congress acted within its Commerce
CJause power).
41 See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2185-86 (Souter. J., dissenting) (expressing desire to reconsider Smith and articulating grave doubts about its its "precedential value and its entitlement to adherence").
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tional theories that had not previously been argued. Thus, when Congress exercises
its independent constitutional judgment, it can actually support and promote
Court's ability to perform its "duty . . . to say what the law is"42 in a way that
slavish adherence to precedent does not. 43

Mr.

CANADY.

Thank you. Professor Strossen.

STATEMENT OF NADINE STROSSEN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
CIVll.. LffiERTIES UNION

Ms. STROSSEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Hyde, Chairman Canady, Representative Scott, and other distinguished members of the committee and distinguished members of the panel. It's
really a pleasure, I have to say, to be here, as well as an honor.
Chairman Canady introduced me as the president of the American Civil Liberties Union. That is my volunteer position. I also
want to state on the record tha" I earn my living as a law professor. I teach constitutional law. l,hairman Canady said to me when
we spoke before these proceedings began that this would be like a
seminar, and I have to agree; it certainly is an intellectual feast,
to quote that notorious judicial activist, Antonin Scalia. [Laughter.]
But, of course, there are also enormous consequences in terms of
individual rights for these discussions that we're holding, and I'd
like to zero in on that issue wearing my ACLU hat. It seems to
me-and I'm delighted-that every person who has testified so far,
including the Members of Congress as well as the academic experts, have agreed that Congress has not only the right, but also
the responsibility t o reach its own independent judgments as to the
constitutionality of parti~ular measures.
I'm so happy that there is agreement and, apparently, enthusiasm about pursuing th at role more vigorously, because I have to
agree with Congressman Frank, when he said that too often his
colleagues are not sufficiently concerned about constitutional
issues. Too often we're in the position of trying to persuade Members of Congress to vote against something on the ground that it's
unconstitutional, and we are told that that is not something that
they feel it is appropriate for them to take into account. So, to the
extent that there is a consensus that we should redouble our commitment in all branches of Government to enforce the Constitution,
I think that's wonderful.
Now, where I see some possible breakdown in the unanimity goes
to the second point I would like to address and that is what law
professors and judges often call the one-way ratchet of interpreting
constitutional rights or individual freedom independently of the
courts. And the notion there is that, yes, Congress does have-and
for that matter the executive branch of Government also has-independent power and authority to interpret the Constitution regarding individual rights, but only insofar as rights are more securely
protected or there is a more expansive vision of individual liberty
that results from that reinterpretation.
42Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803).
43 I do not mean to endorse contumacious adherence to rejected interpretations. Such resistance can siplificantly undermine the ability of the judiciary to fulfill its constitutional role. The
possibility of such a course of action does not alone eliminate the benefits that m~ follow on
a responsible adherence to a constitut.ional interpretation in conflict with Supreme Court precedent. As is often the case, this is a question of balance.
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Congress does not, under this theory, have the power to reject a
Supreme Court decision that says, for example, a certain law violates the First Amendment, and go ahead and re-pass that law (although obviously, the Congress has the power to pass a constitutional amendment). One way that I like to summarize this for my
constitutional law students is that the Supreme Court can put a
floor under our constitutional rights, but it cannot impose a ceiling
over them.
Conversely, though, that vl-ould mean that Congress could not
sink beneath that floor that the Supreme Court has articulated. I
wasn't sure whether Con~essman Hostettler would agree with
that one-way ratchet theory. I got a little uncomfortable when I
heard him criticizing a decision of a Federal court that a certain
law that had been passed by Congress violated the First Amendment. I don't think it would be within Congress's prerogative to
second guess such a judicial interpretation if it were from the Supreme Court, and the example that he referred to was not from the
Supreme Court, so perhaps I have no need to be concerned on that
score.
The other possible breakdown in the unanimity here on this oneway ratchet theory of expanding individual rights is, of course, the
Supreme Court's decision in the Boerne case, and I was happy to
hear my distinguished colleagues on this panel agree that that decision is quite questionable.
As Congressman Hyde knows, I had the pleasure of testifying in
favor of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, both in the House
and in the Senate. The ACLU spearheaded the coalition, called the
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, that lobbied very
strongly for RFRA and argued for it in the Supreme Court, and,
coincidentally, even as we are meeting here this morning, that coalition is still engaging in discussions about what's next, what steps
can be taken, either by Congress or in other branches of Government, to secure the expanded vision of religious liberty that RFRA
embodies, and that the Supreme Court rejected.
1\Tow, I do agree though with colleagues \\"ho have said that the
RFRA decision, the Boerne decision, does still leave some openings,
and I think that's important. I didn't hear the Supreme Court there
to be completely rejecting this one-way ratchet of constitutional
law.
May I please beg the Chair's indulgence to continue?
Mr. CANADY. Please continue.
Ms. STROSSEN. I'll try to be very brief. So I agree that Congress
has the power to expand constitutional rights. I am concerned,
though, about a possible subtext when courts expansively interpret
constitutional rights beyond what Members of Congress are willing
to support, at least publicly. I'm going to give you an example.
When the ACLU lobbied against the Communications Decency
Act, we were told by a number of Members of Cangress that they
understood that it was unconstitutional, or probably unconstitutional, but they didn't want to risk the ire of their constituency by
voting against something that could result in their being labeled
soft on porn or soft on crime. And, when the Supreme Court agreed
with us and struck down that law, essentially unanimously, in a
case that I'm happy is called Reno v. ACLU, a number of Members
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of Congress who had voted for the law told us they were relieved
that the Supreme Court had voted as it did.
I think it's very striking that the members of the Supreme Court,
as well as the six lower court judges who ruled on the CDA were
unanimous in finding it unconstitutional across a very broad ideological and political spectrum. These judges were appointed by five
different presidents-three Republicans and two Democrats-and
when this United States Supreme Court is unanimous that a law
is constitutional, it is really unconstitutional.
Having said that, it's quite shocking when you consider how
very, very few Members of Congress voted against the CDA, and,
of course, the Administration enthusiastically supported it. So, I'm
very concerned that we have too many elected officials who are not,
in fact, seriously upholding their oath to defend the Constitution.
Then, to add insult to injury, they turn around and attack those
members of the Federal judiciary who do have the political courage
and who do take those oaths seriously, even in striking down very
politically popular measures.
I'm going to end by harking back to the underlying principles of
separation of powers aJ.ld checks and balances. I wanted to underscore one additionai function to those that were laid out by Professor Kinkopf. It's the one that I have foremost in mind, and if I had
more time I would cite evidence that the founders had foremost in
mind, and that is to maximize individual liberty.
The Supreme Court reminded us of that essential function in the
Mistretta case in 1989. The Court stressed that separation of powers is not an end in itself; rather, quote, "it is an essential means
to the preservation of liberty."
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Strossen follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NADINE STROSSEN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAI~ CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee:
I am Nadine Strossen, President of the American Civil Liberties Union and Professor of Law at New York Law School, where I teach constitutional law.
I want to thank House Judiciary Committee Chair Henry Hyde as well as the
Constitution Subcommittee Chair Charles Canady and Ranking Minority Member
Bobby Scott for inviting me to testify on the vitally important-and perennially controversial-subject of "Congress, the Court, and the Constitution."
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU is a nation-wide, non-partisan organization of more than 275,000 members devoted to protecting the principles of freedom
set forth in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.
I understand that these hearings have been called in response to charges by some
members of Congress and by some citizens' groups that federal judges have engaged
in inappropriate "activism" that, in their view, undermines democratic principles
and the separation of powers. Proposed solutions to this alleged problem include
calls for impeaching particular judges and amending the Constitution to constrain
the power and independence of all federal judges through such means as imposing
fIXed, limited judicial terms of office and allowing Congress to override judicial decisions on constitutional issues.
While I welcome the Committee's discussion of these important issues, I disagree
both with the diagnosis of the alleged problem and with the vaunted solutions. Not
only is there no disease of unwarranted judicial activism, but even if there were,
the proposed cures would be worse than the disease. And, in so stating, I speak in
both of my capacities,: as a scholar and teacher of constitutional law and as head
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of the organization that has been hailed by supporters and critics alike as the most
influential advocate of constitutional rights in our nation's courts. l
. Critics denounce as inappropriate activism judges enforcement of constitutional
nghts, especially when the consequence is to invalidate government measures that
are supported by the majority of elected officials and the electorate, and especially
when the most immediate beneficiaries are unpopular or controversial individuals
or disempowered minority groups. But, far from deciding such judicial action as deviating from the judiciary's constitutionally designated role, as critics contend, I applaud it for faithfully fulfilling the Constitution's commands concerning individual
rights and the judiciary's responsibility to protect them.
Although all elected and appointed government officials take the same oath to defend and uphold the Constitution, far too often, elected officials honor that pledge
in the breach. When it would be politically unpopular to stand up for constitutional
principles rather than follow the latest public opinion poll, too many politicians ignore our nation's original "Contract with America," our Constitution and Bill of
Rights. To add insult to injury, they then attack the federal judges who do have the
political courage to abide by their oath to enforce constitutional limits on governmental power and to uphold constitutional guarantees of individual liberty.
Regardless of whether I agree or disagree with a particular judge's ruling in a
specific case-and, certainly, my ACLU colleagues and I have criticized many court
decisions over the years-I respect the independence of the judicial branch of our
federal government, and the special role it holds in the carefully structured system
of limited and divided governmental powers that our constitutional framers devised.
The remedy for particular decisions with which one disagrees is to seek relief
within the judicial system itself. A number of rulings that have provoked denunciations have in fact been overturned-to cite one recent example, Judge Thelton Henderson's preliminary injunction against the implementation of California's anti-affirmative action voter initiative, Proposition 209. 2 The ACLU led the constitutional
challenge to Proposition 209, advancing strong arguments-consistent with Supreme
Court precedents and constitutional principles-that it violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, I
disagreed with the ruling of the federal appellate court that rejected these arguments and overturned Judge Henderson's order.3 However, in contrast to some Congressional and other critics of Judge Henderson's ruling, neither I nor any of the
ACLlYs broad-based coalition partners in the Proposition 209 case have called for
the impeachment of the appellate judges who denied our claims.
In addition to seeking to overturn particular rulings by appealing those rulings
themselves, anyone who has a certain vision of constitutional rights-or of limits on
those rights-can also seek to influence constitutional law through longer-term
strategies aimed at remolding the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution. The most famous example of this longer-range approach is the NAACP's carefully orchestrated series of cases that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education,4
in which the Supreme Court unanimously overturned an earlier decision, Plessy v.
Ferguson,5 and held that racially segregated public schools violate the Constitution's
equality guarantee, repudiating the "separate-but-equal" doctrine.
More recently, we have witnessed a campaign using a similar strategy to advance
a dLlferent constitutional vision: the efforts by "pro-life" forces to overturn Roe v.
Wade,6 with its recognition of constitutional protection for women's reproductive
freedom. While these efforts have not achieved the outright and complete reversal
of Roe, they have resulted in a substantial cutting-back on the scope of the night
that Roe had upheld, and a concomitant expansion in governmental power to restrict women's access to abortions. 7 I certainly disagree with the Supreme Court's
1 See, for example, the article by Ken Chowder in the current issue of the Smithsonian Magazine (January, 1998), "The ACLU Defends Everybody" (p. 86). He writes, "No matter what you
think of the ACLU, it is probably the most potent legal organization in America. . . . Its story
is virtually a highlight reel of 20th-centu~ legal history. . . . [O]ur modem defmition of liberty
has been greatly influenced by the ACLU." ld. at 88, 97. For a comparable assessment from
an ardent critic of the ACLU-and of "judicial activism"-see Robert Bork, Slouching Towards
Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline (1996) at 97 ("rr]he American Civil Liberties Union . . . has had, through litigation and lobbying, a very considerable effect upon
American law and culture."); id. at 98 ("The ACLU is the premier litigating and lobbying arm
of modem liberalism, and it has been extremely successful.").
2 Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
3 Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 107 F. 3d 704, rehearing denied, 122 F. 3d 692 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 17 (1997).
"349 U.s. 294 (1954).
5163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6410 U.S. 113 (1973).
?See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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post-Roe decisions that have curtailed women's reproductive rights. Again, though.
my belief that specific judges or courts are mistaken in particular rulings does not
undermine either my support for the independent federal judiciary as an institution,
or for the judicial review power, as essential pillars in our conatitutional structure.
The evolution of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in abortion cases, in the past
quarter-century since Roe, illustrates another important avenue of redress for those
who disagree with particular rulings, which - in contrast with radical proposals to
impeach judges or curtail their constitutional powers-is wholly consistent with the
Constitution. Specifically, the Constitution affords the President and the Senate an
?pportunity to influence the composition of the federal courts by confIrming or refllsmg to confirm individuals based on their character, qualifications, and the judicial
philosophies they espouse.
In this respect, as in so many others, I celebrate the genius of our Constitution.
which struck a delicate balance between-on the one hand-making federal judges
too beholden to majoritarian pressures, and thus not sufficiently protective of individual and minority group nghts, and-on the other hand-shielding judges too
much from majoritarian concerns, hence making them insufficiently accountable to
democratic processes. Avoiding both of these extremes, our Constitution affords federal judges some independence from majoritarian forces by guaranteeing them tenure "during good behavior," subject to removal only through the extraordinary process of impeachment; but the Constitution also imposes some degree of democratic
accountaoility on federal judges by requiring them to be nominated by the President
and confirmed by two-thims of the Senate.
In recent history, the nomination and conimnation process concerning federal
judges has received much political, media, and judicial appointments. Indeed, many
scholars and jurists have charged that this process has become too politicized, tilting
our Constitution's delicate balance too far away from judicial independence and too
far toward popular accountability. Putting aside the merits of those charges. it suffices for the present discussion to note that critics of Roe and other "activist" rulings
have had an enormoul:i influence in remaking the iederal courts, from the Supreme
Court on down, by electing Presidents who would nominate, and Senators who
would confmn, judges who shared their constitutional and judicial philosophy.
In short, critics of judicial "activism" have already had a significant influence on
the composition and philosophy of our federal courts, by acting through existing constitutional and legal channels. Therefore, I cannot understand either why they continue to complain of activism or why they still seek to alter our established constitutienal and legal processes.
The recently stepped-up attack on the perennial bogeymen of many (but, significantly, far from all 8) political conservatives, "activist" federal jud~es, is as ironically
ill-timed as it is dangerously destructive of fundamental constitutIonal values. While
the courts' critics decry ''tyranny of the judiciary," the alternative they advocate is
the far more dangerous ''tyranny of the majority."
The irony of the timing is that this attack comes while our federal courts continue
to be dominated by jud3!~nappointed during the twelve years of appointments by
the Reagan and Bush A . istrations. Both Administrations systematically selected
judges who as a group have a relatively narrow view of judicially enforceable constitutional rights. To compound the irony, as Attorney General, Ed Meese played an
instrumental role in this selection process; yet he is now railing against the federal
bench that still bears his stamp.
Nor has that stamp been significantly muted by President Clinton's subsequent
judicial app()intments. He has moved slowly and cautiously in filling federal Judicial
vacancies. He has avoided nominating individuals who would be ideological counterweights to the many extreme exponents of "judicial restraint" who had been appointed during the preceding dozen years. Moreover, as was recently noted by no
less staunch a conservative than Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Senate has been slow
to act on the judicial candidates that President Clinton has nominated. 9
B Many prominent conservatives have expressed grave concerns about the campaign against
"judicial activism," voicing many of the same misgivings set out in this testimony, including that
this campaign threatens the independence of tile judiciary and the security of constitutional
guarantees of individual liberty. See, e.g., Statement of Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow and Director,
Center for Constitutional Studies. Cato Institute, before tne Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives. May 15,
1997; Bruce Fein (Associate Deputy Attorney General in the Reagan Administration), Judge
Not, N.Y, TIMES, M@!{ 8, 1997 at A31.
'See Bruce Fein, The Chief Justice vs. H(Jt~h, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 6, 1998. at
A12 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist as stating: "The Senate confirmed only 17 judges in 11196
and 36 in 1997, well under the 101 judges it confirmed during 1994. . . . The Senate is surely
Continued
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The ideological tilt of the U.S. Supreme Court typifies the cast of all our federal
courts. On the one hand, the current Chief Justice and two of his brethren-Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas-are among the most conservative jurists to sit on the
Court in recent history, voting to overturn many core tenets of post-New Deal jurisprudence. Io In contrast, the present Supreme Court includes not a single member
who espouses the energetic enforcement of constitutional rights that was its hallmark during the Warren Court era.
During the Warren Court era, the battle cry against "judicial activism" was at
least understandable, insofar as it responded to that Court's active protection of individual liberties and civil rights. Now, more than a generation and two conservative Chief Justices later, the Court has stepped back from that role. It has significantly reduced both the substantive scope of rights it deems constitutionally protected and the remedies it affords to victims of rights violations.
Nowhere is this rollback more severe than in the criminal justice arena. The
Court has overturned many longstanding precedents to curb constitutional rights of
suspected criminals. Moreover, it has cut off numerous avenues for asserting even
those truncated rights that it continues to recognize in theory. For example. the
Court (together with Congress) has hamstrung the hallowed remedy of habeas corpus, or federal court review of state convictions' which Alexander Hamilton hailed
as "the greatest liberty of all"-so severely that, for all practical purposes, it is unavailable to many prisoners, even if they are on Death Row, their constitutional
rights were violated, and they have evidence that they did not commit the crimes
for which they face execution.
In the area of racial justice-another area where the Warren Court vigorously
protected constitutional rights-the subsequent cutbacks parallel the pattern in the
criminal justice area. In a series of decisions over the last several years, the Supreme Court has consistentlY prevented lower federal courts and other government
officials from implementing meaningful remedies for school segregation, discrimination in voting, and discrimination in government contracting. Of particul.ar note, the
Court has dramatically restricted the availability of race-conscious aiTmnative action remedies. The repeated attacks on federal courts for upholding racial "quotas,"
therefore, illustrates the misguided nature of the current assault on the judiciary.
In short, the current Supreme Court and other federal courts already exercise the
very judicial restraint concerning constitutional rights claims for which their critics
clamor. Apparently, though, these critics are not content for their views to prevail
on most courts and in most cases. Nor are they satisfied with a series of recent congressional measures that already sharply limits the power of federal courts to hear
important categories of cases involving basic rights on behalf of relatively unpopular, powerless groups, including poor people, prisoners, and immigrants-the very
kind of claims and clients fur which the Constitution and its independent federal
judiciary are designed to serve as the ultimate protector.
Nonetheless, these critics call for even more extreme "court-stripping" measures,
including the elimination of the lifetime tenure that the Constitution guarantees to
federal judges, and the power of judicial review that has been enshrined since Chief
Justice John Marshall's historic ruling in Marbury v. Madison.ll They thus endanger the federal judiciary's constitutionally mandated independence from the elected
branches of government, and prevent it from fulfuling its designated role in the
Constitution's scheme of checks and balances: to curb overreaching and abuses by
the other branches of the federal government and by state governments, and to protect even the politically powerless individuals and minority groups whose rights are
the least likely to be secured by the political branches of government.
Our founders wisely structured a government that was not a pure democracy. Although most government policies are detelmined by elected representatives who are
responsive to the majority will, our Constitution's framers recognized that there are
some rights that are so fundamental that no majority-no matter how large-could
deny them to any minority, no matter how small or unpopular. In orner to prevent
what James Madison termed "tyranny of the majority," the Constitution provided
for federal courts whose members were insulated from majoritarian pressures
through lifetime tenure, subject to removal only by impeachment.
under no obligation to confinn any particular nominee. but after the necessary time for inquiry
it should vote him up or vote him down. In the latter case, the President can then send up another nominee."); id. (quoting the Chief Justice as stating that "Vacancies Ion our nation's fed·
eral court benches] cannot remain at such high levels without eroding the quality of justice").
IOSee generally Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24
Fordham Urban Law Journal 427 (1997).
115 U.S, (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Modem history provides many examples of federal court jud.ges withstanding popular pressure to stand up for the rights of embattled racial~ religious, political, and
other minorities. With twenty-twenty hindsight, the contemporary consensus now
recognizes recurrent past instances in which the elected branches of government
~cted in an unconstitutional and unjust manner. Correspondingly, while the federal
Judges who resisted those political tides were at the time harshly denounced and
threatened with impeachment or even physical harm, they are now widely respected, even by current critics of judicial autonomy.
A prime illustr.9f:;on ;9 the ''massive resistance" that Southern officials mounted
to Brown v. Board olEducatioT! 12 and other Warren Court rulings outlawing racial
segregation, aqd to the remedial orders issued by such "activist" Southern federal
judges as Elbert Tuttle, John Minor Wisdom and Frank Johnson. \Vhere would we
now be, in our national struggle for racial Justice, were it not for the leadership
of these courageous federal judges, who actually honored the oath that all government officials take to uphold the Constitution? As their inspiring example underscores, the fact that federal judges are unelected and life-tenured is not a problemas current critics contend-but rather a solution ~o some of our nation's most intractable problems, such as racial discrimination.
The special responsibility of federal judges to enforce constitutional rights evenindeed, especially-when they are unpopular with elected officials and the majority
of theit' constituents was most eloquently explained by former Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, who could hardly be accused of being a "judicial activist." Nevertheless, in 1943, he and seven of his fellow Justices struck down a very popular
measure that had been adopted throughout the country in response to World-WarII-heightened nationalistic fervor: mandatory flag salutes in the public schools. In
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court recognized that the Constitution protects even such a tiny, unpopular minority as J'ehovah's Witnesses
schoolchildren from having to participate in even such a deeply revered ritual.
While the Jehovah's Witnesses objected to the flag salute specifically because it
violated their religious beliefs, Justice Jackson explained why all constitutional
rights deserve protection from majoritarian pressures, and hence illustrated the
uniquely important role of federal courts in general:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to \vithdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principlES to be applied by the
courts. One's night to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 13
While we now recognize Barnette and Brown as landmarks of liberty, at the time
they were decided, they and the judges who issued them were denounced in precisely the same terms that critics are now using to attack more recent judicial rulings upholding other human rights claims. Perhaps, in due course, these more recent rulings will also be vindicated in the court of public opinion.
In any event, the fact that federal judges overturn initiatives supported by the
majority of citizens or politicians does not cast any doubt on the legitimacy of the
federal courts. To the contrary, it vindicates the special, essential function of these
courts as a check against abuses of power by elected officials and intolerant majorities. The independence of the federal courts must be preserved not despite their
power to overturn majoritarian decisions, hut rather p~cisely because of that
power. 14

Mr. CANADY. Thank you. Professor Franck.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW J. FRANCK, CHAIRMAN AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSf)R OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, RADFORD UNI..
VERSITY

Mr. FRANCK, Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to come here today to discuss
12 349
23 319

U,S, 294 (1954),

U.S. 624, 638 (19<J.3).
t4 A Bio
yhical Statement is attached. Pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(g)(4), I affirm
that nei r nor the Amf,rican Civil Liberties Union receives any federal funds-as a matter
or organizational policy.
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the roles of Congress and the Court in interpreting the Constitution.
If I may, I think I could correct one mis-statement by Professor
Strossen. I think it was that even more notorious judicial activist,
Judge Robert Bork, who referred to his love of intellectual feasts.
Ms. STROSSEN. I'm sorry; you're right. How could I get them
mixed up? [Laughter.]
Mr. FRANCK. Well, for a while there Judge Scalia had a beard.
On June 25, 26, and 27 of last year, the Supreme Court held
three acts of Congress in 3 days to be unconstitutional. I don't
know when was the last time the Court was quite that busy. I do
know that there are good arguments to be made about all three
cases, that the Court got them wrong. I'd like to focus, however, on
one of those three cases, the one that's come under the most scrutiny this morning, the City of Boerne v. Flores, because it involved
the most explicit confrontation between Congress and the Court.
The Boerne ruling overturned the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act passed in 1993 as an attempt to legislate a reversal of the 1990
Smith decision of the Court on the meaning of the free exercise of
religion clause in the First Amendment.
RFRA, for short, failed, I argue, because it was not a thoroughgoing challenge to the regime of judicial supremacy, and, thus, citing the very notion that the Court is the final authority on the
meaning of the Constitution, the Justices struck down the act. The
act, I argue, assumed three things that are at best questionable,
and at worst, simply mistaken.
First, it was assumed by RFRA that the Court is properly the enforcer of the First Amendment, a view we cannot find espoused by
the father of the Bill of Rights, James Madison. Second, the act assumed the propriety of the First Amendment's application to the
actions of State and local governments, a legal fiction of the 20th
Century based on a misreading of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, RFRA attempted to resurrect the view that the free exercise
of religion requires Government to make exemptions on religious
grounds to otherwise valid general laws, a doctrine barely 35 years
old, which was itself a breach with the original view of this matter.
Only on this last point did the Court disagree with Congress. The
Court in Boerne refused to take instruction from Congress on that
last point but it got away with it-the Court did, that is-because
the fist two assumptions mentioned gave it a firm ground to stand
on.
I would just very briefly suggest some different approaches for
the Congress in asserting its own vital role in interpreting the Constitution. First, and this actually falls within the Senate's purview,
nominees to the Federal bench should be challenged to acknowledge, and to state plainly their understanding of, the difference be..
tween judicial review and judicial supremacy.
Second, Congress should take a serious new look at the rules of
civil procedure and the way they currently facilitate dubious constitutional rulings, thanks to excessively loose standards on standing to sue, declaratory judgments, class actions, and remedial decrees 1 for instance.
Third 1 the Con~ess's power to make exceptions to Federal· Court
jurisdiction should be considered a potent weapon for reversing ju-
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dicial error. For instance, a great restoration of federalism could be
effected if Congress were to rule out-of-bounds certain kinds of
challenges made to state law under the Bill of Rights.
Fourth, it should not be forgotten that the Framers regarded the
congressional impeachment power as a significant potential restraint on judicial usurpation of power. Impeachment is not a
criminal proceeding, but a political one, and may be used to redress
"injuries to the society itself," in the words of Alexander Hamilton.
The Constitution we have, without any need of amendments attacking the Court's independence, provides Congress with all the
tools it requires to begin the rescue of the Constitution from the
Supreme Court. The Congress must take its own role under the
Constitution seriously before it can induce the Court to do likewise.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of !VIr. Franck follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MA'ITHEW J. FRANCK, CliAlRMAN AND AsSOCIATE
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ScIENCE, RADFORD UNIVERSITY

When Congress made its most recent attempt to influence the Supreme Court. the
result was an unmitigated failure. I refer to the fate of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), overturned on June 25 of last year in the case of City
of Boerne v. Flores. In response to a perceived threat to the free exercise of religion
in the Court's 1990 Smith decision,l Congress in RFRA sought, through the use of
its power to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, to overturn that ruling and restore, as against every agency of government in the land, the "compelling
interest" test for judging the validity of incidental burdens on free exercise resulting
from generally applicable laws. RFRA had overwhelming support from all points on
the political spectrum, and passed in the Congress nearly unanimously. But to vet.·
eran Court-watchers, the Boerne decision was entirely predictable, inasmuch as the
justices of the Court do not take kindly to legislative instruction in how to decide
constitutional cases.
But the Act's failure went far deeper: it was in fact not a serious enough challenge
to the Court's authority, for it conceded too much to the current regime of judicial
supremacy. The following are the multiple ironies of the clash between Congress
and the Court that culminated in Boerne.
1. Congress assumed that the Court is properly the enforcer of the First Amendment.
This is by now a very old error, and one so venerable that to speak. in correction
of it is to raise questions about one's sanity in most circles. So deep runs the popular myth that the Supreme Court is properly the final authority in enforcing virtually every provision of the Constitution that a digression is necessary here into
the more general question of judicial review. As Professor Robert Clinton has shown,
the judicial power to invalidate the actions of other branches of the national government was widely understood at the founding to be "departmental" or "coordinate"a power he calls ufunctional review" enabling the judiciary to pronounce authoritatively on the constitutionality of laws touching on the integrity of the courts' own
functions, for instance where a case concerns jurisdictional issues, standards of evidence, or the provision of simple due process. This limited version of judicial review
was all that was either exercised or claimed for the Court by John Marshall in the
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison. 2 On the other hand, the legislative and executive
branches have a like authority to have the "last word" on those constitutional questions bearing on the exercise of their own powers, arising from the provisions of the
Constitution addressed to themselves. Thus, that same John Marshall, for instance,
held that the reach of Congress's power over commerce among the states was to be
controlled authoritatively not by the judiciary, but by the people through democratic
lE,,!ployment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. u. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
21 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). See Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial
Review (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1989), passim. See also Charles F. Hobson, The Great
Chief Justice: John lfarshall and the Rule of Law (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1996), 4771; Matthew J. Franck, AIlainst the Im~rial Judiciary: The Supreme Court us. the Sovereignty
of the People (Lawrence: Oniv. Press of Kansas, 1996), 65-105; and James Burnham, Congress
and the American Tradition (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1959, 1996), 129-36.
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processes: such are "the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in
all representative governments." 3
Now obviously, the terms of the First Amendment address themselves to the Con~ss and not to the judiciary, and in no way would an infringement of one of the
nghts therein have an adverse effect on the proper functioning of judicial processes.
~o~~ver, if the First Amendment had been expected to be the subject of routine
J~dlClal enforcement, we would expect the subject to have come up frequently in the
Frrst Congress that debated and drafted the Bill of Rights. Yet, in his brilliant account of how the Bill of Rights came to be added to the Constitution, Professor Robert Goldwin manages to tell the whole story in complete detail without ever once
mentioning that the subject of judicial enforcement of the Bill arose at all. The point
of the Bill of Rights was not to trigger judicial review, but to weave a love of liberty
into the American political culture. Here "is how it works," Goldwin tells us in his
recent book:
[T]o the extent that these principles of free government [in the Bill of Rights)
have become a part of our "national sentiment," they do, indeed, often enable
us, the majority, to restrain ourselves, the majority, from oppressive actions.
That is the import of the Ill'St five words of the Bill of Rights: "Congress shall
make no law" that attempts to accomplish certain prohibited things. It means
that even if a majority in Congress, representing a majority of us, the people,
wants to make a law that the Constitution forbids it to make, we, all of us, superior to any majority, say it must not be done, because the Constitution is the
will of all of us, not just a majority of us. 4
So as not to be misunderstood, I should add that certain provisions in the Bill of
Rights do address themselves to the courts, and so are fit subjects for judicial review~bviously amendments five through seven, arguably four through eight-but
the First Amendment is not one of them. It is only in this century, with the expansion of judicial authority in every direction, that we have come to think otherwise.
And RFRA played right into that modem myth, insisting that a clause of the First
Amendment be enforced by courts in a certain way when, at the very least, clear
doubt exists that it was meant to be judicially enforced at all.
2. Congress assumed the validity of the c1incorporation" doctrine.
Whatever uncertainty there might be about whether the First Amendment is
gathered into the scope of judicial review, there is none whatever about the proposition that, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, it was intended to restrain only
the national government and not the states or their subdivisions. And, among scholars who do not hold a prior commitment to judicial activism, a second th~position
is virtually settled as well: that the Fourteenth Amendment changed no . g about
that fact. 5
Of course, on the Court the debate has gone all the other way, so that Justices
Scalia and Thomas no less than their more liberal brethren act unquestioningly on
the basis of twentieth-century precedents that declared that much of the Bill of
Rights is selectively "absorbed" or "incorporated" into the terms of the due process
clause of the Four'"l.eenth Amendment. But these precedents are worse than doubtful:
they represent a plain usurpation of power by the Court, and they ought not to be
respected, on or off the Court, by anyone who regards the Constitution as superior
to "constitutional law."
Yet the Congress, in passing RFRA, paid its respects to this judicial usurpation.
The Act prescribed a judicial test of constitutionality to be applied to the laws and
policies of all levels of government, including acts of Congress,6 but clearly the legislation was motivated chiefly by fears for religious liberty's fate at the state and local
level. Thus the Senate report on the Act cited, as part of the authority for its passage, the "incorporation" precedent of Cantwell v. Connecticut, a 1940 case in which
3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton (22 U.S.) 1 (1824), at 197.
.. Robert A. Goldwin, From Parchment to Power: How James Madison Used the Bill of Rights
to Save the Constitution (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1997), 100. See also Franck, Against the

Imperial JudiCiary, 83-87.

f) See Richard G. Stevens, "Due Process of Law," in Stevens, The American Constitution and
Its Provenance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 12~2; Raoul Berger, Government
~y Judiciary: The Transformation. of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 1997), 155-89; and Berger, 'l'he Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman:

Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1989).
6 Hew the Court could have applied RFRA to nullify any subsequent act of Congress is a mystery, since any such contradictory act would naturally be considered an implicit repeal of
kFRA's tenns, at least in part.
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~he free exercise clause of the First Amendment was applied to the actions of states

a casual four sentences carrying no historical analysis whatsoever. 7
Whatever one's worries about the fate of religious liberty after the Smith caseand Archbishop Flores of San Antonio was hardly being ground beneath the heel
of oppression-whatever one's politics in these matters, the proper position of a constitutional consel'Vative is to wonder what on earth the Supreme Court is doing enfO':Cing the terms of the First Amendment against state and local governments.
WIsely or unwisely-and I think the former-the framers of the Bill of Rights and
tht:: framers of the Fourteenth Amendment left the subject of religious liberty in relatIon to state and local policy to be sorted out by state constitutions, state legislatures, and state courts. How members of Congress ostensibly committed to federalism could overlook this is a source of some wonder. Why Congress does not wish
to restore that federalism from the ashes in which the Court has left it is cause for
amazement.
ill

3. Congress assumed the soundness of the "compelling interest" test.
Even if we assume both that the Supreme Court is the proper enforcer of the First
Amendment and that it may act against the states under that banner, there remains the fact that the Smith ruling was no innovation, but a return to a previous
generation of decisions under the free exercise clause. The "compelling interest" test,
having originated in other areas of constitutional law, was carried over to the adjudication of free exercise cases only as recently as 1963 (in Sherbert v. Verner), with
its full import being discernible only in 1972 (in lVisconsin v . Yoder). 8 The effect of
the test is to carve out exemptions to generally applicable laws, otherwise held
valid, for those with religious scruples about obeying them. From the date of the
very first religion case under the First Amendment until 1963, it was not thought
that such exemptions are affirmatively required of government by the provision
against "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. As Chief Justice Morrison Waite
put it in 1879, "UJaws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." To
hold otherwise, he continued, "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself."9 Precisely so did the Court begin to hold in the 1960s and
1970s.
In the 1990 Smith case, the Court did not overrule the
Sherbert and Yoder precedents, but distinguished them away so that they would
have practically no value for the guidance of future decisions. In RFRA, Congress
explicitly identified Sherbert and Yoder as the precedents it wished the Court to follow instead of Smith. Much disagreement persists on and off the Court about just
how the free exercise clause ought to be applied. But I would offer one fairly mild
judgment about this matter: that Sherbert and Yoder are the progeny of judicial activism, and Smith a return to judicial restraint. One may like Sherbert and Yoder
and dislike Smith, but it seems clear that if that is one's preference, one is (here
at least) on the side of judicial activism.
Thus the Religious Freedom Restoration Act presented the ironic spectacle of the
Congress complaining that the Supreme Court was not being activist enough in its
interpretation of the Constitution. "Stop us all before we legislate again!" was the
rallying cry of the Act's partisans as it swept virtually unhindered through both
houses of Congress. In the fmal irony, the Court in the Boerne case rebuffed the
demand, standing on its dignity and defending its newfound judicial !estraint respecting the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
In a way, Boerne presented a case in which judicial activism was at war with
itself. Congress, as I have said, demanded of the Court more activism than the
Court was prepared to provide. But the Court could only refuse the demand by turn·
ing to its own well-worn precepts of j:'ldicial supremacy in the interpretation of the
Constitution. Mistakenly citing Marbury v. Madison for support of judicial authority
to have the last word,lo Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court concluded that Congress overreached with its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment:
7 Senate Report 103-111, at 14 n. 40. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), at
303.
8Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), at 166, 167. Justice Scalia partially quoted
these words in Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. See also Walter Berns, The First Amendment and the
Future of American Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1976; reprint, Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1985), 35-55.
10 800 City of Boerne v. Flores,_U.S. __( 1997), slip op. at 6 (Kennedy, J. t for the Court).
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Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said
to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. 11
What everyone (except perhaps Justice Kennedy himself) must surely notice is that
he is, in effect, saying that only the Supreme Court enforces constitutional rights
by chan:ging what they are (and sometimes by making them up out of whole cloth),
and that it will not tolerate the Congress interfering as it goes about its bl!Smess,
The Boerne case, in the end, presents the friend of the Constitution's original
meaning .md of judicial restraint with one of those rare instances when he does not
know which side to choose, and must instead say "a pox on both your houses." On
the one hand, the Court continued on its accustomed course of asserting its supreme
position in the decision of all questions of constitutional politics, even where a
clause of the Constitution (§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) arguably gives Congress a legitimate role to play in such questions. On the other hand, Congress, rather than truly challenge judicial supremacy, had written legislation that embraced
it: accepting the Court's role as tmal enforcer of the First Amendment, accepting the
application of that amendment to the states, and importunately demanding that the
Court return to its activist habits in the interpretation of the free exercise clause.
Little wonder that the Court had the better of the confrontation.
The ''judicial usurpation of politics," as First Things magazine referred to our
present straits a little over a year ago, remains the most pressing problem confronting the American experiment in republicanism. If RFRA is a failed model for congressional challenges to that usu..~ation, what is to be done instead?
1. Challenge judicial supremacy directly.
Over eleven years ago, then-Attorney General Meese got a lot of attention for saying, in an address at Tulane University, that "the Constitution cannot be reduced
to constitutional law," and that in its notorious dicta in Cooper v. Aaron in 1958,12
the SUJ?reme Court had misread both the Constitution and Marbury v. Madison in
describmg its own authority to determine the content of the supreme law of the
land. 13 He was much excoriated on ap-ed pages and by many legal scholars, but he
was abso1utely right.
It is time to translate words into action, to move from rhetoric to a more concrete
approach. If we are serious about the proposition that all the branches of the national government share a coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution, with
none of them commanding the obedience of the others as to every sort of constitutional question, then it is past time the Congress began to assert its co-equal authority in practical ways. This reassertion of congressional responsibility can begin
with the breaking of some comfortable habits.
First, during Senate confmnation hearings on nominations to the federal bench
at all levels, senators should cease requiring nominees to declare their allegiance
to the "Marbury myth" that the Supreme Court has the last word on constitutional
questions. The Senate should instead demand just the opposite-a clear statement
from every nominee that he or she recognizes the difference between judicial review
(properly understood) and judicial supremacy. Other matters of what is infelicitously
called "judicial philosophy" should also be central to confumation hearings, but this
is a good place to start.
Secondly, the Congress should stop bowing in the direction of the Court's presumed imal authority when it legislates, and should instead consider repealing, or
at least exempting some legislation from, the standard mechanisms by w:6ich it currently does so-such as the remedial-power and class-action provisions of the 1938
Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended in 1966).
Consider the recent fate of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996. No
one was ever prosecuted under the Act's ~rovisions. Instead, under federal rules of
procedure that are within the ~wer of Congress to change, politically interested
parties led by the ACLU brought suit against the government, secured a hearing
before a three-judge panel of a district court as required by the CDA itself, and won
a preliminary injunction from that panel against the governmenes enforcement of
the law's indecency provisions
'nst anyone whatsoetter. Then, under a "special review provision" of tlie CDA itse a rapid appeal was taken directly to the Supreme
Court. The resulting aifll"Il18Dce of the district court's injunction means that a writ
that cannot be gainsaid runs against every U.S. attorney barring enforcement of the
11 Ibid. at 9.
12 358
1 (1958).
13 The speech was later
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printed as Edwin Meese III, MlJ'he Law of the Constitution," Tulane
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Act, presumably on pain of contempt proceedings if any federal prosecutor seeks to
enforce it anywhere. Major provisions of the CDA were thus rendered a dead letter
before they ever really lived. 14
This method of broadly striking down laws by injunction short-circuits the kind
of response to judicial error that Lincoln exemplified. In criticizing the Dred Scott
ruling, Lincoln insisted that the Missouri Compromise was not to be considered unconstitutional just because the Court had held it so in one case concerning individual parties. The statute had already been repealed three years earlier by thE:; KaPsas-Nebraska Act of 1854-but if the other branches of the government did not
agree with the Dred Scott ruling, the law could, in Lincoln's view, be revived by the
Congress and enforced by the executive. (This is exactly what happened in 1862,
w hen Congress forbade slavery in all federal territories.) And had the :Missouri
Compromise not already been repealed, it is more than likely that Lincoln would
have argued for its continued enforcement after Dred Scott, bolstered by supplementary legislation if need be. It would have been a different matter for Lincoln and
for the fate of self-government if an injunction extending to the whole of the government had accompanied the Court's pronouncement on the law's constitutionality.
It must be said that the CDA was designed to be struck down; it was passed with
an engraved invitation to the courts to do so. Had Congress, in passing the CDA.
been confident of its own position as a true equal of the Court in interpreting the
Constitution, it not only would have refrained from the timidity of the special review provisions in the Act. It would have included instead a provision shielding the
Act from the injunctive procedure by which the courts declared it unconstitutional.
Then we would have seen some criminal trials under the Act's provisinns, and if on
appeal of any convictions the Supreme Court had held the Act unconstitutional, it
would still be open to Congress to legislate support for the Act's continued enforcement against others, and for the executive to prosecute under it. What would happen next could get very interesting indeed.
The fate of the CDA should, more generally, prompt rethinking of some of the procedural aspects of modem-day judicial power. As Professor Gary McDowell pointed
out ten years ago, it is within the power of Congress to undo some of the damage
that has been done to the traditional "case or controversy" requirement of A...rticle
III by the loosening of standards in the judicial process concerning standing to sue,
class actions, intervention, consent decrees, declaratory judgments, and the merging
of actions in law and equity.15 By traditional procedural criteria, the lawsuit that
resulted in the invalidation of the CDA's indecency provisions would never have gotten off the ground.
2. Start defending the states instead of undermining them.
In recent cases such as U.S. v. Lopez and Printz v. U.S.,IG some see a trend toward the defense of federalism on the Supreme Court. One may see this trend at
work in the Boerne case as well; certainly RFRA, whatever one thinks of its solicitude toward religious liberty, was an assault on the authority of states and localities. I7 Even if we do not agree with all of these decisions-and I do not-we can
be happy with the results in them if we care for local self-government. But the question remains: why must the Court rather than the Congress be the states' defender?
The Court is a fickle defEmder in any event, as recent cases on abortion, gay rights,
and single-sex public higher education clearly show.
And has the Congress mended its ways since the Republicans became the majority
party? It doesn't seem so. Last October the House passed H.R. 1534, the "Private
Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997," which would permit property owners
to hurry straight into federal court with claims that a local or state regulation has
resulted in a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. Senator Hatch introduced similar legislation in the Senate (S. 1256, the "Citizens Access to Justice Act of 1997").
These bills are merely RFRA all over again, albeit on a smaller scale-and as the
least of their sins, would merely add to the workload of our strained federal courts,
a problem recently noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist. I8 Such efforts should be abandoned by members of Congress who value the Constitution and reject the "incorporation" doctrine. It is not really a matter of having to make a hard choice between
14 See Reno v. ACLU_U.S._(decided June 26, 1997).
15Gary L. McDowell, Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 168-96.
16 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, __U.S. __(decided
June 27, 1997).
17See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Constitutional Revolution." Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1997,
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18 800 William H. Rehnquist, "The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary." 1 January
1998, section I.A.
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federalism and property rights; in this case the Constitution has already chosen for
us.
Instead of such measures that add to their miseries, the Congress should take
steps to shield state and local governments from the depredations of the Court.
Where the danger comes from judicial interpretation of federal statutes, Congress
can (and sometimes does) easily forestall the danger by including language about
non-preemption of state laws, or declaratory clauses on the rules by which a statuf:e
is to be construed. But the greatest blows to federalism in this century have come
from the Supreme Court working quite on its own with no other weapon than what
it purports to be the Constitution. To beg'.n to reverse that damage, more imaginative approaches are needed. One scholar, for instance, has recently suggested that
the enforcement power given to Congress in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
can be turned to good use here, to limit rather than expand the reach of judicial
power over the states. 19
The Fourteenth Amendment is certainly the major "culprit" if we are concerned
about reining in the Court. By "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights, and by creating
under the doctrine of "substantive due process" rights which are contained nowhere
in the Constitution at all, the Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to nationalize some of the most important policy questions that the Constitution properly
leaves to the states.
A broad approach to this problem would be for Congress to avail itself of its seldom-used power under Article III to regulate and make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction-as well as its complete authority over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. It would take careful draftsmanship to close all the loopholes to judicial
creativity, but Congress ought to take up legislation declaring all questions regarding the application of the Bill of Rights to states and local governments off'limits
for the federal courts at every level. Where the "extra-constitutional" rights currently packed into the due process clause are concerned-such as the "right of privacy" at the heart of the abortion decisions-even more care would need to be take&.
in drafting appropriate jurisdictional legislation. For how does one describe a protean legal fiction with sufficient precision so as to exorcise it from the law of the
land? The problem is rather like legislating that the courts shall no longer hear
cases concerning dragons only to learn that they are hearing caSf:S concerning unicorns instead. But I am convinced it is worth the effort.
For some, the option of "jurisdiction-stripping" by statute poses a potential difficulty, inasmuch as the legislation could itself be subject to judicial review, and the
Court could conceivably declare it unconstitutional. 20 But the leading precedents
suggest otherwise: if Congress cleanly removes certain types of cases from the
Court's jurisdiction, the justices will not dare to act on such cases. Only if the Congress attempts to interfere in how the Court decides the cases it does hear, by predetermining their outcome or by fIXing the probative value of evidence in a constitutional case, will the justices strike down purported efforts to regulate their jurisdiction-and rightly SO.21 Avoid that sort of problem, and this congressional power can
be a potent check on the Court.
3. Keep examining the impeachment option.
The good news on Capitol Hill in the last session was that members of Congress
(such as Reps. Tom DeLay and Charles Canady) began to talk of impeaching federal
judges for their usurpations of political power. Rep. Howard Coble (chairman of the
House Judiciary subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property) conducted hearings on judicial activism last spring that raised this possibility. This exploration
should be encouraged. At the same time, however, hasty calls for impeachment on
the basis of a single wrongheaded ruling by a judge somewhere should be discouraged. For impeachment talk to be taken seriously and not dismissed as simply red
meat for one's partisans, the exploration must proceed with restraint and prudence,
and a proper marshaling of arguments.
The basic question is this: can the decisiOD3 of a federal judge, arrived at without
criminal corruption as that is ordinarily understood, be considered among those
U~See Dennis Teti, "'the Ten Commandments and the Constitution," The Weekly Standard
(July 21, 1997), 21-24.
20See Richard John Neuhaus, "The Anatomy of a Controversy," in Mitchell S. Muncy, ed., The
End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation ol Politics: The Celebrated First Things Debate with
Arguments Pro and Con (Dallas: S~nce Publishing, 1997), 254-55.
2'lCompare Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869), and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128
(1872).
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"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" for which he may be impeached, tried, convicted,
and removed from office? The answer from the founding is a very clear "yes."22
In the Federalist, Hamilton describes the impeachment process as "a method of
NATIONAL INQUEsY' into "the abuse or violation of some :public trust," aimed at discovering political offenses that result in "injuries done Immediately to the society
itself." And he explicitly extends this interpretation of Congress's power to the judiciary, writing that the threat of impeachment is "a complete security" against "a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature."23 Almost half a
century later, Justice Joseph Story agreed with Hamilton's reasoning on impeachment's political character, and its application to judges, in his Commentaries on the
Constitution. 24
What seems to stand in the way of this method of controlling the judiciary is not
the Constitution or the framers' intent but history. A handful of lower federal judges
have been removed who were not found guilty of any criminal offense in the narrow
sense, but only one Supreme Court justice has ever been impeached, and he was
acquitted: Justice Samuel Chase in 1805. A common misconception, however, is that
the Chase trial settled the issue whether "political" impeachrilents may be pursued
against judges with a firm "no." Our present chief justice has so concluded, in a
book and in a well-publicized 1996 speech. But more careful scholars than Chief
Justice Rehnquist (who can hs.rd.ly be considered disinterested in this question) have
concluded that the Chase trial was inconclusive on the constitutional issues-that
it settled nothing regarding the breadth of Congress's power to impeach judges.25
Should impeachment proceedings be launched regarding any federal judge, most
particularly against any Supreme Court justice, the greatest care must be taken to
pitch the issues at the highest possible level. Beginning in the House Judicihry
Committee, and continuing on the floor of the House and in the Senate, members
of Congress mt.st reeducate themselves about the separation of powers and judicial
review-about their own role and that of the judges under the Constitution. The
focus must be, not one or two un~pular rulings, but (in Hamilton's words again)
a "series of deliberate usurpations of authority not belonging properly to the judiciary. The cause being defended by congressional removal efforts must be, and be seen
to be, not a narrowly partisan one, but the integrity of the Constitution. It will be
impossible to convince everyone of this. But with adequate preparation of the public
mind to receive the idea that self-government itself is at stake, and with the freest
possible opportunity for open and fair-minded colloquy with any judge placed on
trial in the Senate, an impeachment proceeding can become a great seminar for the
whole nation regarding the political arrangements under which we choose to live.
It is possible that even a trial resulting in acquittal could be instructive for the polity and chastening for the judiciary. But prosecutors do not like to take cases to trial
that they think they will lose; hence the first defendant judge in particular must
be one against whom ~ impeachment case can be made absolutely compelling. And
remember that a two-thirds majority is necessary to convict in the Senate. The
framers set the bar high with good reason, and under present circumstances in the
Senate, the politics of impeachment will have to be clearly distinguished from the
politics of partisan ideology and scorekeeping.
4. Leave the Constitution alone.
By no means have we exhausted the possibilities for controlling the judiciary
under the terms of the Constitution, but I should like to mention one other that is
generally a bad idea: succumbing to the urge to amend the Constitution. In the last
session alone, several amendments were introduced, for example, to limit the judicial term of office to eight years in the lower courts (H.J.Res. 74), or to ten years
at all levels including tlie Supreme Court (S.J.Res. 26 and H.J.Res. 77), or to twelve
years for all (H.J.Res. 63). The amendments that absolutely limit judicial terms
would do little to address our difficulties, as judges would be free to act as they
please during their term of office. And those that provide for reappointment for successive terms might endanger the independence of the judiciary that Hamilton and
his fellow framers were intent on securing.
For all the branches of government, the courts included, it was the aspiration of
the framers to create a balance of strength and limitation-with officeholders power22See Franck, Against the Imperial Judiciary. 45-51; and "The Supreme Court and the Politics of Impeachment," On Principle (Ashbrook Center). vol. IV. no. 4 (August 1996): 3-5. See
also McDowell, Curbing the Courts. 121.
23 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton
Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961), no. 6G, pp. 396-97; no. 81, p. 485.
~.. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitutioll. of the United States. 1st ed. (Boston: Hilliard, Graj1, 1833),11686-87,740-801, 1629.
21See Franck, Against the Imperial Judiciary, 223-24 n. 90.
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ful in their own right and free to act on their convictions, yet restrainable by the
others when power becomes tyranny and the freedom to act becomes mere license.
I have argued that the Constitution as it already stands provides us with the principles that reveal judicial usurpation for what it is, and with the tools necessary to
fashion remedies for that usurpation. The abuses of the judiciary run deep in the
body of twentieth-century caselaw, and it will not be the work of a moment to undo
the damage. But patient toil, and a renewed attention in Congress to the high politics of constitutionalism, can. begin to move us away from government by judges and
back to genuine republican government.
My opposition to amending the Constitution to deal with our difficulties is not
rooted m mere reverence for the framers' handiwork if evidence shows its insufficiency in some respect. No institutions crafted by human beings can be truly permanent, never requiring any alterations. Yet the Constitution, as Joseph Story said,
was "reared for immortality, if the work of man may justly aspire to such a title."
Before we take risks with a structure whose "foundations are solid" and whose
"compartments are beautiful, as well as useful" (again Story's wordS),26 we should
explore the! building thoroughly and be certain we have not overlooked any of the
useful features it already contains.
Conclusion.
All the suggestions I have made will come to nought until members of both houses
of Congress recover for themselves what the framers had in mind when creating
truly co-equal branches of government under the Constitution. Only in this century
did it begin to become commonplace to regard the justices of the Supreme Court as
the "guardians" of the Constitution, as though only they" and no one else. had this
charge by virtue of their oath of office. The framers knew better. For them, the fate
of republicanism, and of constitutionalism itself, rested with "the extent and proper
structure of the Union," and with institutions that "divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other." They knew
that men are not angels, nor are they governed by angels-that we have a government "administered by men over men," and that judges are no more angelic than
legislators. 27 Thus they charged all public officials, indeed all citizens, with the duty
to preserve the Constitution, fully expecting us to persuade. to argue, to clash over
what that preservation means. To forget that, to believe complacently that that
highest task of our shared political existence is somebody else's business in which
we will not interfere, is to let the cause of republican self-government slip through
our fmgers, and to dishonor the memory of the men from whom we inherited that
cause.
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Professor Franck. You get the award for
giving your testimony within the allotted time. [Laughter.]
Mr. CANADY. Professor Clinton.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. CLINTON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
Mr. CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for giving me the opportunity to state my views on this
very important question of the proper relationship between Ct*.ngress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution.
Despite what so many of the members of the committee and
panel have said, on my v/ay to the airport yesterday, I shared a
limo ride with an anthropologist from my university. When I told
her that I was going to a hearing about Congress's role in constitutional interpretation, she looked absolutely stunned and said,
"What role?" [Laughter.]
And this is a woman with a Ph.D. in anthropology who is, in fa.ct,
one of the most noted anthropologists in the country. So, in spite
of the fact that we seem all here to agree that Congress has a VE~ry
important role in constitutional interpretation, apparently that
view has not gotten out into the general public.
26 Story's Commentaries, quoted in Fram:k,
27 Federalist No. 10, p. 84~ No. 51, p. 32~l.
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We have witnessed during the last 40 years the rise to prominence of a constitutional theory that gives the U.S. Supreme Court
a virtual monopoly in American constitutional law. This theory
grants to the Court final, ultimate, exclusive authority to determine the meaning of constitutional provisions with conclusive effect
on Congress, the President, the States and private citizens. The
power extends even to the determination of the constitutional powers of the co-equal branches of the National Government.
Judicial supremacy rests on a number of foundations, one of
which is the historical claim that the Court's hegemony is firmly
grounded in American Constitutional history, esper.=ially in the
landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, which has been cited byalmost everyone here today. It is to this argument that I will address
my remarks today.
Before the Civil War, constitutional interpretation was performed
by Congress and the President as much as by the Court. This is
most apparent when one looks at the great Congressional debates
over the establishment of the National Executive in the 1790's.
Congres&ional determinations of constitutional meaning were then
regarded as highly as those of the Court. After the Civil War, the
Courts became more aggressive in challenging laws believed to be
defective, but it is not until 1958 that the Court first staked its
claim to be the exclusive interpreter of the·Constitution. The claim
was made in Cooper v. Aaron where the Court declared its own
constitutional rulings to be part of the suprenle law of the land, on
a par with the Constitution itself. Since 1958, the Court has asserted this authority several times, most recently in the City of
Boerne v. Flores in 1997
In that case, the Court went even farther than it had in Cooper,
ruling that Congress has no power to determine the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause when passing laws designed to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Cooper, Boerne, and the other cases in
which the Court has exerted its conclusive authority, it relied on
Marbury v. Madison for support. But Marbury does not support
such authority. Marbury involved Article Ill's jurisdictional distribution, which is a provision is directly addressed to the Court.
Boerne involved the Fourteenth Amendment, whose enforcement
provision is directly addressed to Congress. ,Marbury contains no
assertion of an exclusive authority in the Court to bind other parts
of the Government. Chief Justice Marshall claims only that the
Court must obey explicit commands of the Constitution in preference to conflicting laws, when such commands are directed at the
Court itself, and not to another branch of Government.
.
The Court's own treatment of Marbury as a precedent throughout most of its history shows that this narrow reading of the case
is accurate. Between 1803 and 1983, the Court cited Marbury 181
times. From the beginning to 1865, Marbury was cited only to support narrow rulings on jurisdiction or mandamus. In Dred Scott,
the other case of the era in which the Court voided a national law,
Marbury is not even mentioned. During the 30-year period following the Civil War, the Court invalidated at least 20 provisions of
Federal law; rat Marbury is mentioned in none of these cases. Not
until 1895, In the Income Tax Case, did the Court first cite
Marbury to support judicial review of national laws. Between 1895
I
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and 1957, the Court cited Marbury only eight times to support judicial power to invalidate laws, and all eight describe the power in
a very restrictive way. So, all totalled, there were 92 uses of
Marbury between 1803 and 1957, and only 10 of these concern judicial power to invalidate laws; all 10 advancing restrictive notions
of the power. Nowhere can be found any claim that the Court is
the final arbiter of constitutional questions. If Marbury really
means what Cooper and Boerne says it means, wouldn't the Court
have said so during its first 168 years?
But all this changes in 1958. Over the next quarter century after
the decision of Cooper, Marbury is employed 50 times to support
judicial review; 18 times to support sweeping assertions of judicial
power; and 9 times to support the idea that the Court is ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution. So if we take the Court's own law
seriously, we must conclude that judicial supremacy originated neither in Marbury, nor in the Constitution, but was established by
the Warren court and developed subsequently by the Burger and
Rehnquist courts. Thus judicial sUlJremacy is not the correct understandin~ of the judicial power established in the Constitution. So
what is. _
The answer to this question is found by consulting Article III of
the Constitution, Marbury v. Madison, and the thoughts of the
Framers. In the first Congress, Madison flatly denied the power of
any branch of the national Government, including tl:le judicial, "to
determine the limits of the constitutional division of power." The
separation of powers was a central concern of the Founders who extended Federal judicial powers to cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties, only after they had generally agreed that
the power was limited to cases of a judiciary nature. Marbury is
the prototypical case of a judiciary nature because it involved .a
constitutional provision aimed directly at the Court that also embodies a clear restriction on judicial power. This means that the
Court could not have applied the statute in Marbury without at the
same time violating the Constitution. Cases of the Marbury type,
in which the Constitution implicates judicial functions directly,
may be expected to arise most often under Article III, Amendments
Four through Eight, and perhaps portions of Article I, Section 9.
Limiting final constitutional review to the Court only in these
cases, leaving to co-ordinate branches the final authority to determine the reach of their own constitutional powers, will preserve the
co-equality accorded to each division of Government by the Founders, strengthens the Se:paration of Powers by emphasizing the constitutional responsibilitIes of Congress and the President, and recovers an important strand of our republican heritage that is nowhere more apparent than in the Supreme Court's own rich constitutionaIlegacy. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clinton follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. CLINTON, AsSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
ScIENCE, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Discussion or the United States Constitution cannot avoid confronting the obvious
fact that the SUfreme Court is now widely regarded to be the primary guardian of
our fundaments law. The Court's monopoly in conptitutionallaw rests largely upon
two kinds or argument. The first argument, political, says that judicial control of
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the Constitution is required in order to protect individuals and minority groups from
the majority tyranny which would be implemented by legislatures in the absence
of the judicial monopoly. The second argument is historical, asserting that judicial
supremacy in constitutional matters is grounded in American constitutional history,
especially in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). My expertise is in
the history of judicial review, so I shall conime my remarks mainly to the second
argument.
In Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review,! I described the historical process
by which legal commentators in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century America employed the Marbury case to lay a precedential foundation for modem judicial
supremacy. Some of the present-day practical effects of the resulting judicialized
constitutionalism are summarized by Robert F. Nagel in the following passage:
Today federal courts control more important public decisions and institutions in
more detail and for more extended periods than at any time in our history. . .
This unprecedented use of judicial power is not a response to specific and limited necessity or emergency. The power is exercised in every state and on a wide
variety of social issues . . . Even a relatively "conservative" Supreme Court
seems transfIXed; recent decisions, such as those dealing with the legislative
veto and political gerrymandering, illustrate the Court's continuing insistence
that almost no public - issue should be excluded from judicial oversight . . .
Heavy reliance on the judiciary-in various idoological directions-is fast becoming an irlgrained part of the American system; already it is difficult for
many. . . even to imagine any alternative. 2
The ever-growing list of judicial intrusions mto areas of activity historically governed by other institutions makes it clear that it is no longer possible to question
the observation that we are, in many of the most vital aspects of life in the American polity, governed primarily by judges. Nagel's metaphor is that of "addiction:"
American society has grown "dependent" on the omnipresent, omnicompetent federal judge, who appears to have supplanted the ,Priest of earlier times. 3 Nagel concludes that "excessive reliance on judicial review undermines long-term support for
basic constitutional principles, impairs the "general health of the political culture,"
and works against "both the preservation and the healthy growth of our constitutional traditions." 4 I concur with these conclusions.
One of the most important results of judicialization has been to tum virtually all
discussions about the Constitution into discussions about the role of judges in its
interpretation. Here are two prominent examples. Soterios Barber, one of the few
contem~rary constitutional theorists who has tried to establish that the Constitution ana constitutional law are two different things,5 nonetheless suggests that the
most important job of "mainstream scholars" is to justify "a strong and unapologetic
exercise of judicial power in constitutional cases." 6 The second illustration is provided by Michael Perry:
In a society, like American society, in which it is axiomatic that the judiciary
should enforce the Constitution, the choice among competing conceptions of the
Constitution is (in part) precisely a choice among competing conceptions of judicial role. In resolving the question how to conceive of the Constitution, we are
resolving the question what role the judiciary should play. In that sense, the
two questions are really one question: What conception of "Constitution/judicial
role" ought we to choose?" 7
This ~uation of Court with Constitution is pervasive in contemporary constitutional theory. It has led to a form of constitutional nihilism, expressed by Mark
Tushnet, that judicial review is an "all or nothin~" proposition: "Either one allows
judges to do whatever they want or one allows maJonties to do whatever they want.
I Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of KanIU, 1989).
~Robert Na.el, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Conseguences of Judicial Review
(Ber~ley, California: Universit, of California Press, 1989), pp. 1-2. See also Robert Lowry Clinton, God and Man in the Law: The Foundations of Anglo-American Constitutionalism (Lawrence,
Kansas: Univeb..ity Press ot Kansas, 1997), pp. 13-14.
:Jlbtd" p, 2, Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 14.
"Ibid" p, 3; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 14.
'Sotetios A. Barber, MMiehaeJ Pes:rY and the Future of Constitutional Theory," Tulane Law
IUlJuUJ 63 (1989): 1289-1303, at 129~j Cli.nton, God and Man in Law, p. 14.
- Ibid., at 1290, Clinton, GOd and Man m Law, p. 14.
u~~1!h~!
~~iew," Ethics, October 1985 (1985): 202-203, at 203; Clinton, God and
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Either choice is deeply anticonstitutional-which means, I suppose, that constitutionalism is self-contradictory." 8
Let's think about this for a moment. Here are three of our nation's leading constitutional theorists unflinchingly declaring: (1) that the main job of constitutional
scholars today is to justify judicial activism (not to understand the Constitution);
(2) that in our system, the word "Constitution" really means '~udicial role"; and (3)
that constitutionalism is "anticonstitutional," or "self-contradictory!" This is astounding. Constitutionalism may be a contradiction under any regime in which judicial review is "all or nothing;" but judicial review is "all or nothing" only under a
theory of judicial supremacy. So if judicial supremacy is incom~atible with constitutionalism, shouldn't we just get rid of judicial supremacy, ana keep the Constitution? My answer is an unequivocal aftIrmative; and I would add that American constitutional history supports this answer. Let's consider this history now.
\

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
\

During the antebellum period, constitutional interpretation was performed continuously by all three branches of the federal government. The great debates in Congress during this period were arguments over the meanin$' of const.itutional provisions. The record is literally permeated by assertions of legIslative duty to interpret
the Constitution both rightly and in accordance with accepted canons of construction. 9 In the 1790s, debates in Congress on the meaning of key provisions in Articles
I, II, and III shaped the contours of the federal government as it was to exist for
a century-and-a-half. 10 At the same time, during the frrst half-century of the republic, preSidential vetoes of congressional acts were exercised almost solely on constitutional grounds, and most of these were accompanied by explicit, uncontested assertions of executive authority to inteI"pret the funaamentallaw. 11
Note also that the indeterminacy of certain portions of the constitutional text has
frequently required provision of constitutional meaning via the interplay of non-judicial political forces (for instance, in the establishment of a national executive administration in the 1790s, in the interposition, nullification, and secepsion controversies
of the antebellum period, in some famous impeachment controversies, or in more recent conflicts over the reach of executive power in foreign and military affairs). rrhe
result here has been an extralegal constitutional construction which, though principled, is nonetheless primarily a political activity necessarily involving non-judicial
actors and agencies and is largely unsuitable for courts. When judges go beyond the
activity of applying determinate legal texts, where all the resources of traditional
legal practice are available both to circumscribe their efforts and to justify their results, they enter an area in which they have neither s~ial claim nor special competence. Attention to the importance of constitutional constructions throughout
American constitutional history makes it clear that constitutional development in
the United States has been very much a "departmental" affair, involving not only
the political branches and the administration of the national government, but the
states as well. 12
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the Supreme Court itself did not claim ''(malit~ or conclusiveness for its own constitutional interpretations until 1958; 13 nor did
constitutional commentators until the early twentieth centuty.14 Nor did the Court
assert any power to control the boundaries of constitutional authority assigned to
other agencIes of If,overnment until the late nineteenth century, except in "cases of
a judicia!,), nature. 15 The last-mentioned point reflects the Court's successful assertion, in Marbu"l~ of its power to construe constitutional provisions in such a way
as to make poSSIble their application as law, but only in the decision of cases involving the ~rformance of judiCIal functions. 16
Thus the historical record unequivocally establishes that the origin of modem judicial supremacy in constitutional law can be found neither in the Constitution itself
nor in its early judicial application. Rather, it originated in the polemics of legal
8Mark Tushnet, "Judicial Review," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 7 (1984): 7779 at 77- Clinton, God and Man in Law, ~. 15.
fSee Clinton, Marbury and Reuiew, pp. 72-77; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15.
lOIbid,; Clinton, God and Man. in Law, p. 27.
"Ibid..f j), 113; Olinton, God and Man in Law p. 15.
12 See Keith E, Whittington, Constitutional Constructions: Diuided Powers and Constitutional
Meaning (typeKript, J?epartment of Politi~, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.,
1996), ••It chap. 1; C1mton.t God and Man In Law, p. 24.
1lSH Cooper v, Aaron, 4:J58 U,S, 1, at 18 a95S); see also Clinton, Marbury and Reuiew, pp.
14-15; Clinton, God alld Man in Law, p. 15.
14SiJe Clinton Marbu",- and RevieUJ, pp, 190-191; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15.
ililbld., p. 121, notel4&-48 and accompanlin, testl Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15.
lflbld., chap. 5; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. ~7.
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academicians and commentators in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 17 It emerged in full flower only in the 1950s. 18 During earlier periods, questions about constitutional meaning were not generally regarded as solely, or even
primarily, judicial. Tocqueville's famous aphorism according to which all political
questions sooner or later developed into judicial ones described a feared tendency
rather than a reality. So had the earlier arguments of the antifederalist BrutuS. 19
When Jeffersonian Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats launched early attacks
on the Court, they did so on the basis of a widespread belief that congressional and!
or presidential interpretations of the Constitution were entitled to as much respect
as those of the judiciary. 20
During the last forty years, the Court has pressed its claim to be the primary
organ of constitutional interpretation in the United States with increasing frequency, intensity, and success. The Court's first assertion of constitutional guardianship came in 1958. In that year the Court decided Cooper v. Aaron (the Little Rock
school desegregation case); claiming, for the fIrst time in American constitutional
history, judicial ''fmality'' for its readings of the Constitution. This ruling effectively
equated the Court's own constitutional interpretations with the Constitution itself.21
The legal peg supporting the maneuver was the Court's assertion that its own constitutional rulings possessed Article VI "supreme law" status, along with constitutional provisions, national laws, and federal treaties. 22 In another "first," the Cooper
Court cited Marbury v. Madison as precedent for its newly-discovered ''ultimate'' interpretive authority.
Since the Cooper decision, many have come to believe that, in Marbury,23 the Supreme Court declared itself to be the primary organ of constitutional interpretation.
The theory that appears to be most widely accepted currently is that the primacy
of judicial review was established in Marbury on the basis of a comparatively weak.
or "inconclusive" historical foundation in the Fou:uling and immediate p!>st-Founding eras. 24 According to this theory, modem (broad-gauged) judicial review is explained and justified as an original "creative" fashioning by the Marshall Court that
was later expanded by subsequent Courts in response to the demands of individuals
and groups for judicial supervision of states, executives, p.nd Congress in accord
with the growing "needs" of American society.
As the Court's own record of precedents demonstrates, this conception of American constitutional history is fundamentally wrong. A limited form of judicial review
was already established by 1800, but only as to relatively "clear cases." 25 Marbury
v. Madison did not alter this, but rather established a clear precedent for the
Court's power to disregard congressional laws in cases "of a judiciary nature"-i.e.,
cases in which judicial functions were threatened by application of a questionable
statutory provision. 26 Marbury thus established only that the judiciary would play
an important role in constitutional interpretation, not that it would be the sole, ultimate, or fmal constitutional interpreter. The idea that a single organ of government
must possess such authority is a product of later times. After Marbury the Court
would not invalidate another act of Congress until the 1850s. 27 Nor would it cite
17 Clinton, Marbury and Review, chapter 10-11; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15.
18See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, at 18 (1958); see also Clinton, Marbury and Review, pp.
14-15; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 15.
190n the "Letters of Brutus," probably penned by prominent antifederalist Robert Yates, and
Alexander Hamilton's (Publius's) response to them, see Clinton, Marbury and Review, pp. 6971. Brutus clearly saw vast potential for expansive judicial development in the 1787 Constitution; but his worst fears did not materialize until a century later. The relevant letters of Brutus
may be found in Cecelia Kenyon, ed., The Antifederalists (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp.
334-357. Tocqueville's best discussion of the level of judicial power being exercised roughly a
half-century after the Constitution's adoption c"ay be found in Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy
in America, 2 vola., trans. George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner (New York: He.'-per
"Row, 1966), pp. 89-93; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 27.
zoSee Clinton, Marbury and Review, chapter 6; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 27.
21 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also Clinton, Marbury and Review, pp. 14-15,207211, Clinton, God and Man in LtJw, p. 27.
2ft Ibid" at p. 18. The Court there declared that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the expositjun oftbe law Dr the Constitution." See also Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 27.
23 1 Ctanch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803); Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 36.
2.
Leonard Leyy, ed., Judicial Review and the Supreme Court (New York: Harper
and
); Clinton, GOd and Man in LtJw, p. 36.
2GBy)vi. S
Review and the Law of the Constitution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
Univendty Prell,
p. chapter 3; Clinton, God and Man in Law p. 38.
"Clinton, Mar
d Review, esp. chapter 6; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 38.
27 Dred Scott v.
ford, 19 Howard 393 (1857); Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 38
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Marbury in support of any kind of constitutional judicial review until the 1880s; and
not in support of broad~gauged review until the 1950s. 28
After its decision in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court has used Marbury to support its
constitutional hegemony at least ten times, most recently in City of Boerne v. Flores
(1997).29 There, the Court invalidated a provision of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) that attempted to restore the "compelling interest" standard m free exercise cases that the Court declined to apply in Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990).30 In promulgating RFRA, CongreBS relied upon its authority to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment which, by judicial ruling, applies the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause to the states. But the Court held in Boerne that the
congressional enforcement authority is only "remedial," not "substantive;" and thus
that Congress is forbidden to determine "the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States," or to enact legislation which "alters the meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause" by determining "what constitutes a constitutional violation." 31
Though it is indeed difficult to see how Congress can "enforce" the Constitution
without being able to "determine what constitutes a constitutional violation;" for
purposes of our historical survey, the crucial point that must be understood here
IS this: the reason why RFRA can be held to have altered the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause is that, in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court has put its own understandings of constitutional meaning (its "interpretations") on a par with the Constitution
itself. In other words, according to the logic of Cooper, the Court's decision in Oregon
v. Smith about the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause is the Free Exercise Clause.
Not content, however, to rest upon this claim alone in Boerne, the Court explicitly
denies the authority of Congress to interpret the. Constitution conclusively or to define
its own powers in accordance with it. 32
Thus it appears that the development of judicial supremacy in constitutional law
is now virtually complete. Modem judicial review is driven by a logic which affords
the Supreme Court ultimate freedom to strike down laws merely because the justices believe those laws to be inconsistent with the Constitution. Co-ordinate agencies of government, the policies of which are defeated by the Court, are then expected to soose-step to the Court-imposed drumbeat, even to the point of conforming
future pollcy choices to judicial preferences.
As I have said, it has not always been so. Nowhere is this shown more clearly
than in the Court's historical treatment of the Marbury case-the very case misrepresented in Cooper and Boerne to support constitutional judicial supremacy.
Given the importance of stare decisis in our legal system, it is worthwhile to examine the Court's treatment of Marbury durin~ previous historical periods, because
this treatment indicates how the Court conceived its own power during those periods.
MARBURY IN THE SUPREME COURT

In Marbu?, v. Madison and Judicial Review, I surveyed and catalogued all of the
Court's citatIons of Marbury from 1803 through 1983. 33 Here's what I found. During
the remainder of John Marshall's tenure as chief justice (through 1835), ten separate opinions contain references to Marbury. Nine arelurely jurisdictional in nature, supporting the distribution of jurisdiction containe in Article III. The remaining reference is made to support the ruling that writs of mandamus may issue to
executive officials only when engaged in the performance of purely ministerial duties. The Court's power to invalidate laws is not mentioned in any of these cases.
Between 1835 and 1865, Marbury is cited in 15 separate opinions in the U.S. Reports. As before, the largest number of cites is in the jurisdictional area (eight references). Six concern nuances in the mandamus remedy. One clarifie's some dicta
in Alarbury that were unnecessary to the decision of that case. Judicial review is
not mentioned at all. Even in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), the only other case before the Civil War in which the Court invalidated an act of Con~ss, Marbury is
not mentioned! This pattern continues during the 30-year period following the Civil
War, a period in which the Court invalidated national laws in no fewer than 20
cases-yet Marbury is mentioned in none of them! As in earlier periods, the in28CHnton, Marbury and Review, chapter 7; Clinton, God and Man in Law, p. 38.
117 S,Ct. 2157,
30 494 U,S, 872.
31 117 8,Ct. 2157, at 2164.
32 117 8,Ct, 2157, at 2168.
33CHnton, Marbury and Review, chap. 7. Full citations for all the cases may be found in the
notes accompanying chapter 7, at pp. 266-274.
2 {1
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stances in which Marbury is cited pertain primarily to jurisdiction or mandamus.
It is during this period, however, that Marbury is first cited in support of any kind
of judicial review-but not over Congress. The citation is found in Mugler v. KanstJ8
(1887), and is offered in support of judicial authority to overturn state laws via use
of the doctrine of substantive due process!
At the beginning of the next period, in the famous Income Tax Case (1895), the
Court, for the f1l'8t time in its history, cites Marbury in support of its power to determine the constitutionality of national laws. Between 1895 and 1957, the Court cites
l1arbury in 38 additional instances, hardly more often than during the 30-year penod preceding 1895. As before, most of the citations have nothing to do with judicial
review. Five refer to the right/remedy maxim. Four support the holding that writs
of mandamus may be issued only as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Four refer
to the distinction between "ministerial" and "discretionary" executive acts. Four confmn that acts in violation of the Constitution are not law, but say nothing about
the Court's power to deny their enforcement. Three pertain to questions about the
removal power of the president. Two refer to sections of the Marbury opinion which
imply that courts may resolve only "cases or controversies" according to the regular
course of judicial procedure. Two concern the idea that general expressions in judi
cial opinions are to be taken "in connection with the case in which they are used."
Two involve the relation between executive appointments and commissions. Two use
Marbury to support the principle that no words in the Constitution should be presumed to be without effect. One maintains that constitutional language should receive a liberal construction whenever individual rights are at stake. Another supports the idea that the national government is supreme within its lawful sphere.
Eight of the Marbury citations during this period pertain to the judicial power to
invalidate laws, and all reflect a narrow or restrictive conception of the power. Two
are offered in support of the idea that judicial review should be confmed to "clear
cases." A third is offered to show that courts have no "general veto power" over legislation, but may invalidate laws only in ''proper cases." A fourth is used to confme
judicial review to "cases or controversies." A rUth restricts court review to cases in
which literal interpretations of the Constitution are possible. A sixth imposes on the
Court the obligation to "interpret the law," but only in ''proper cases." A seventh
merely notes the petitioner's argument that Marbury forbids executive invasions of
"the Judicial sphere." The eighth citation mentions Marbury as one of a long line
of cases in which legislation was decla.red unconstitutional "because it imposed on
the Court powers or functions that were regarded as outside the scope of the judicial power' lodged in the Court by the Constitution."
Thus it may be fairly concluded that, although the Court began to notice
Marbury's judicial review aspect dur..ng the fIrSt half of the present century, it recognized fully its restrictive nature. Nowhere is there anything approaching a declaration that the Court is the fmal arbiter of constitutional questions. All told, of
the 92 citations of Marbury by justices of the Supreme Court between 1803 and
1957, only ten refer to that portion of the Marshall opinion that is currently thought
to have "established judicial review."
All this changed in 1958. During the 25-year period between 1958 and 1983, there
are 89 separate citations of Marbury, a number that almost equals the total of the
previous 154 years. Of these 89, fifty utilize Marbury in support of judicial review.
Of these 50, at least eighteen employ Marbury to justify sweeping assertions of judicial authority. Of these 18, nine apply Marbury to support the idea that the Court
is the "(mal" or "ultimate" interpreter of the Constitution, with power to issue "binding" proclamations to any other agency or department of government respecting any
constitutional issue whatsoever. As I have noted above, Cooper v. Aaron is the first
of the cases in this last-mentioned category. If we take the Court's own statements
seriously, then it must again be concluded that judicial supremacy could not have
originated in Marbury, but rather is a doctrine firmly established by the Warren
CoUrt and subsequently developed by the Burger Court. And if we take seriously
the Court's use of Marbury in the Boerne case, we must also conclude that the
Rehnquist Court is presently doing its part to perpetuate the doctrine.
But if the doctrine of Judicial supremacy in constitutional law is not the correct
understanding of the judicial function established in the Constitution, then what is
the correct understanding? The best way to answer this question is to contrast the
modem doctrine with its traditional counterpart. I shall fll'St sketch out the judicial
lunction as it was understood at the time of the Founding. I will then try to show
bow the modem practice review in cases involvinJ the constitutional powers of
co-ordinate agencIes of gove.rnment like Congress deViates from traditional practice.
Finally, I sball attempt briefly to make out a case for a return to tradition.
r
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THE FOUNDERS AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

. Judicial review of national law in the U.S. is usually thought to be constitutionally grounded in the Article III extension of federal judicial power to cases "arising under' the Constitution, laws and treaties. 34 The most explicit statement regarding the scope of this power is found in James Madison's Notes on the Federal
Convention. According to Madison, the Founders extended federalJ'udicial power to
such cases only after it had been generally agreed "that the juris iction given was
constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature."35 According to. B.F. Wright,
Madison's meaning points to "a theory of jud.icial review which did not recognize the
courts as the exclusive or fmal interpreters of all parts of the Constitution." 36 Ralph
A. Rossum says that Madison did not believe "that the Court's interpretations were
su~rior to or entitled to precedence over those of Congress or the President. He
clauned only that the Court should have n."lal authority to pass on constitutional
~uestions that affected its own duties and responsibilities, that is, that were of a
'Judiciary nature'." 37
Supporting the statements of Wright and Rossum are Madison's own remarks
during the 1789 congressional debates over the president's removal power. Arguing
in support of vesting this power solely in the president, and responding to the
charge that the legislature had no right to interpret the Constitution (via vesting
of the power by statute), Madison states the following:
I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of government, that the exposition of the
laws and constitution devolves upon the judicial. But, I beg to know, upon what
nrinciple it can be contended, that anyone department draws from the constitution greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of
the several departments. The constitution is the charter of the people to the
government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted, and marks
out the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of either
be brou5dlt into question, I do not see that anyone of these independent departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that
point. . . . There is not one government on the face of the earth, so far as I
recollect, there is not one in the United States, in which provision is made for
a particular authority to determine the limits of the constitutional division of
power between the branches of the government. III all systems there are points
which must be adjusted by the departments themselves, to which no one of
them is competent. If it cannot be determined in this way, there is no resource
left but the will of the community, to be collected in some mode to be provided
by the constitution, or one dictated by the necessity of the case. 3S
It can be argued that Madison's "mode to be provided by the constitution" is formal amendment and that the modes "dictated by the necessity of the case" may be
elections, impeachments, or even revolutions. 39 It is more plausible, however, to assume that "necessity of the case" refers to the three branches of government working out in the daily routine of constitutional government the functional differentiations inherent in the separation of powers. It waD Madison who just two years previously had recorded approvingly the Philadelphia Convention's restriction of the
"arising under" jurisdictlon of fedf:ral courts to cases "of a Judiciary nature;" and
in the passage just quoted, Madison straightforwardly denies the power of the
courts to issue fmal constitutional pronouncements in cases which involve interpretations of the constitutional powers of co-ordinate agencies. Cases not of a judiCIary
nature that also arise under the Constitution are pre-eminently those that require
determination of the constitutional authority of the legh;lative or executive branch.

ApproprilJte cases for judicial review must be those which do not require such a determination.
34 United States Con9titution, Article III, Section 2: "The Judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made under their Authority."
35Mu Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 4 vols. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1911). vol. 2. p. 430.
"Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942; ChicI",O: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1967 (reprint», p. 18.
J7RaJpb A. Rouum, write Courts and the Judicial Power," in Leonard Levy and Dennis
Mahoney, ed•. , The Framing and Ratirreation of the Constitution (New York: Macmillan, 1987).

p.236.

"Jam.. Madison, "Comment. on the Removal Power of the President" June 17 1789, in
Chari _ F. HobNn and Robett A. RutJand, eels.• The PaIJe..rs of James M;}ison., 16 vola. (CharJottesyjJJe, VirJigia: UniV8t1ity Pre•• of Virginia, 1979), vo], 12, p. 234.
"Wolle, TIM RttJe of Modern Judlc141 Review, p. 9ft
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It is likely that the 1787 cases "of a judiciary nature" are exactly those 1789 cases
in which, ''in the ordinary course of government," the exposition of the "constitution
devolves upon the judicial." Under this view, it is only in cases which involve constitutional provisions directly addressed to the courts that the Supreme Court's refusal to apply relevant law is necessarily fmal. In cases involving constitutional provisions addressed to other branches of government (e.g., the Article I, Section 8 "necessary and proper" clause), the Court may surely refuse to apply the law, but it may
not do so with finality in the strict sense. Even though the Court's decision may
bind the parties in a particular case, Congress may nonetheless choose to disregard
the Court's constitutional ruling and provide for executive enforcement of the statute. Congress may even go so far as to utilize its power to regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction so as to discourage or prevent future appeals on the question of
the law's constitutional validity. In such instances, it is the judgment of Congress,
not that of the Court, which will be ''fmal.'' On the other hand, if the case involves
such a constitutional provision as that in the Sixth Amendment's right to confront
one's accusers in a federal criminal trial, then the Court's decision on the constitutional question will necessarily be fmal, since carrying on any federal criminal trial
requires a Cl)urt, and federal trial courts are bound by rulings of the Supreme Court.
From this perspective, Madison's theory of judicial review partitions constitutionally defective laws into two categories. One group includes those instances in
which judicial review is appropriate, because fmal authority for nonapplication of
the unconstitutional law rests in the courts by virtue of the nature of the judicial
function. The most obvious example is an act which operates "unconstitutionally" on
a court's performanc~ of its own duties. In the other category, constitutional judicial
review is inappropriate, because the performance of judicial duty in those instances
is unaffected by the constitutional infirmity of the law.
MARBURY AND THE EARLY CASES

The case which best illustrates Madison's theory is also the one which has been
most often used to support the modem theory of review, and which (nominally) involved Madison himself as a party. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, held a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789
(which extended the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to all federal officials) to
be in contravention of Article Ill's jurisdictional distribution (which restricted the
Court's original jurisdiction to cases involving "ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, and states ").40 Marbury is a case of judiciary nature in the pure sense because
it involved not only constitutional and statutory provisions aimed directly at the
Court, but also involved a constitutional provision which embodied a clear restriction on judicial power. The Court's refusal to apply the law thus left the coordinate
branches of government no alternative but to comply with its decision (i.e., to do
nothing) because the Court, by enforcing a constitutional restriction on judicial
powe,:, essentially did nothing. Its decision therefore amounted to a "fmal," or "ultimate" interpretation of the Constitution.
If this sounds like a strange basis for judicial review, one should be reminded that
virtually all exercises of review by courts in the early American republic were of
the Marbury type; that is, they involved courts resisting legislative attempts either
(a) to impose extra-constitutional duties on judges, (b) to interfere with judicial procedure in ways that were unauthorized by the Constitution, or to usurp judicial
functions outright. In the first category, one may point to the Invalid Pensioner
Cases of the 1790s,41 to the famous Correspondence of the Judges,42 and to Marbury
itself. In the second category, one can refer to the many early cases involving statu40Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
41See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas 409 (1792); United States v. Yale Todd (unreported at
the time), .ummarized by Chief Justice Taney in United States v. Ferreira, 13 Howard (54 U.S.)
40, at 52-63 (1851). Speaking of the judgments in both Hayburn and Todd, Taney said that
the admini.trative power "proposed to be conferred on the Circuit Courts of the United States
(by eon......) wu not judicial power within the meaning of the Constitution, and was therefore
unconstitutional, and could not be lawfully exercised by the courts." See a]so Case of the Judges,
.. Call (Va.) 135(1788); Turner v. Turner, 4 Call (Va.) 234 (1792); Page v. Pendleton, Wythe's
Reoort. 211 (Va) 1793, Kamper v, Hawkins, 1 Va Cues 21 (1793).
---12AuPH 8, 1793, Here the Court refused to render an advisory opinion requested by the
pre.ident and HCretary or 8tate, on the ground that such an opinion wou]d be "extrajudicial"
and tbul violative of the H~aration of powers. See David P. Currie. --rhe Constitution in the
Supreme Court: 1789-1801, Uniuersity of Chicago Law Reuiew 48 (1981): 819-885, p. 829.
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tory suspension of jury trials. 43 In the third, we have frequent instances of legislative usurpation via passage of attainders and retrospective criminal laws. 44
If one has trouble imagining judicial review so confmed in its scope, it is probablr
because the modem American mind, conditioned by at least a half-century of judicial supremacy, can hardly help but regard the judicial branch as a co-equal partner
~ the public policy makinJC1~rocess. But it was doubtless to prevent such participatIon by judges in policy-m . g that the Founders circumscribed the jurisdiction and
power of courts so narrowly in the first place. And just as surely was it to prevent
being dragged into such processes that early American judges strongly utilized the
power of review to safeguard their independence; both br resisting legislative encroachment on legitimate judicial functions, and by l'efusmg to intrude themselves
upon domains they regarded as better left to others.
Marshall implicitly recognized this in Marbury, by drawing a clear distinction between the issue of constitutionality and that of judicial review; that is, between (a)
a law being a nullify due to its incompatibility with the Constitution, on the one
hand, and (b) a court's having the power to nullify such a law, on the other. In Marshall's words, granting that "the constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts,"
does it nonetheless follow that an act, "repugnant to the constitution, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?"45 In answering
this rhetorical question, Marshall articulated the theory of judicial function for
which Marbury is justly celebrated:
It is emphatically the province the duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the court must either decide that case conformaoly to the law, disregarding the
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the
very essence of judicial duty.46
Since these lines recently have been so frequently cited as precedent for a notion
of judicial power which renders the Supreme Court ultimate arbiter of all constitutional questions, it is important to assess what is not said in them. No exclusive
power to interpret the fundamental law is claimed for the Court, here or anywhere
else in Marbury. To be sure, it is ''the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is," but only "of necessity," whenever those "who apply the rule
to particular cases" must determine which of two "conflicting rules governs the
case." In other words, the power of review claimed by the Court in Marbury is merely a power of discretion to disregard existing laws in the decision of particular controversies, provided that the constitutional and statutory provisions involved are, like
those in Article III and the Judiciary Act, addressed to the Court itself If the provisions are not addressed to the Court, then the Court will not be compelled, as a
matter of logic, to choose between them in order to decide the case. Since precedents
are created by holdings on points of law necessarily decided in particular cases, the
Court's choice between constitutional and statutory provisions, one or both of which
are not addressed to the Court, should not control the decision of subsequent cases.
Marbury thus affords no basis ior inferring that the Court is bound to disregard a
statutory provision in conflict with the Constitution, except in that relatively small
number of instances in which the Constitution furnishes a direct rule for the courts.
Where does the Constitution furnish direct rules for the courts? Most of the provisions of this type may_ be found in two places: Article III and Amendments 4-8 of
the Bill of Rights. The classic example is one that Marshall himself used in
Marbury: the treason clause, which requires either a confession or the testimony of
two witnesses in open court to the same overt treasonable act. 47 It''or an obvious ex.U See, e,g., Austin Scott, "Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent," American Historical
Review 4 (1899): 456-469; Trevett v. Weeden (Rhode Island, 1786), reported in J.B. Thayer,
Ca,es on Constitutional Law, 2 vall'. (Cambridge, Mass.: George H. Kent, 1895), vol. 1, PI». 7378; Ba,ard v. Singleton, 1 Martin (N.C.) 42 (1787). See generally William E. Nelson, "The Eighteenth·Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Juril!J)nadence," Michigan Law Review 76 (MaI1978): 893- 960, See also Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay (S.C.) 252 (1792); Stidger
v, Rogl!r6, 2 Sneed <Ky,) 129 (1802); Enderman v, Ashby, 2 Sneed (Ky.) 53 (1801).
"' ~.t e,g., Commonwealth v, Caton, 4 CaJJ (Va.) 5 (1782); Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cases
21 (l7Wd' ; Caldwell v, The Commonwealth, 2 Sneed (Ky.) 129 (1802).
46Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U,S.) 137, at 177 (1803).
4fJlbld., at 177- 178.
41United States Constitution, Article III, Section 3.
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ample from the Bill of Rights, one only need add the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment that such a confession be uncoerced. Now sUPfose that Con~ss, in a
zealous attempt to suppress subversion, amends the federa rules of crimmal procedure so as to make it possible for the government to obtain a conviction on a char
of treason on the baSIS of a coerced confession. This situation presents a clear- t
case of a -judiciary nature precisely because the Court cannot apply the statutory J,.ovision without at the same time violating the Constitution.
Reformulating the emphasized portion above as a question allows formulation of
a rule which will help one to determine whether any particular case is one of a judiciary nature. In eac1i case, one may ask: "Can the Court apply the law ~cn question
without itself violating the Constitution?" If the answer to this question is negative,
then the case is one of a judiciary nature, and the Court will have n· :;ensible alternative but to invalidate (refuse to apply) the law. If, on the other 3-,dnd, the answer
is positive, then the case is no~judlciary in nature, and the Cot' : t must apply the
law, whether or not the law itselr violates the Constitution.
Applying this method, one may read down the list of provisions in Article III and
Amendments 4-8, and be quickly satisfied that most of the cases which have arisen
(and may yet arise) under them fall into the former category (cases of a judiciary
nature). At the same time, one may look almost anywhere else in the Constitution
and be satisfied, though perhaps not so quickly, that most of the cases which have
arisen (and may yet arise) under provisions other than Article III and Amendments
4-8 fall into the latter category (cases of a nonjudiciary nature).
FUNCTIONAL CO-oRDINATE REVIEW

What would be the effect of the Supreme Court's adoption of an approach which
confmes the scope of judicial review in cases involvin~ the constitutlO1:al power of
co-ordinate agencies of government to those "of a judiCIary nature," leaving to other
branches the right to construe constitutional provisions addressed to them? Such an
approach would authorize judicial invalidation of laws only when to do otherNise
(Le., to uphold the law) would cause the Court to violate a constitutional restriction
on judicial power. It would not 3r uW the Court to defeat legislative or executive policies merely on the sround thao: such policies were unauthorized by the Constitution.
It would not allow Judicial T .llification of policies forbidden by the Constitution, except when the participation of courts is required to effectuate them. Would not adoption of this approach, which I call ''functional co-ordinate review," put an end to constitutional law as W P lJresently understand it, leaving us in the grip of tyrannous
popular majorities?
Examination of the historical record does not confirm such fears. To be sure, had
the Supreme Court followed this approach throughout its history, the majority of
the cases \' 'rein congressional acts were nullified would have been decided differently. O t t.he 130-odd cases in which federal laws were invalidated between 1800
and 198.) , only 38 were "of a judiciary nature." 48
H wever, when the cases are examined more closely, a different picture emerges.
Firot., leaving aside Marbury and Dred Scott 49 (the earliest instance of judicial invalidation of congressional policy in a case not of a judiciary nature), the Court invalidated national laws in 75 cases between the end of the Civil War and 1936on the eve of the Roosevelt Court-packing scheme. 50 Only 14 of these occurred in
cases "of a judiciary nature;" leaving 61 having occurred in cases inappropriate for
judicial reVIew, under Madison's theory. The bulk of these latter cases were decided
on the ground either of: (a) Fifth Amendment substantive "economic" due _process,
(b) Tenth Amendment "dual federalism," or the Court's mere opinion that Congress
had overstepped its constitutional authority. The crucial point is this: virtually all
the last-mentioned decisions (the "inappropriate" ones) have since been either overruled or so thoroughly emasculated as to nave effectively disappeared from our constitutionallaw.
During the period following the Court-fight to 1985, the Court overturned some
53 acts of Congress. 51 The ROosevelt and Warren Courts together performed 26 of
these, all but five in cases "of a judiciary nature." 52 Conversely, the Burger Court
performed 27 nullifications, only two of which clearly were in cases of a judiciary
nature. 53 The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey is that, unless
one happell8 to be a staunch devotee of the Burger Court, adoption of :Madison's the'' ' Clinton, Marbury v, MadiBonand Judicial Reuiew, pp. 117- 121,207- 211.
49Dred Scott v, Sanford, 19 Howard (60 U.S.) 393 (1857).
60CJinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Reuiew, p, 121, pp. 207- 208.
61Ibid., pp. 208-210.
62Ibtd" pp, 208-209.
" Ibid" pp. 209-210
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ory of revi~w would hardly reduce our constitutional law to a shambles. Instead, it
would only serve to elimiriate the more questionable portion of the Court's historical
interferences with national legislative policy. Indeed, of the 90-odd cases comprising
this portion, the Court has itself already eliminated roughly two-thirds!
I believe that this record is a testament to the good sense of Madison and the
Founders. They knew what we have afparently forgotten, that courts are fragile institutions, with little political capita to squander, and which must be jealously
guarded if they are to perform well their most vital function: that of resolving disputes peacefully, so as to prevent alternative resolution by force of arms. This is arguably the most important activity of any governmental office in a constitutional republic, and it cannot likely be performed well by any but the "least dangerous
branch." When that branch attempts self-aggrandizement via constitutional struggles with the more explicitly "political" (and ultimately stronger) organs of government, it will not, in the long run, become the "most dangerous branch;" rather, it
will put the entire machinery of peaceful dispute-resolution at risk, and thereby un_
dermine the real source of its own authority.
The Founders also knew something else that we seem to have forgotten. Three
decades ago, constitutional historian Donald G. Morgan, warning of the danger of
the already-advancing judicial monopolization of the Constitution, reported being
struck by "the solicitude with which citizens and officials [in the early constitutional
period], when contemplating measures of government action, probed constitutional
Issues." 54 Jefferson believed that "congressional involvement with constitutional inquiries" was "essential to an informed electorate," tb~~ "safest depository of ultimate
power."55 Madison viewed such constitutional involvt'yo.ent as 'essential to the integrity of the Legislature itself:
It is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of the government
as to any other that the Constitution should be preserved entire. . . the breach
of the Constitution in one point, will facilitate the breach in another; a breach
in this point may destroy that equilibrium by which the House retains its consequence and share of power. 56
Commenting on Morgan's book, the late Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. issued a call
which J in the wake of the Boerne decision, seems especially appropriate:
The thesis of this book is that it is the responsibility of every Senator and Representative in the national Congress to study the constitutionality as well as the
wisdom of the legislative proposals pending before the Congress. . . As a member of the Senate, I accept the validity of this thesis, which was evidently in
the minds of the men who drafted and ratified the Constitution. 57

Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Professor Clinton. Mr. Scott.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was delighted with the
testimony, and one of the things that we kept hearing was whether
the Court had the last word. One of the things that is interesting,
the nature of passing legislation; passed by Congress, then the
President. Just in the order of things, the Supreme Court would be
tJ~e last one to speak; there's no way to get the Court speaking
first.
Let me ask a couple of questions; since this is a political discussion, whether or not the witnesses see any ideological bent in the
cases where the acts of Congress are invalidated?
Ms. STROSSEN. I have to say, Congressman Scott, looking at the
cases that I follow most closely, which are those dealing with civil
liberties, to a surprising extent on some issues there is a lack of
ideological bent, and I say surprising because it is quite different
from what we encounter in elected branches of Government.
The Communications Decency Act, struck down in the Reno case,
is a perfect case in point. Essentially, that decision was joined by
64DooaJd G, Mo an, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge,
Ma••achuMttl: Hard University Prell, 1966), p. vii.
Hlbid., p. 362.
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all nine Justices, with just small dissents on very small portions
of the law-by Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist. But,
essentially, they all agreed that the CDA. was unconstitutional, regardless of their own personal ideologies or the ideologies of those
who appointed them.
The counter-example that I can think of in the area of the First
Amendment, is~and I'm sure Congressman Hyde, in particular, is
familiar with this-some critics have charged that the Court is engaging in an "abortion distortion," and have argued that the
Court's decisions concerning free speech, or alleged free speech and
free association rights of anti-abortion demonstrators are less protective than they would have been of the free speech rights of, let's
say, pro-civil rights demonstrators. And I think it's interesting that
in those cases you have Antonin Scalia standing more strongly, for
a more solid version and a more absolutist version of the First
Amendment than held by Justices who would be considered liberal.
Mr. SC(YrT. I think Professor Clinton kind of alluded to this, and
I wanted to ask if the invalidation of acts of Congress seems to be
more common today than it has been historically.
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I don't think'~here's any doubt about that. Of
course, during earlier periods, prior to the Civil War, there were
only two acts of Congress invalidated, and in one of those, which
was the Marbury case it's not clear that the Court even knew, at
least until the 1880's or 1890's, that the Court had invalidated any
law there; because if you look at the citations of Marbury during
that entire period, you get virtually nothing, except very narrow
references to jurisdiction or mandamus.
The first time I know of that ltlarbury was ever even cited in
support of judicial review was 1887 in the Mugler case; and there
the Court mistakenly cited the case as an example of substantive
due process, in effect. In other words, they used Marbury as a
precedent for the Court striking down state laws on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds; and so it's not clear why they even dredged
it up, and it's Dot clear that they knew what they were citing either. Now that all changed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which happens to be the same era in which the Court started striking down more acts of Congress.
And, I think, if you look-there's an interesting thing that gc·es
on here. If you look at the modem period, after the Warren court,
you find that the Warren court struck down more state laws than
anything else, but very few Federal laws. The Burger court, on the
other hand, struck down a whole lot of Federal laws. And the
Rehnquist court seems to have followed suit, although I haven't
done those numbers. But there's no q11estion that the exercise of
judicial power over Congress has increased steadily since the late
19th century. I think that would be a fair enough statement. Some
of the other panelists may have something to add to that.
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, I'd just like to say that it certainly is true that
there have been more Federal statutes struck down in this century
than the preceding century; but this is not the first period of judicial actiVIsm in tliat regard. One thinks, of course, of the famous
invalidation of many New Deal measures during the 1930's. And I
think that thisMr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes.
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Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This suggests that the degree of invalidation of congressional action is proportional, in part, to the degree of congressional action.
That is, one of the reasons why there were very few congressional
statutes struck down in the early 19th century was that the Congress was much more restrained in the exercise of its powers during those years than it has been since. It is when Congress begins
breaking new ground and reaching out ,into new areas \vhere there
are questions about its constitutional power that the Court is naturally given more opportunities to pass on the extent of its powers.
Mr. SCOTT. No one-there's one other aspect of this that I think
is significant, and I haven't heard much on it, and that is the fact
that Congress is elected one way, the President is elected independent of Congress, but the Judicial Branch is dependent on the other
two branches, so that if there is a disagreement between the legislative and administrative branches, there's a solution. It takes a
little time to get there, but there is a solution. Is that any restraint
on historical, traditional activism, and disagreeing with Congress
and the President?
Mr. DEVINS. Well, the ballot box also applies to the Courts because the selection of judges and Justices is an overtly political
process. So, to return to the example of the Court striking down
New Deal legislation that Professor Currie mentioned before, it
was inevitable that with the death of Justices on the Court, that
the view of the Court to the New Deal would change over time because of political events, the reelection of Roosevelt, and the substitution, with it, of old Justices with new Justices. So, I don't quite
know if the demarcation you suggest is really a true demarcation.
Mr. FISHER. I am reminded by your question of what happened
in the early 1940's, and, Nadine said, which is true, that if the
Court is unanimous, that means something is really unconstitutional. But at times, the Court is nearly unanimous, and the public,
in this case, reacts in the newspapers and editorials, and so forth.
I'm thinking about the 1940 case that upheld a compulsory flag salute. It was an eight-to-one vote by the Court, and the reaction in
the public was fierce against the Court's ruling. Very strong determination by the general public and experts that the Court didn't
understand the Constitution, didn't understand religious freedom,
and didn't understand individual rights. Two years later, three Justices recanted; said they had regretted their being part of the eight.
Two new Justices came on, and in 1943, the Court reversed itself.
Now, the Court's opinion in 1943 was a beautiful description of
the Bill of Rights, and what it means, but I think the credit goes
to the country weighing in and saying this is just unacceptable to
force school children to take a flag salute that's in violation of their
religious rights. So, sometimes Congress is the restraint, sometimes it is the President, sometimes the general public.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CANADY. Thank you. Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and !
want to conFatulate you on holding this hearing. This is a fascinating subject and I just wish we had two or 3 days on a mountaintop retreat where we could not be stymied by the limitations
of time, and really have some exchanges. Nadine Strossen is a pal
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of mine, and I admire and respect her, and I don't think there's
anything we agree on. [Laughter.]
And that's what makes it such fun, because she brings a level
of learning, and intelligence, and analysis to these subjects, but I'm
just going to go through some of the things that trouble me in this
field.
Court-stripping as a remedy. Sure, it's in the Constitution, and
we can limit jurisdiction of the Courts, but just try it. I remember
some years ago--I won't mention his name, a Senator from a
southern State, introduced legislation to remove abortion cases
from the Court, and it produced an explosive reaction from the academic world. And I remember Arthur Fleming testifying with great
indignation that this would shred the Constitution, and I asked
him if he would send me his paper in opposition to the N orrisLaGuardia Act, and he just smiled and made no response. Judicial
activism, yes, there is, there really is. Someone, Kissinger, I guess,
said. that power is the ultimate aphrodisiac" and it is,. and there are
judges who exercise this.
But what I did not hear is who gets the last word. Roe v. Wade
created a constitutional right out of the air, and it's there, and
every court and every State in the la..1J.d had their abortion laws
wiped out with one fell swoop, and the Court has danced around.
it now with Casey, but reinforced it for the marvelous reason that,
by God, it's here, and we're used to it. So, who gets the last word?
We're bound and we're chained by that. State courts, state legislatures are chained by that, and so the court has got the last word,
and that's really what counts.
Is the Constitution a living, breathing document ala Justice
Brennan, or does original intent count for something? "You pays
your money and you takes your choice;" good question.
Defining deviancy down-so true, so true, Senator Moynihanbecause obscenity 20 years ago-and NadinE; has written a book on
this-·but, twenty years ago, the stuff you can see now in some of
the movies, see on your nightly television, and listen to, would be
criminalized. The Court has been defining deviancy down, but
there you are. Flag burning; is burning a flag symbolic speech? The
Court refuses to recognize that many of us, the majority of Americans, don't think it's symbolic speech, but that's where we are. The
Second Amendment; I don't care what you say, it's there-and the
right to keep and bear arms is there. Internet porn, which Nadine
was so concerned about. The consent of the governed is out there
somewhere as a basis for this whole Government. And parents and
people are worried about the poison that's on the internet, and it
may be delightful to say what you want to say no matter how obscene it is, but there's a real problem and I hope we can somehow
work it out.
There are noble exceptions to principle. Tort reform, we hear the
argument from State's Rightists, saying we have 50 states and we
ought to keep our nose out of their tort laws but in the real world
today, you have 50 different sets of laws that insurance companies
and exporters have to comply with and it just won't work.
So, I remember 8l"guing with a Justice or judge of the Fifth Circuit one time ovef lunch about judicial activism, and I said-I 'was
trying to be critical Qi' judicial activism and he pointed out an ex-
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ample where they have to do something they shouldn't do. And I
said, what's that? And he said, reapportion. He said, your state legislatures won't do it, many times, and, so, it's left to the Courts to
do. For years, we didn't do it and nothing happened, but the political process was distorted because the legislatures abandoned their
responsibility; we did it and we do it. He's quite right. And I would
call that a-Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes.
Chairman HYDE. That's all right, I've trespassed on everybody's
time, but-Mr. CANADY. We've all trespassed. [Laughter.]
Chairman HYDE. But this is really a fascinating subject: judicial
review versus legislative review. It's nice to say we have the same
responsibility, but we don't really have the power because the
Court has the last word and it's really a conflict of laws problem.
But, thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you all for giving your time
to us.
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Hyde. Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT" Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I seldom take the oppor..
tunity to praise the chairman of this subcommittee, and I - Mr. CANADY. Let's get this on tape. [Laughter.]
Mr. WATT. I will do that publicly and I want to make sure that
our reporter is recording this. I think this has been an outstanding
exercise. It may just be an exercise, unfortunately. I suspect that
most of us will go back to our various ways of dealing with these
issues when the hearing is over, and it'll be a nice academic backdrop for us. But, it's at least nice for us to have the opportunity
to have these kinds of exchanges as part of our legislative process.
I think it's important for the Judiciary Committee, in particular, to
take up some of these kind of discussions that appear to be -academic but have some very, very important and powerful legal and
political implications.
I should say that I resemble the chairman's remarks about neoState Righters. I had the sense that he might have been pointing
that at me, but I'm sure he wasn't.
Chairman HYDE. No, sir, I think you're a genuine States Righter.
[Laughter.]
Mr. WATT. I haven't heard anything today that I'm surprised by.
The thing that I have not heard much about, that I'm extremely
concerned about is impeachment of judges. I mean, there are a
number of issues, that like the chairman I c~uld go down and differ
with the Court on going back historically, differ with the Court on
currently, and call them judicial activism or say that they ought to
be doing something different. I'm kind of satisfied with that equalizing itself over time and coming out in a reasonable way; the political process will take care of that.
The one issue that is very troubling to me though is one that
only Professor Franck addressed in a tangential way. And that
when we, on our side, start talking about impeaching judges for activism, and because we disagree with their opinions on issues.
There are several issues I would vigorously disagree with members
of the Supreme Court, and members of other courts, about, but I
think that it's another matter to start talking about impeaching a
judge. I heard what Professor Franck said about it. He thinks it's
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apparently a legitimate, primary tool that one might consider. I'm
just wondering how the others on the panel may feel about how
this whole threat of impeachment plays into the process, and when
and under what circumstances it might be appropriately threatened and or applied.
Ms. STROSSEN. May I address that, Congressman Watt? I did address that in my written testimony and certainly the ACLU, as a
staunch defender of free speech, would absolutely defend the right
of everybody, including you and Congressman Hyde and all of us,
to criticize particular decisions, and most of us have criticized the
Boerne decision, as an example. That is protected free speech. But
when you start not only the impeachment process itself, but even
threatening to invoke the impeachment process, and when those attacks are voiced by Government officials who are in a position to
actually initiate the impeachment process, our concern is that
starts crossing over a very important line between your protected
right to criticize Government officials, including judges, versus dangerous threats and intimidation. Even if they don't result in impeachment, they can have a chilling effect on judicial independence, which, by the way, no less staunch a conservative than Chief
Justice Rehnquist called the crown jewel of our system of Government.
And Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote a book about the impeachment process in which he, going back to the first incident in
history in 1804, talked about the extremely important precedent
that, was set in the case of the impeachment of Justice Chase. It
was not a legitimate basis for impeachment that somebody disagreed with the judge's constitutional interpretation. That is the
basis for criticism, certainly, but that is not a basis for removal.
One can cite not only history for that proposition, and not only
the text of the impeachment clause of the Constitution, but also,
I think, even more importantly, the whole structure of checks and
balances and of the very special role that is carved out for our judiciary to be a check on the majoritarian branches of Government,
to help them resist political tides that may well-and, unfortunately, throughout our history, have-run roughshod over the
rights~ especially, of unpopular individuals and dis-empowered minority groups.
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman may have two additional minutes.
Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WATT. I'll certainly yield.
Chairman HYDE. I just want to say on this subject, I think the
gentleman is absolutely right. The word is thrown around promiscuously and wrongfully, and it should never be, and it's usually
non-lawyers who do it. I don't mean to be critical of non-lawyers,
but their visceral reaction to a judge they don't like is impeach.
Thank God it takes a two-thirds vote and requires bipartisan support to impeach anybody. But I don't think that's a real threat. I
think. very few people have reacted to a local situation; however,
it gets a little dicey when you have a Federal judge who waits 8
years to rule on a case, a serious criminal case that involves the
freedom of the person, and of having to try it again, and fmd the
W11tn8181H'. after 8 years-·to have the decision in your bosom for 8
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years, it gets close to egregious misconduct. And those are tough
cases; we don't have one before us, although I know of such a case.
And just one last thing, you mentioned internet pornography and
that we have a duty to look at the Constitution and say, hey, this
isn't constitutional. Many times, Members of Congresq want to-it
isn't a question of sending a message, but they k.,uJW the Courts
change their mind, and yeu want to give them a chance to get it
right next time, and they can't unless they get legislation up before
them. That is sometimes a motive, rather than a blatant disregard
for doing something that is unconstitutional, but let the Court
worry about it. Sometimes you want to keep sending it up to them,
hoping. Roe v. Wade, I'd like to send one every week up there, hoping they'll get it right sometime.
Thank you. Thanks.
Mr. WATT. Can I just-I don't have any more questions, but I
would like to hear from as many of the panelists as you will give
time to respond to i t Mr. CANADY. Sure.
Mr. WATT. The impeachment issue.
Mr. CANDAY. The gentleman has two additional minutes.
Mr. CURRIE. I certainly agree with v/hat has been suggested
about the inadvisability of killing the umpire because you don't like
his decisions. Impeachment is one form of killing the umpire, and
the Senate of the United States in a very admirable bipartisan decision back in 1805 in refusing to remove Justice Chase for political
reasons gave, I think, the definitive answer to the use of impeachment as a means of controlling the exercise of judicial power. The
use of impeachment for that purpose is squarely contrary to the
whole idea of judicial review.
And, so, I think, is any attempt by other branches to destroy the
effective)~ess of the Court. For example, you go back to the 1930's
again, when the Supreme Court was frustrating the New Deal, the
President's reaction was, let us neutralize the Court by packing it
with a bunch of new Justices who will be sympathetic to my program. That is totally inconsistent with the role of the Court as an
enforcer of the Constitution. That is to say, kill the umpire.
I have similar problems if the Congress undertakes to kill the
umpire by removing the jurisdiction of the Court-by stripping the
Court of jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of acts of
Congress or the state legislatures. It was not just people like Marshall and Hamilton who believed in judicial review as an essential
check on the unconstitutional actions of other bra...ches of government. Madison, as I said in my testimony, was also of that view;
so was Thomas Jefferson. Congress has a role, the President has
a role, everybody in a sense, Congressman Hyde, has the last word,
in that if the Congress thinks that a bill is unconstitutional, it
won't pass it. If the Court thinks that the bill is unconstitutional,
it will hold it unconstitutional. And I think that's the best way to
enforce the Constitution. Don't kill the umpire; let every branch of
Government exercise its independent responsibility to protect us
agfl1n!n; constitutional violations. This is not to say that there are
no checks on the Court; of course there are checks on the Court.
The appointment process has been mentioned. The amendment
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process has been mentioned. But let's not kill the umpire just because we don't like his decisions.
Mr. FRANCK. May I respond since I - Mr. WATT. I wanted-I may have misstated what your intention
was.
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes.
Mr. WATT. I didn't intend to do that. I'm sorry.
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes.
Mr. FRANCK. I don't believe you did misstate my intentions, Con..
gressman Watt. Professor Currie refers to the Supreme Court as
the umpire, and wishes us to not kill the umpire. I would object
to that noun being applied to the Supreme Court, actually. Professor Currie and Professor Strossen are in agreement with our esteemed Chief Justice on the question of impeachment, but the
Chief Justice is in disagreement with Alexander Hamilton, with Joseph Story, and with Henry Adams who wrote the most significant
history of the Jefferson and Madison Administrations back about
a century ago. Hamilton, you'll recall, of course, is the man who
puts forward the argument for judicial review in Federalist 78, but
th,en three essays later in Federalist 81, says that the impeachment power is our complete security against the deliberate
usurpations of the legislative authority by the Justices of the
Court.
Joseph Story agreed with that in his Commentaries on the Constitution in 1833 and when Henry Adams, late in the 19th century,
took a look at the Chase trial of 1805, he concluded that nothing
was concluded. That is, nothing was settled conclusively by the
Chase trial because neither side really came out clearly victorious
as a theoretical matter. On the side of those seeking to remove Justice Chase was the argument that the Congress could impeach and
remove for any reason it chose. Chase's defense team argued to the
contrary, that something had to be clearly within the ambit of
criminal law to be an impeachable offense. And Adams' conclusion
was that neither side really won that argument. The truth has to
be somewhere in between.
A similar conclusion was reached about 5 years ago by the
woman who wrote what I think is the definitive work on this, Eleanore Bushnell, whose book, Crimes, Follies and Misfortunes, was
published by University of Illinois Press. She concludes likewise
about the impeachment trial, in fact, reviews all the judicial impeachments in our history. And, I think her scholarship, frankly,
is superior to Chief Justice Rehnquist's.
All that being said, I believe too that impeachment is inadvisable
almost all the time. I mentioned it today because I did not want
to leave out what I think is a powerful potential check on the
Court.
Mr. WATT. What about on substantive disagreements? Is that a
permissive basis?
Mr. FRANCK. If the Congress concludes, if the House by majority
sends a prosecution team up to the Senate chamber and succeeds
in persuading two-thirds of the Senators th.at a particular judge or
Justice has committed a deliberate series of usurpations on the au..
thority of the
lature, I believe that that is sufficient grounds
for impeachment.
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And, of course, the Court itself ruled in Nixon v. United States
in 1993 that Senate determination of someone's guilt is really a
procedural issue, but by extension they could be said to have concluded that impeachment proceedings are unreviewable by the
Courts themselves. They called it a political questiot;l.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, I didn't mean

to--

Mr. CANADY. Oh, no, I think that was a productive line to pursue. M)r. Goodlatte.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank
you for holding these hearings. I think it's a very important subject
that we have neglected for too long. Let me also say that I agree
with Chairman Hyde that we need to avoid trying to change the
Court's jurisdiction as a solution to this. But I would never say
never to that.
And I agree witb the gentleman from North Carolina that impeachment is not a suitable alternative, but I would never say
never to that either, because that's a constitutional power that we
have and we should preserve and protect it.
And I would say that the gentleman, Professor Franck, that his
point's well-taken; that it's only going to be used in the rather extreme circumstance that the body would refer to the Senate for
trial and action that would require two-thirds majority of the Senate. Rarely is it even going to be undertaken, and even more rarely
would it succeed. But, I can envision circumstances where a Justice
was totally and flagrantly ignoring the provisions of the United
States Constitution, and under those circumstances, without any
high crime or misdemeanor, but rather simply the misdemeanor of
the opinion of the public and of the Congress that they are ignoring
the dictates of law, would be a basis for their removal, and I would
not ever foreclose that as a possibility.
But, it is certainly not an adequate solution to the steady, caseby-case erosion of the power of the other two branches of Government and, in my opinion, of the Constitution itself, that takes place
when the Court deals with issues in a manner that I think flagrantly disregard the Constitution.
So my question to you then is, what do we do as an alternative?
And let me take the Smith case and the Boerne case as an example. I think most people in this country were stunned at the Smith
decision. It was an easy decision, perhaps, in that particular factual scenario. Nobody wants to be upholding the right of people to
smoke drugs, and that's what they founded that decision on, but
it was a dramatic erosion of our First Amendment free exercise
rights, in hindsight. But we read into that decision the inference
that Congress hadn't spoken on this issue and that if we did speak
on this issue, the Court would recognize that and honor it, and so
by overwhelming majorities we passed through the Congress-almost no dissent--!-the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, making it
clear that the higher standard of protection of free exercise of religion would be the law of the land, and the Court then simply came
back and said, no, you don't have the authority to do that.
There are other alternatives. A constitutional amendment is one,
and, I, frankly, in this particular instance, think a constitutional
amendment is called for, and I think it would have a great chance
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as you might like, but nonetheless, I think, a quite significant difference, and that's on the abortion issue. I think things, in terms
of Supreme Court doctrine, are very different 25 years after the
Roe v.Wade.
And I understand that the Casey case is one that employs stare
decisis, but in so doing nonetheless overturns the trimester standard of Roe. The Casey court undoubtedly is responding to its recognition that Roe may have gone too far. There are new Justices
on the Court who perhaps think that Roe was not a good decision
when first decided. But beyond Casey, you have, through the Hyde
amendm~nts, an opportunity to place further limitations on abortion rights. You have through the initiatives of President Reagan
and Bush the gag orders-Mr. GOODLATTE. But none of those overturn the underlying decision that many of think was incorrect in the first place, and 32 million abortions later-to me, I don't think that our ability to chisel
around the edge of that really is a ' chilling of strength. All it is, is
being able to operate in areas the Court have not acted and, therefore, given us a little more room to operate. But, that's simply like
saying, well, here are the crumbs that we've left for you to operate
around the edge of this issue, but the core of the issue, we said,
stay out of it because of what many people believe is a misinterpretation of the Constitution.
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes.
Mr. GoODLATTE. Anyone else want to respond to that?
Ms. STROSSEN. I would love to. Specifically, in the area of religious freedom and RFRA. As I mentioned, the ACLU had testified
in favor of it. We're very disappointed by the Supreme Court's decision. By the way, with all due respect, Congressman, the drug involved-peyote-is not smoked, so I'm told. One has to ingest it.
But, seriously, what was at issue there, of course, was the right not
to ingest a drug in general, but in ·a particular religious ceremony.
As it happened-Mr. GoODLATTE. But I'm not trying to go over that. I think-my
opinion is that the Court picked a case where it would not stir
great public controversy-Ms. STROSSEN. I completely agree with that.
Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing). People's religious freedoms were infringed by that particular decision, yetMs. STROSSEN. And, yet, it had sweeping consequences, absolutely. And in that particular case, the follow-up, I think, points
the way toward other action that can be taken. Namely, the state
legislature in Oregon, where that case came from, immediately
passed a law making an exemption from the drug laws for those
who were ingesting peyote in religious ceremonies. And, short of a
constitutional amendment-which not only is difficult to enact, but
may have some very strong dOY/nsides as well-I'm heartened that
there are a lot of other possible strategies for securing the religious
freedom that Congress tried to secure through RFRA.
One potential vehicle is another Federal statute, and I think a
couple of the witnesses on this panel testified about a legislative
record that could perhaps be responsive to the concerns the Supreme Court raised. And another possible approach that Congress
could follow would be not to have a law that is written in such
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sweeping terms that it sounds like an interpretation of the Constitution, which is what, I think, got the Supreme Court's back up,
but one could isolate the particular violations of religious liberty
that are being conducted under Federal laws.
One example was already given: the regulation that prohibited
the wearing of religious headgear by members of the military. One
could find out what all the existing violations are and correct them
by passing statutes. In addition, the states are very strong avenues
of potential support for religious freedom. Not only through laws,
such as the one that was passed in Oregon, but also through state
courts' interpretations of their religious freedom provisions in their
constitutions. Since the Supreme Court's Smith decision-Mr. GoODLATTE. Can I interrupt since I'm going to have to leave
and I'm sure the chairman doesn't want to go on indefinitely, but
I don't disagree with what you're saying, that there are other alternatives to seek legislative remedies. What I am concerned about is
the lack of ability to change an overlying Supreme Court decision
that the majority of the people in this country find offensive and
your solutions don't address that. Professor Franck, do you want to
say something?
Mr. FRANCK. Professor Clinton- · Mr. CANADY. The gentleman will have one additional minute.
Mr. CLINTON. Yes, I think what's frustrating here is that you're
looking for something a little more definite and a little more forceful, and I think that I can give that to you. And it seems to me
that you should go back to the Founders, and reread all that history and then reclaim your authority to interpret the boundaries of
your own power from the Court, which I think the Congress has
given away.
Mr. GoODLATTE. How do we take it back?
Mr. CLINTON Essentially, take it back. You're simply taking it
back. You're going back to the original understanding of the Constitution.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Is that in defiance of Mr. Hyde's concerns about
the Congress changing the jurisdictional authority of the Court?
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I don't mean to do it that way. I mean, simply, I think the understanding was, in the beginning, that each of
the branches of Government would be the judge of their own constit.utional powers. IVladison said it; he said it flatly in debates in ._.
the first Congress. And I think that would be the most-I suppose
that would be the most direct and the most forceful approach. It
would answer Mr. Hyde's suggestion-he raised a question-I
think it was the first or second thal he noted-was, who has the
last word. I think that's the issue, seems to me. Seems to me, the
problem is, we have, in the last 40 or 50 years, come to expect that
the Court has the last word, but I think that's a-historical and it's
not in accordance with the original design of the Constitution, and
so, there may be some tension.
Now, it creates a problem. The problem is, if there's no finality,
then it looks as like there's going to be a form of anarchy in constitutional interpretation. Well, yes. I think that's precisely what
was intended.
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. GoODLATrE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. CANADY. One more time? Without objection, the gentleman
from Virginia, Mr. Scott, will be recognized for three additional
minutes for an additional question.
Mr. SCOTl'. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We've heard a lot about
the will of the people-and I don't know if this is a question or an
observation, it just occurred to me that when the Supreme Court
steps in with a ruling invalidating a statute, that it is always going
to be in violation of the will of the majority of the people. And
that's just the way it is, and that's how we like it because we have
a minimum standard of rights that aren't going to be violated, and
if something passes 97-to-2 in the Senate, if it's unconstitutional,
it doesn't matter how popular it is.
Mr. FISHER. I have a comment. Chairman Hyde had said that on
Roe v. Wade it's still the last word even though the Court backed
up a little bit in Casey to give up on the trimester standard. I don't
think that's a statement on the power of the Supreme Court. I
think that's a statement of reality of politics in the United States.
I think that if Roe v. Wade had been resisted by 90 percent of the
people, it wouldn't be around today. But the country is fairly closely divided on this issue, and it gives the Court enough political
room to hold on to some of Roe and give up on the rest.
I think on the other cases that we have been talking about-on
Boerne and on Lopez, on guns in the schoolyard-it may not be a
case of the Court being the last word, but Congress not putting
enough attention into building a record to show why it would have
that authority to enact the legislation. You probably know-I think
it was last year, within the last year-Congress passed legislation
again on guns in the schoolyard and the dialogue continues. So, I
think the burden is on Congress. Particularly on Boerne, where
what you were doing was probably fatal. To tell the Court, when
you gave up on the Sherbert standard in Smith, we are reimposing
it in RFRA, I think that's probably a red flag for the Court. But,
you could have stated that although the Court held that religious
freedom is at this level, we're going to go above it with some other
language and not to confront the Court by telling it to adopt a
standard that it itself had rejected. So a lot of the power is left to
you to build a record and show why the legislation is necessary.
Ms. STROSSEN. Congressmen Scott, if I could comment just briefly_ I think what you said is partly correct, but I would like to add
an important caveat. Ifs partly correct that, of course, it's inevitable that in striking down a popularly enacted law, whether by
referendum or through the legislative process, the Court is violating or thwarting the will ·')f the people that is at that moment in
the time the majority of the people. So we are talking about temporary, shifting majorities. But in doing so, the Court is honoring
the will of the people in the larger, more durable sense, as reflected
in that great document that begins, "We, the people of the United
States."
And, it also honors that larger concept of popular will, insofar as
we the ~people retain the right to amend the Constitution to overturn a Supreme Court decision. l.'hat is a power that has been exercised recurrently throug!tout our history. I agree with the remarks
that were just made. The fact that such a constitutional amendment has not been adopted with respect to abortion, and we cer-
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at passage because the underlying statutory legislation was almost
unanimously approved by Congress, but that's not often going to be
the case.
;
And we also have the alternative proposed by President Jackson,
,vhich is-I don't recall if it was Justice Marshall or Justice Taney
who was Chief Justice at the time-but, he said, the Justice has
issued his opinion, now let him enforce it. Certainly a dangerous
precedent to follow, but there's certainly a temptation by the executive branch and the legislative branch to ignore Supreme Court decisions since they obviously ignore our opinions in some of these
cases.
I wonder if you all would comment on that.
Mr. DEVINS. Yes. Congress has an enormous range of tools available to it to express disagreement with the Court to affect the constitutional value at play in a decision that go well beyond impeachment, restrictions of jurisdiction or even constitutional amendment.
Mr. GoODLATTE. Let me interrupt you on that point.
Mr. DEVINS. Sure.
Mr. GOODLATTE. A. number of us cheered when some California
Supreme Court justices were removed from office a number of
years ago; they did not have a lifetime appointment, and they were
clearly making decisions contrary to the will of the general public
in California, as evidenced by their removal from office. But, we
don't have that with the Federal judiciary. They have lifetime appointments. Are you advocating a change?
Mr. DEVINS. No, I'm not. As we have seen over the past decade,
the composition of the Courts changes roughly one-half, I think,
every decade. It's a quite significant change over a decade. But let's
get beyond-Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, I don't want to get beyond that. I think
you raise a good point, but then we have well-established within
the Court the document of stare decisis. They are very, very reluctant to go back and overturn previous decisions by the Court. They
do it, certainly, in some instances, but the progress seems to me
to be a steady march away from what many would view as the
original intent in our Constitution.
Mr. CANADY. The gentleman has two additional minutes.
Mr. GoODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wonder if you would address that point. Yes, we do get new
Justices; we work very hard to pick them and to make sure they
are of the-I don't want to take a liberal or conservative approach
here-but, of the correct interpretation of the Constitution, that
they will continue what we think is the established intent, and
then they refuse to do it because previous Courts have said otherwise ~nd they're not willing to overturn the precedents of the
Court.
Mr. DEVINS. I think, Congressman, you may be a little pessimistic, very pessimistic of your authority, and let me suggest by
wayMr. GooDLAnE. Well, you haven't given me much authority to
h~g lI!y hat O D Mr. DEVINS. Let me give you a concrete example where I think
Congress and the states, in resisting a Supreme Court decision
have made a huge difference. Perhaps not as much of a difference
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~ainly know it's been tried, suggests that the court is in fact honorIng the will of the people in that larger and, I think, more important sense.
Mr. CANADAY. The gentleman has one additional minute.
Mr. WATT. Let me make a quick comment, and that is that if
you're. talking about freedom of speech, the only time you have
standing to rely on freedom of speech is when the Government is
probably doing something to you like throwing you in jail. What
you have said, or what you have expressed, has made democratically-elected officials so mad that they want to throw you in jail,
and then you resort to the Constitution. I don't see how you can
ever rely on the First Amendment and be in the majority. That's
just a comment.
Ms. STROSSEN. That's why the ACLU's First Amendment clients
are such unpopular people. [Laughter.]
l\lr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CANADY. Thank you. I'll now recognize myself.
I want to get back to Professor Clinton's testimony about
'Marbury v. Madison, and his historical analysis of what that case
meant when it was decided, and how the Supreme Court dealt with
that case over the following 100 years. Is there anyone who disagrees, who would express disagreement with what Professor Clinton adds, and then I'll give him a chance to respond. Professor
Currie?
Mr. CURRIE. Indeed, I do disagree and I'm happy to have the opportunity to say so. The Supreme Court itself has never suggested
that Marbury v. Madison should be limited so narrowly, and the
Supreme Court has always understood that it has the power to test
the validity of any act of Congress or any state legislation that
comes before it in case controversy. If one goes back to the intentions of the Framers, which have been invoked here and which I
do think have an important role to play in the interpretation of the
Constitution it's perfectly clear from the record of the Constitutional Convention that the Framers of the Constitution intended
judicial review as a part of the system of checks and balances. Not
just to prevent the powers of the courts from being unconstitutionally infringed by acts of Congress, but to prevent Congress from
unwittingly or deliberately exceeding the limits on its own powers.
That's the way it was described by Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. That's the way it was understood by innumerable Members
of the early Congress.
The question often came up, do we have the constitutional power
to pass a particular bill? Every once in a while somebody would
say, let's leave it to the Supreme Court. A number of people here
today have rightly criticized that approach. Members of Congress
have an independent obligation to construe the Constitution for
themselves and to obey it. But everyone on both sides of that debate during the first 12 years in Congress said, of course the
Courts have an additional check on the constitutionality of legislation passed by Congress. And that means that Congress will not always have tlie final word. That's inherent in a system of checks
and balances.
Sometimes the Court may make a mistake, but ~gain, if the
Court makes a mistake, it's dangerous to destroy the Court. I said
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the court was an umpire; I didn't say it was the only umpire. In
baseball, you've got umpires now. The Court is the third base umpire, the Congress is the first base umpire, and the home plate umpire is the people of the United States, who will ultimately see to
it that wrong decisions by the Court get corrected one way or the
other. The Dred Scott case, the Child Labor case, Plessy v. Ferguson, a whole lot of wrong decisions of the Supreme Court have
not steod the test of time; they have not withstood the opposition
of the people, for in the long run and here I certainly agree with
Professor Strossen, in the long run the .people's good sense will prevail. That's why we have a Constitution, that's why we have the
Supreme Court as one of the umpires, that's why obligation of
Members of Congress are also obliged to interpret and respect the
Constitution.
Mr. CANADY. Would anyone else like to comment on the historical issue before I give Professor Clinton a-ehance to respond? Professor Devins?
Mr. DEVINS. This is an extension of what Professor Currie was
just saying. I think that no branch speaks the last word, -even on
a particular case. It's a circular process and if you have four umpires, they must all be in play all the time. Along those lines, it's
important we look at Marbury as a precedent to recognize what
Marbury speaks to is only the power of the Court to interpret the
Constitution and not to the power of the Court to speak the last
word about the Constitution.
Mr. KINKOPF. I'd like to, if I might-Mr. CANADY. Yes, Professor Kinkopf.
Mr. KrNDOPF. That is, again, just to amplify on Professor Curries'
remarks, but it, I think, would profit us to bear in mind what it
would mean if each branch would be the ultimate arbiter of its own
power. I think that would effectively, or potentially, would effectively eviscerate Congress in that. Chairman Canady, you mentioned in your opening remarks the President's authority to interpret the Constitution pursuant to the Take-care Clause. Congress
could enact laws, but the President could decide himself not to enforce those laws so that it wouldn't leave to Congress-it would end
up undermining Congress's authority in that way, to allow the
President simply to determine that he's not going to enforce any
statute of Congress with which he disagrees as to Congress's basis
of authority.
Mr. FRANCK. I would just like to go on record as saying that I
absolutely agree with Professor Clinton's view of the history of
these matters. I've looked into much of the same history myself. I
find, as Professor Clinton does, Madison saying quite the opposite
of what Professor Currie asserts he says in the First Congress. I
also find it interesting that in the question of the Court's role as
the enforcer of the boundaries on Congress's power, you have this
statement on the interstate commerce power from John Marshall
in Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824. He says that the reach of Congress's
power over commerce among the states must be controlled authoritatively not by the judiciary, but by the people through democratic
processes-those are my words, so far-then Marshall says, such
are, Uthe restraints on which people must often rely solely in all
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representative governments." Where Professor Currie and I emphatically agree is that the home plate umpire is the people.
Mr. CANADY. Mr. Fisher?
Mr. FISHER. I want to comment on something that Neil Kinkopf
said about the Take-care Clause. Maybe he can explain it again because, to me, if Congress passes legislation, the President is to see
that the laws are faithfully executed. He doesn't have authority to
pick and choose, and say, I'm not going to enforce this.
There was a case in the Reagan years where the Justice Department decided that it wasn't going to implement all of the Competition in Contracting Act, and the Circuit Court, the Appellate Court,
said that the President doesn't have such authority; that would be
like a line-item veto. Well, we have one, live with one now, but at
that time, that was considered a forbidden act. You enforce all the
laws; you don't pick and choose.
Mr. KINKO~F. Right, I agree with you, Professor Fisher, and I appreciate the opportunity perhaps to clarify what I said. I agree that
that is not for the President to do, and my concern would be that
if we were to adopt the position that each branch is the ultimate
arbiter of its own authority we would end up very quickly in a very
significant constitutional crisis. And I think the Court's approach
which accommodates and is greatly deferential to each branch's
view of its own power, but which is not finally deferential allows
us to avoid those constitutional conflicts and I think properly enforces the Constitution's structure.
Mr. CANADY. Professor Clinton?
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I'd first like to ask Professor Currie; something he said confused me. I agree with you that Congres-s does not
have the last word on all constitutional questions, but are you saying that the Court does?
Mr. CURRIE. No. As I tried to say a few moments ago, I think
each branch has a negative. Each branch, if it says something is
unconstitutional, can prohibit it from going into effect. I think
that's what the Framers intended and I think that gives us maximum protection for constitutional rights.
Mr. CLINTON. Well, I'm unclear as to why you think I disagree
with that.
Mr. CURRIE. Well, if you don't disagree with it, fine.
Mr. CLINTON. I think all I really said was that it seems to me,
according to the original understanding, that each branch of government was to be the final judge of its own powers. I think that's
way the constitutional history of the country went for at least a
100 years and then things started changing in the late 19th century.
Mr. CURRIE. What I took you to say-Mr. Chairman, if I mayI took you to be taking a narrow view of Marbury v. Madison, saying that it only upholds the power of the Court to strike down
those acts of Congress which interfere with its own functions, and
I'm saying I do not agree with that. Gibbons v. Ogden was just
cited as an example of a narrow view of judicial review, but actually what the Court did there was to review the constitutionality
of a substantive act of Congress.
Mr. CLINTON. Well, isn't it true that a Court's holding is generally confined to the situation of the case.

122
. Mr. CURRIE. I hope so.
Mr. CLINTON. It seems like if you interpret Marbury that way,
that's all that could be drawn out of the case in terms of judicial
review.
Mr. CURRIE. Marbury doesn't stand alone. We have 200 years of
other decisions of the Supreme Court, reviewing the validity of substantive decisions of Congress, and I that history supports that authority.
Mr. CLINTON. But it seems to me that history doesn't really start
until about the 1890's and that's where the historical problem
comes in. Sure, if the Court had decided other cases right away and
continued to do that throughout the 1800's, and the 1820's, 1830's,
and the 1840's, and on, at an increasing rate, that would be one
thing; but the fact seems to me to be that the Court did not do
that. It waited, in effect, almost 100 yearg before it ever invalidated
an act of Congress, other than the Dred Scott case-we have to
admit that was an exception. But that was the only exception until
1895, it seems to me, where the Court actually invalidated a Federallaw on grounds other than those stated in Marbury~
Mr. CURRIE. The Court had practiced substantive judicial review
ever since of Hylton v. United States in 1796 in which it was asked
to invalidate an act of Congress imposing a tax on the ground it
violated the direct tax apportionment provisions of Article I. The
Court recognizes and exercises the power of judicial review not only
when it in fact strikes down a statute, but whenever it asks the
question, as it asked innumerable times throughout the 19th century, is this act constitutional. The historical record supports the
Supreme Court's power to do that, and I don't think tod.ay anybody
is going to cause us to retreat from judicial review of acts of Congress on substantive grounds that do not affect the jurisdiction of
the Court. That's a very established and very essential part of our
checks and balances.
Ms. STROSSEN. I'd just like to echo that and to say I think it
would be very dangerous if we inferred from the fact that it took
the Supreme Court a long time to exercise its power of constitutional review with respect to particular acts of Congress that,
therefore, that means the Supreme Court doesn't have that power.
Take the area where I have continued to voi(.'e concern, in the
acts of Congress that violate the First Amendment. We've had
them for a long time; earlier on in today's session, somebody mentioned the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Supreme Court did not
have occasion to find those unconstitutional Interestingly enough,
it was Congress that stepped into the breach by .failing to re-enact
the law. But it was not until 1965 that the Supreme Court for the
first time struck down an act of Congress as violating the Free
Speech guarantee in the First Amendment, and I would be loathe
to infer from that historical record that, therefore, the Supreme
Court does not have the power to strike down acts of Congress that
do violate the First Amendment.
Mr. CANADY. Mr. Fisher?
Mrs FiISHER. The point that David Currie just made about the affirmative role of the Supreme Court I think should be underscored.
That gives you the creative, constructive power. You're the ones
who are deciding what national legislation should be, and, OD the
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whole, the Supreme Court comes along and says, you're right,
you're right, you're right, and occasionally they say, you're wrong,
and you're back on the dialog again. But the affirmative part of judicial review just emphasizes how large a role the Congress plays
and the Court is generally instrumental in supporting you.
Mr, CANADY. Well, thank you for your comments. All of you have
made a very important contribution to our hearing today and I
want to extend my gratitude to you.
I want to thank the members of the subcommittee-we actually
had pretty good attendance today for a day that Congress is not in
session, and I'm grateful to the members who were able to be here.
I wish we could continue, but time is racing on. I do thank you,
and this is a discussion that will go on, and I think the issues that
we've raised today are important issues, not just for the subcommittee, but for all Members of Congress to reflect on and hopefully some of the things that have been discussed today will be discussed more widely in the Congress as we go about our constitutional responsibilities.
Thank you very much. The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject
to the call of the Chair.]
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UDICIAL supremacy is down but hardly out. Notwithstanding
calls by interest groups that Congress Uis. now the co~ of last
resort.,,1 the myth of judicial exclusivity nonetheless· persists. The
popular press .treats Coun rulings as definitive,! law school casebOoks typically identify .constitutional law as the work of the Supreme Coun/·and when a government official. make that Reagan
Administration Attorney General Edwin Meese.. argues that Supreme Court decisions are not 64binding on .all persons and pans of
government.'" editorialists and representatives of the Washington
Post. New York Times. and American Bar Association are sera
into a state of apoplexy.~ Among I~gal academics however. it is
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now commonpJace to discuss constitutional law as something larger
and more complex than merely court rulings. The degree to which
some scholars now dismiss the Supreme Court as the exclusive
source of constitutional law prompted Mike Paulsen recently to
ask. somewhat plaintively: "Will nobody defend judicial supremacy
anymore?"?
Fear not Mike. Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer have heard
your cry.- In an analysis that is "neither empirical ~or historicar"
(it cannot be), they derive judicial supremacy from 4>'preconstitutional" norms. 9 In particular, Alexander and Schauer believe that
vesting in the Court the authority to interpret, with finality, the
meaning of the Constitution contributes to poJitical stability.1lI Correspondingly. they claim that "an important-perhaps the important-function of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to
be done. nil
Alexander and Schauer's argument is important, provocative.
and unconvincing. To their credit, by grounding judicial supremacy on law's settlement function, they have reinvigorated the academic debate over democratic government's duty to obey Court
edicts. Nevertheless. if stability is the problem, judicial exclusivity
is not the answer. Their ahistorical analysis collides with everything we know about the Court as a political institution. In parfa

president Eugene C. Thomas as saying that this disregard would "'shake the founda·
tions of our system").
• See. e.~ .. Louis Fisher. Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (1988): .Louls Fisher & Neal Devins. Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (2d
ed. 1996): Robert F. Nagel. JudiCial Power and American Character: Censoring OurselYes in an Anxious Age (1994): Neal Devins. ed.• EJected Branch Influences in
Constitutional Decisionmaking. Law & Contemp. Probs.. Autumn 1993. at 1. 3-4;
Barry Friedman. Dialogue and Judicial Review. 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993): Michael
J. Klarman. Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions. 82 Va. L.
Rev. 1 (1996): Sanford Levinson. Could Meese Be Right This Time"? 61 Tu!. L. Rev.
1071 (1987): Michael Stokes Paulsen .. The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
to Sav What the Law Is. 83 Oeo. W. 217 (1994): David A. Strauss. Presidential Interprelation of the Constitution. IS Cardozo L. Rev. 113 (1993): Robin West. The
Aspirationa) Constitution. 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 2-'1 (l993).
, Michael Stokes Paulsen. Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber. 83 Geo. W. 385. 38S (1994).
• Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer. On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation. 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997).

·Id. at 1369. .
-Id. at 1375-77.
II Jd.. at 1377.
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ticular, Alexander and Schauer do not take into account how concentrating complete interpretive authority in the Court would create political instability and undermine the fragile foundation that
supports and sustains judicial power. Instead of suggesting that the
judiciary can settle in any decisive way such contentious issues as
abortion. affirmative action. federalism, privacy, race districting,
and religious' freedom, the record of the last two centuries points to
a more modest and circumscribed role for the courts. I: No doubt at
various times in our history the Supreme Court has attempted a
more ambitious agenda, but it has done so at great cost to itself and
the nation. U
Perhaps we are being unfair. Alexander and Schauer "engage in
direct normative inquiry,"'" considering democratic acceptance of
what judicial supremacy ··should" be. I!' Yet. even if it was understood that the Court should have the last word on the Constitution's
meaning, judicial exclusivity would marginalize the Constitution by
overwhelming the obligation to fol1ow the Court's constitutional
judgments with the competing policy-driven "«:>bligationsn of government officials. I. In other words. absent the constraints imposed by
social and politica] forces, the Court's constitutional judgments will
be less relevant and hence less stable. The tugs and pulls of politics
therefore make the Constitution more relevant and more durable.
I. PRESERVING THE CONSTITlITION

Can the Constitution be preserved and honored without .... a final
interpretive authority for choosing among competing [constitu~onal]
interpretations?"I': For modern day defenders of judicial supremacy. like Alexander and Schauer. this question is little more than
rhetorical. Suggesting that the ··seulement and coordination functions of law"" are the Constitution·s -chief raison d'etre;t.if judicial
I: See

infra Pan II.A: notes 1! 1.. 120 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-86. 101·104 and accompanying leXI•
... Jd .. at 1370.
•, Id. at 1369.
fa See infra Part II.B. Makin, matters wone. lhe Coun might well attempt to demonsrrate ils lasl word SlalUS by purposefully distancing lIseJr from populist sentimenl
chrou,h iu decisions.
" Aleunder "Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1381.
IIld. at 1376.
It
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supremacy is heralded as the onJy way to protect "a single written
constitution" from ·"shifting political fortunes. ,,:c, This conclusion.
however, is not suggested in the text or structure of the Constitution. the framers' intent, historical development. or even Supreme
Court declarations of its own status as the ultimate and final interpreter of the Constitution.:1 Instead. the overriding value promoted by the framers was a system of checks and balances. with
each branch asserting its own powers and protecting its own pre·
rogatives.
Alexander and Schauer dodge this historical bullet by reminding
us that their inquiry is ""normative" and suggesting that, in any
event . "[t]he present, and not the past. decides whether the past is
relevant. ,,:: For an essay on whether a Constitution ought to have
an authoritative interpreter, this bit of trickery might suffice. For
an essay on "The Constitution of the United States:' however, it is
self-contradictory to argue that judicial supremacy is needed to defend the Constitution. Claiming a power for the Coun that was
never intended hardly preserves and defends the Constitution. In ..
stead, this claim debases and threatens constitutional government.
The Constitution's text. its original intent. and intervening practice support a form of judicial review far more limited than that offered by Alexander and Schauer. Indeed. no specific language in
the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to declare cer..
tain governmental conduct unconstitutional .. let alone the exclusive
authority to do so. Judicial review can be derived from some sec·
tions of the Constitution . but in almost every instance it is the
power of federal courts to strike down state actions or to void congressional statutes that threaten judicial independence ..!.\ The de·
.' Jd. at 1381.
Id. at 1376.
;, On Coun declarations of its lasl word status. see text accompanying nOles 58·75:
:!It

see also Louis Fisher. The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy. 2S Suffolk U. L.
Rev.8S (1991) (discussing various Justices· interpretations of the Court's role).
:: Alexander &. Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1370.
:J The specification lhat the ··Constitution. and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof. .. shall be the supreme Law of lhe land: and lhe
Jud,es in every Stale shall be bound thereby:' U.s. ,Const. art. VI. makes clear that
federal couns must review the actions or Slale governments. One might argue that
coftp'essionaJ statutes nOI ··;n [pJunuance" of the Constitution are subject to judicial
nullification. bue judicial reyiew oyer the coequal branches represents a major al·
JI'Indi.zemenl and requires convincing evidence. Furthermore, in extendinllhe judi-
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bates that occurred during state ratification conventions suggest
that the framers believed judicial review of Congress was limited
and the President had the power to independently interpret the
Constitution.:" Although there was some support for a broad conception of judicial review,':j no one argued for judicial supremacy.:'
Early Court rulings. confirm this understanding. From .1789 to
1803, several Justices wondered whether the power of judicial review would reach to congressional and presidential actions. They
.could not decide whether the power existed . whether it was vested
in the Court. or under what conditions it might be invoked.:-:
Certainly judicial supremacy would have been alien to the members of the First Congress. During the debate in 1789 on the President's removal power. Madison saw no reason to defer to the judi-

cial power to all cases -arising Under the Constilution..... it was "'generally supposed
that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature:" 2
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. at 430 (Max Farrand ed .• rev. ed.
]937) (hereinafter Records]. For example .. cases of a -judiciary nalure" would include congressional statutes that reduce the salaries of federal judges. However defined. the idea of cases of a "judiciary nature- is something far short of giving the Supreme Court ultimate control over the meaning of the Constitution. At the Virginia
ratifying convention. for example. Madison interpreted "arising under" 10 justify judicial review only against the states. 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 532 (Jonathan Elliot ed .. 1968). Alexander Hamilton made the same point in Federalist No. 80. The Federalist No. 80. at
503 (AJexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.• 1961). In addition. several delegates at the Philadelphia convention spoke in favor of judicial review when
invoked against unconstitutional Siale laws. 2 Records. supra. at 92·93 (remarks by
Gouverneur Morris and Jamts Madison).
:. See Paulsen. supra nOle 7. at 219~92: Frank H. Easterbrook. Presidential Review.
40 Case W. Res. L. Re\,. 90S. 921·22 (1990).
!' See William Michael Treanor. The Case o/Ihe Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review. 143lJ. Pa. L. Rev. 491 (1994).
:. Sylvia Snowiss. Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution 195·97 (1990).
:'f See Hylton v. United Stales, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171. 175 (1796) (Chase. J.)
(emphasizing that if the Supreme Coun had such a power it should never be exercised ""b"l in II very clellr CIIS"-); see also comments in Calder v. BUll. 3 U.S. (3 Dalt.)
386.399 (1798) (Iredell. J.) (the authority of the court to declare a statute void is of a
"delicate" nalure and the Coun will not use such power except in a "clear and urgent
case") and Cooper v. Telfair.... U.S. (4 DaU.) 14. 19 (1800) (Chase. J.) (while some
CircuilS have decided the Supreme Coun could declare an act unconstitutional. the
Supreme Court itself has nol 50 held). Moreover. when John Marshall provided lhe
rationale for judicial review in Marbury. it was through a chain of reasoning lhat presupposed presidential authority 10 interpret the Conslitution. See Easterbrook. supra note 24. at 919·20.
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clary on the constitutionality of what Congress was about to do.!l'

While acknowledging that "the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary," he begged to know on what
ground '·any one department draws from the Constitution greater
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the
several departments?",2?
Early presidents also believed that each branch of government
should act as an independent interpreter of the Constitution. George
Washington's firSt veto was on constitutional grounds.)!) Thomas
J efferson, viewing the Alien and Sedition Acts (which criminalized
speech critical of the government) as patently· unconstitutional, used
his pardon power to discharge u every person under punishment or
prosecution under the sedition law.")) Andrevi Jackson announced
his own theory of coordinate construction in a message vetoing legislation to rechaner the Bank of the United States.32 Since the Coun
had previously upheld the constitutionality of the Bank,3:t Jackson
was under pressure to consider the matter as settled by precedent
andjudiciaJ decision.~ He disagreed: The Supreme Coun's authority
over Congress and the President would extend only to "such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. "J~
Jackson's position has been followed by every other President.
Abraham Lincoln, in repudiating Dred Scott v. Sandford,}6 argued
that if government policy on "vital questions affecting the whole
:I I Annals of Congress 500 (Joseph Gales cd .. 1834). Yet in introducing the Bill of
Rights in the HouS4: of Representatives. Madison predicted that once they were incorporated into the Constitution. "independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rig.hts: they will be an impenetrable bulwark aga.inst every assumption of power in the Legislalive or Executive,·'

Id. at 439.
:! Id. at SOO.
"'See Easterbrook. supra note 24. at 907.
't Leller from Thomas Jefferson 10 Mrs. John Adams (July 22. 1804). in 11 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 42. 43 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed,. 19(5). See also
Easterbrook. supra note 24. at 907.(noling that the effect of Jefferson's pardon was 10
nullify the: statutes Mas much as if the Supreme Court had held lhem unconstitu-

lional").
Q 3 A Compilation of the Messales and Papers of the Presidents 114445 (James D.
Richardson cd•• 1897) [hereinaher Compilation I,
»McCulioch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (]819).
"3 Compilation. supra nole 32. alll44.

" lei. at 114S.
-60 U.s. (19 How.) 393 (18S7).
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people is to be irrevocably fixed" by the Supreme Court~ "the people will have ceased to be their own rulers. "r, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt lashed out at the Lochner Court for taking the country
. back to the .... horse and buggy" days.lI Richard Nixon's campaign
to undo Warren Coun liberalism/9 Ronald Reagan"s attack on Roe
u
\I. Wade,al and Bill Clinton"s embrace of efforts to .... reverse Court
standards governing religious liberty'" also follow this pattern.
For its part, Congress has launched numerous challenges to the
Court. In response to Dred Scott. Congress passed a bill prohibiting slavery in the territories.,u Disagreeing with the Court's 1918
ruling that the commerce power could not be used to regulate child
labor~ .1) Congress two decades later again based child labor legislation on the commerce clause.'" Public accommodations protections
contained in the 1964 Civil Rights Act similarly followed in the
wake of a Supreme Court decision rejecting such protections:'~
More recently, lawmakers have challenged Court rulings on abortion" busing, flag burning. religious freedom .. voting rights, and the
legislative veto.....
Judicial exclusivity. then .. finds no support in Congressional and
White House practices. in the debates surrounding the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution, or in the Constitution itself. To the
extent that language and tradition matter•.a7 the argument for judicial supremacy is a nostaner.

" 7 Compilation. supra nOle 32. at 3210.
"4 The Public Papers and Addressc=s of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Coun Disapproves. 1935. at 2()9.)U (Samuel I. Rosenman .:d .• 1938) (hereinafter Public Papers of

Roosevelt] .
.. See Fisher & Devins. supra note 6. at 94-95. 247-18.
·'410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Fisher & Devins. supra note 6, at 184·94.
"See Remarks on Sianina the Relicious Freedom Restoration Act or 1993. 2 PUb.
Papers 2000 (NoY. 16. f993):
.e: Act of June 19. 1862. c. 111. 12 Sun. 432 (-An Act to secure freedom to all Persons within the Territories of the United Slates'").
"Hammer Y. Dagcnhart. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) .
... This episode is recounled in Fisher It Devins. supra note 6.. at 70-76 .
.If See id. at 87·94•
.. See ,enerally ide (discussin. recent constitutional challenges before ahe Coun).
•, For an ar,ument thallanluale matters. see Frederick Schauer. Easy Cases. !i8 S.
Cat I- Rev. 399 (1985). For the classic argument that tradition matters. see Youngstown Sheel" Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579.593·97 (1952) (Frankfurter. J•• concurrin,); see also McCulloch v. Maryland. 17'U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 323·24 (1819)
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Alexander and Schauer9 as well as others before them, have
navigated this terrain. discounting the relevance of notoriously
ambiguous texts and indications of intention which presuppose that
the Uintentions of long-dead people from a different social world
should influence us."'" When it comes to judicialexclusivitY9 however, the problem with "·tak[ing] neither original intent nor intervening practice as autboritative'Y<&9 is that there is not a scintilla of
evidence supporting the Court's ultimate interpreter status.'oC· AI·
exander and Schauer, for example, never explain how judicial exciusivitY9 a principle derived from ""the nature of law·" can trump,
well, the sl.preme LAW of the land. Suggesting that "preconstitutional" norms and ··meta-rules'· are more imponant than the Con·
stitutionitself' is. in the end, not enough to pull off the impossible
feat of demonstrating fidelity to the Constitution by disregarding
its basic command about the separation of powers.
II. PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY
There may be an element of unfairness in our efforts to link the
Constitution's design with interpretive theories intended to make
the Constitution the ·"supreme law of the land.·' We do not~ for example. consider the central question which animates Alexander
and Schauer's admittedly "normative inquiry . - that is, ""[w]hat ...
is Jaw for?";! Yet .. even assuming-as they do-that law's principal
function is to '''settle [matters] authoritatively.... and promote

(contending that historical practices are relevant in determining the division of powers among the branches),
... Sanford Levinson. Law as Literature. 60 T c=x. L. Rc\', 373. 379 (J982). See also
Alexander &. Schautr. supra note 8. at 1370 (explaining "what in facl has the status of
law. and ~'hat should ha\'c lhe status of law-can onlv be decided non-hisloricallv-).
Moreover. as a maner of '~Qlpolilik. ··non ..deference often load political stratejy,'"
and lawmakers and Ihe President suffer "neither l~galJy nor politically·' for making
"polilic.ally popular or otherwise anrac:ti,'e poJicy decisions ... nally inconsistent with
established precedent." Id. at 136~·66.
If Alexander &. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1370.
!It Oc:casional claims by Supreme eoun Justices that they speak the last word. prove
jusl the opposile. Ihat is, the Court is extremely sensitive to social and poliiical forces.

is

See infra Pan II.A.
t. Alexander &. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1369. J370.
• lei. al 137().71.
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"stabjlity~"~~ the argument for judicial supremacy falls short. With-

out the powers of purse and sword. "'[t]he Court must take car: to
speak and act in ways that allow people to accept. its decisions.""
As such. rather than advance its institutional self-interest through
claims of judicial supremacy., the Court understands its role in government as limited. Correspondingly., even if Coun decisions were
viewed as final, elected officials would sublimate their Uduty to
obey the law . . to allegedly overriding duties more consistent with
their policy preferences. This marginalization of the Constitution
is directly at odds with the .settlement function of law. For the
Constitution to truly operate as a stabilizing force . it must be relevant to the lives of democratic government and the American people. Judicial exclusivity cannot accomplish this task; rather., stability can only be achieved through a give-and-take process involving
all of government as well as the people.
A. Settling Transcendent Values

The history of the Supreme Court has been a search for various
techniques and methods that will permit the judiciary to limit and
constrain its own power. Justices understand. either by instinct or
experience, that the hazards are great when the Court attempts to
settle political., social., and economic matters best left to the political process.~~ Despite occasional utterances from the Coun that it
is the "'ultimate interpretern :r.6 of the Constitution. Justices by necessity adhere to a philosophy that is much more modest. circumspect, and nuanced. Rather than settle transcendent values, Court
decisions. at best. momentarily resolve the dispute immediately before the Court.
11le strongest support for this proposition. ironically,. comes
from those cases in which the Court has defended its authority to
bind government officials through its interpretation of the Constitution. MarbflTY v. Madison.~ the supposed foundation of judicial

c, Id. at 1371. 1376. Law actually has many different natures including flexibility.
ulility. and the service of human needs.
" Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 50S U.S. 833.865 (1992).
44 See infra notes 62. 78. 86. 94 and accompanying teXl.
,. See infra not~s 63·7J .
"" U.S. (1 C,anc:h) 137 (1803).
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supremacy,414 nicely illustrates how political challenges to the
Court's interpretive authority and claims of judicial supremacy are
inextricably linked to each other. When Marbury was decided. the
Supreme Court and its Chief Justice. John Marshall, were under attack. Court foe Thomas Jefferson had just been elected President
and. at his urging, Secretary of State James Madison openly challenged the Court's authority to subject executive officers to judicial
orders." Further complicating matters, were the Court to rule
against the Jeffersonians. Marshall believed that his political ene·
mies would push for his impeachment. "'! Un\villing to engage in a
head .. to-head confrontation with the Jeffersonians. the Court's
supposed war cry in Marbury, that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. "·· is
window dressing for the Court's reasoning in ultimately ducking
the Marbury dispute on jurisdictional grounds." As such, other
than to assure that William Marbury did not get his job and to
usher in a claim of judicial review debated ever since., Marbury settled very little . if anything.
On those few occasions when the Court does insist that it is the
"last word" in interpreting the Constitution. such announcements

- See. e.g., Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1. 18 (1958). Marbury. of course, did nOI
rule that the Court's constitutional interpretations were final and definitive: instead,
the Court simply declared lhat it had the power to invalidate unconstitutional Congressional action. 5 U.S. (l Cranch) at 177-80.
"
• Specifically. when William Marbury challenged Madison's failure to deli\lcr him a
judicial commission. Madison refused to present a defense. thereby forcing the Court
to decide the case without the benefit of the executive's arguments. See Fisher &.
Devins. supra nole 6. at 25·35.
1111 Manhalltook the impeachment threat seriously.. contending Ihat if would be better for tbe elected branches 10 reverse a Coun opinion by statule than to impeach
Supreme Court Justices. See 3 Albert J. Beveridge. The Life of John Manhall: Conand Conslruclion. 1800-1815. at 177 (1929) (citing tener from John Marshall ..
Chie! Justice. 10 Samuel Chase. Associate Justice (Jan. 23 .. ]804». Along these same
Jines. a modern day Courl which regularly and unabashedly frustrated majorilarian
preferences might find its members subject to the threat of impeachment.
.. S U.S. (I Cranch) at 177.
III As Chief Justice Warren Buraer nOled: ·'The [C]oun could stand hard blows. but
not ridicule. and tbe aJe houses would rock with hilarious laulhter" had Marshall is·
sued a mandamus ignored by the Jelfcnon administration. Warren E. BUfler. The
Doctrine of Judicial Review: Mr. Mlnhall. Mr. Jeffenon. and Mr. Marbury.. in Views
from tbe Bench: The Judiciary and Constitulional Politics 7. ]4 (Mark W. Cannon
and David M. O·Brien eds•• I98S).

met
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must be understood within their political context. Cooper v. Aaron.~
the decision that Alexander and Schauer embrace, exemplifies this
practice. The Court's claim that federal court constitutional interpretations are l-4osupreme,,601 was made in the face of massive Southern
resistance to Brown v.Board of Educaliont"~ including Arkansas·
enlistment of the National Guard to deny African-American
schoolchildren access to Little Rock's Central High School.~
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. which reaffirmed the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade. similarly underscores the Court's belief that
'~a surrender to political pressure" would result· in "profound and
unnecessary damage" to the Coun.rt7 The threat of resistance to its
orders likewise animated invocations of judicial supremacy in
Baker v. Carr,tt1t Powell v. McCormack.1N Uniled Stales v. Nixon,-:U
and City of Boerne v. Flores. 71

., 358 U.S. 1 () 958).
III 358 U.S. at 18. The best academic treatment ofCoop~r is Daniel A. Farber. The
Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Coop~r v. Aaron Revisited. 1982 U. III. L Rev.
387 (1982).
~

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

See Fisher & Devins. supra note 6. at 242-56. Moreover. recognizing inhercnt
limns on its power to compel Southern schools to comply with Brown. Coop~r was
the Courfs onlv statement on school dese2rcution from 1955-64 (whcn Comtress
encoura2cd thc -COUTt to reenter the school dC2ere2ation frav throu2h its enactment
of the 1964 Civil RhthlS Act).
- .
-, 50s U.S. 833. 853. 867.869 (1992). Refusing to bend to the stated desires of the:
presidents who appointed them and overrule Roe -under fire,,· Justices Sandra Day
O·Connor. Anthony Kennedy. and David Souter "all[ed] the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division by accepting" ... ··the Coun's interpretation of the Constitution:' ld at 8:)7. The Casry plurality. however. validated
political challenges to Rot's rigid trimester standard by replacing it with a more deferential"undue burden" test. Id. at 873-79.
~ 369 U.s. 186. 211 (1962). At oral arguments. c:ounsel for Tennessee suggested
thai they might resist coun-ordered reapponionment. Jack Wilson. Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee. advised the Coun aboul the sovereign rights of his state.
56 Landmark Briefs and Ars.umcnl$ of the Supreme Court of the United Slatcs: Conslitutional Law 656. 658-59. 666 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper cds .• 1975)
(hereinafter Landmark Briefs)•
.. 395
486. 549 (1969). In PDw~ll. the House of Rc:presentatives signaled that it
might resist a courl order requiring il to seat Adam Clayton Powell. See Roben B.
McKay. Comments on Powell v. ,WcCormack. 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1] 7. 12S-29 nn.42-44
(1969).
"418 U.S. 683. 70~ (1974). During oral arguments.. Nixon·s attorney James St.
Clair cquivcxaaed on Nixon's willinpess to accepl the Court's judlment on executive
M

u.s.
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The Supreme Coun's practice of declaring itself the final word
on the Constitution's meaning when it feels especially challenged
by the other branches is anything but surprising. Invariably, the
Court takes a bold stand because it fears that the political order
will ignore its command. These sweeping declarations of power
cloak institutional self-doubts.. much as a gorilla pounds his chest
and makes threatening noises to avoid a fight. Invocations of judicial supremacy.. for example .. often place few demands on the government (as in Marbury) or are linked with popular outcomes. a~ in
Cooper., Baker v. Carr, Nixon, and Casey.-:~
Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the military.7J the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners
public acceptance.7.. In other words, as psychologists Tom Tyler and
Gregory Mitchell observed. the Court seems to believe c·that public
acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitutionthat is, the public belief in the Court's institutional legitimacyenhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions.'·'~
privilege as binding on the President. See 79 Landmark Briefs. supra note 68. at 861.
87)·72.879: Alexander &, Schauer. supra note 8. at 1364 & no.21-22.
" 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). Invalidating congressional crtons to "'overrule" Empio.Y.
menr Division v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). the Boerne Court told COOi~ress lhat it
-will treat its precedents with the respect due them- and that "[t]he power to inlerpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.... 117 S. Ct. at
2172.2166.
:0: With respect to Cooper. ~lihoU8h Arkansas" Governor Orval Faubus' repudiation
of Brown scored points with in-staie voters. national public opinion ravored President
Eis~nhower's decision to make; Cooper a reality by sending federal troops into Little
Rock. See Gerald N. Rosenberg. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 78 (1991). Like Cooper. Baker v. Ca" risked ill will with stale officials in
order to reach an outcome popular in the national political arena. -Of sixty-three
leadinl metropolitan daily newspapers.thiny-ei,ht favored the Coun"s disposition or
the [Boker) case. Icn opposed it. and the remainder expressed neutral or confused
opinions.- Richard C. Conner. The Apportionment Cases 144-17 (1970). With respea to Ni.ton. public opinion suonlly suppuned the Coun"s authority to order the
Presidenl to release the tapes. See Louis Harris. President Should Obey Order to
Give Up Tapes. The Harris Survey. July 29. 1974. Case.v. in upholding Ro~. relied 011
an ·undue burden"" standard that matched public opinion. See Neal Devins. Shapin,
Constitutional Vatu.:s: EI.:cted Government. the Supreme enun. and the Abonion
Debate 73-74 (1996).
n Alexander" Schauer. supra note 8. at 1366 &. n.34 .
•~ See Cilsey. 'OS US. 3t 96'~ (recognizing the connection between tbe Coun"s
"legitimacy· and "people"s acceptance").
~Tom R. Tyler &. Gregory MitcbeU. Lt!~itimacy and the Empowerment or Discretionary ulal Authority: The United States Supreme Coun and Abonion Ri,hlS. 43
Duke U. 703. 7J' (1994).
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This emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary seems to be
conclusive proof that Coun decisionmaking cannot be divorced
from a case's (sometimes explosive) social and political setting.
A more telling manifestation of how public opinion affects Court
decisionmaking is evident when the Court reverses itself to conform its decisionmaking to social and political forces beating
against it. 7. Witness, for example.. the collapse of the Lochner era
under the weight of changing social conditions. Following Roosevelt's 1936 election victory in all but two states, the Coun. embarrassed by populist attacks against the Justices, announced several
decisions upholding New Deal programs." In explaining this transformation, Justice Owen' Robens re~ognized the extraordinary importance of public opinion in undoing the Lochner era: Looking
back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the
popular urge for unifonn standards throughout the country-for
what in effect was a unified economy.""
Social and political forces also played a defining role in the
Coun's reconsideration of decisions on sterilization and the eugenics
movement," state-mandated flag salutes.·' the Roe v. Wade trimester standard.M1 the death penalty.1: states" rights."3 and much more.Aoi
U

,. Recognizing the nexus between its aulhorilY and public ac:ceptance. the Court is
rarely out or step with prevailing mores. See. e.g., David Adamany. Le!titimacy.
Realigning. Elections. and the Supreme Courl. 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 790 (1973); Raben
A. Dahl. Decision.Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker. 6 J. PUb. L. 279.285 (1957); Richard Funston. The Supreme Coun and Crill·
Cal Elections. 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Re\,. 795 (1975): Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus. Publicity. Public Opinion. and the Coun. 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 985. 1023 (I990).
"On the role of the 1936 elcc:tions, sec Michael Nelson. The President and the
Coun: Reinlerpreting the Court-packing Episode of 1937. 103 Pol. Sci. 0.267 (1988).
On populist attacks. see Fisher. supra notc 6. at 211. For an alternative explanation.
see Bam' Cushman. Rethinkint. the New Deal Court. 80 Va. L Rev. 201 (1994).
"Owe~ J. Roberts. The
and the Constitution: The Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures. 1951. at 61 (195 1).
"See Louis fisher. Social Influences on Conslitutional Law. 15 J. Pol. Sci. 7. 11·15
(1987).
*'See David R. Manwarins, Render Unto Caesar. nle Flas·Salute Controversy
154-60 (1962): H.N. Hirsch. The Enipna of Felix Frankfuner lS2·S3 (1981).
I, See Devins. supra note 72. at S6-77. 139-48.
., See Fisher. supra nOle 6.8175·76.
•• See Mark Tushnet. Living in a Constitutional Moment?: LO/H: and Constilu·
IiouJ Tbcory. 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev.84S (1996).

Co;"
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It did not matter that some of these earlier decisions commanded
an impressive majority of eight to one.1S Without popular support.
these decisions settled nothing. Justice Robert Jackson instructed
us that ·'(t]he practical play of the forces of politics is such that judicial power bas often delayed but never permanently defeated the
persistent will of a substantial majority.,t116 As such, for a Court that
wants to maximize its power and legitimacy. taking social and political forces into account is an act of necessity. not cowardice. Corre. spondingly when the Court gives shon shrift to populist values or
concerns, its decisionmaking is unworkable and destabilizing."
The Supreme Court may be the ultimate interpreter in a particular case. but not in the larger social issues of which that case is a
reflection. Indeed, it is difficult to locate in the more than two centuries of rulings from the Supreme Coun a single decision that ever
finally settled a transcendent question of constitutional law. When
a decision fails to persuade or otherwise proves unworkable,1/\
elected officials. interest groups, academic commentators. and the
press will speak 'their minds and the Court. ultimately, willlisten.lI'I
Even in decisions that are generally praised. such as Brown. the
Court must calibrate its decisionmaking against the sentiments of
the implementing community and the nation. In an effort to temper Southern hostility to its decision, the Coun did not issue a
t

... For a useful summary of instances where the Coun ovenumed earlier precedent.
see Michael J. Gerhardt. The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Dccisionmakinl!
and Theory. 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68. app. (1991).
.. Sc:e. e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. S86 (1940) (upholding mandatory naJ salute). overruled by West Va. Slate Bd. o( Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624
(1943).

• Roben H. Jackson. Maintaining. Our Freedoms: The Role of th.! Judiciary. ]9 Vital Speeches of the Day 759, ;61 (1953) .
., This is not to say that Coun dec:isions at odds With popular will are always destabilizing. Our point. instead. is thai the Justices must bt= somewhat sensitive to social
and political forces to avoid a destabilizing populisl backlash or rcpudialion of the

Court.

• The Court. (or example. abandoned its decision in NDlional L~lJg,,~ 0/ Cities v.
426
833 (1976). because il produced doctrinal confusion rather than creale an inaeJli,ible prin~iple for federalism. See Fisher '" Devins, supra note 6. al
Us~ry.

u.s.

94-104.
lit On ahe power of the press and Kademic: commentators, see LawreocE C. Marshall. Intellectual Feasts and Intellectual Responsibilities. 84 Nw. U. L Rev. 832.
842·50 (1990); UndaGreenhouse. Telling the Counts Slory: Justice: and Joumalism

at the Supreme Court. 105 Yale W. 1537 (1996).
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remedy in the first Brown decision.'" A similar tale is told by the
Court's invocation of the so-called "'passive vinues. n that is, procedural and jurisdictional mechanisms that allow the Court to steer
clear of politically explosive issues;' For example. the Court will
not '''anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it...... '·formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required or u pass upon a constitutional question . . . if there is . . . some other ground,,·· such as statutory construction, upon which to dispose of the case.t: This deliberate
withholding of judicial power reflects the fact that courts Jack ballot-box legitimacy and need to avoid costly collisions with the general public and other branches of government."'·'
It is sometimes argued that courts operate on principle while the
rest of-government is satisfied with compromises.'#.I This argument
9"

"'See Brown v. Board or Educ.• 347 U.S. 483 (1954). More than a decade after
Brown. a federal appellate court nOled: -A national ertort. bring.ing. together Congress. the executive. and the judiciary may be able to make meaningful the ri,ht of
Negro children to equal educational opportunities. Tht corcns acting Dione hDl;t
failtd.- United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Edue.• 372 F..2d 836. 847 (5th eire
1966), eert. denied. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. v. Davis. 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
For (urther discussion. sec infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
-. See Alexander M. Bickel. The Supreme Court. 1960 Term-Foreword: The Pas·
sive Virtues. 7S Han'. L. Rev . .10 (1961).
-: Ashwander v. TVA. 297 U.s. 288. 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis. J .• concurring)
(citations omitted) .
•~ Correspondingly. the threshold teslS or jurisdiction. justiciability. standing. moot..
ness. ripeness. political questions. and pruden"al considerotions are ~nvoked regularly and deliberately to protect an unelected and unrepresentatIve judiciary. See
Don B. Kales. Jr. &. William T. Barker. Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a
Coherent Theory. 62 Cal. L. Re\'. 1385 (1974): David A~ Logan. Standing 10 Sue: A
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis. i 984 Wis. L. Rev. 37 (198-J): Gene R.
Nichol. Jr .• Rethinking Standing. 72 Cal. L Rev. 68 (1984). A typical example of this
strategy is the usc: of ripeness in 1955 to avoid decidin! the constitutionality of a Vir·
,inia miscc,enation statute. Coming on the heels of the desegre~ation case of 195....
the Court was concerned that striking down a law banning. interracial marriages
would confirm the imaained fcars of c:ritics of dCSClrclation who warned that inte·
,rated schools would lead to -mon,relization" of the ;hite race. Years later. after
the principle of desegrc:gation had been safely established and Con!rC",ss and the
President had forled slfon!! bipartisan majorities to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
the Court was then politically positioned to strike down ~he Virginia statute. See
Lovin, v. Virginia. 388l!.S. 1 (1967): Naim v. Nairn. 350 U S. 391 (1955).
"The classic stalement of this position is Herbert We~hil(;r.. Toward Neutral PrincipJes of Constitutional Law. 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1. 14-15 (1959). See also Earl Warren.
The Memoirs of Earl Warren 6 (19n) (explaining that progress in politics "could be
made and most oflen was made by compromising and taking half a loaf where a
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is sheer folly. A multimember Court. like government .. gropes incrementally towards consensus and decision through compromise.
expediency, and ad hoc actions. "No good society." as Alexander
Bickel observed, "can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be
principle-ridden. "IJ~
Courts, like elected officials. cannot escape "[t]he great tides and
currents which engulr~ the rest of us." Rather than definitively set..
tle transcendent questions. courts must take account of social movements and public opinion.or. When the judiciary strays outside and
opposes the policy of elected leaders, it does so at substantial risk.
The Court maintains its strength by steering a course that fits
within the permissible limits of public opinion, Correspondingly.
"the Court's legitimacy-indeed, the Constitution ·s-must ultimately spring from public acceptance:' for ours is a hpolitical system ostensibly based on consent."""

8. How Not 10 Marginaliz.e the Constitution
"In urging officials to subjugate their constitutional judgments to
those of the Supreme Court . "'" Alexander and Schauer condemn
the possible repudiation-by elected officials and the pubJic-of
Court decisions that operate outside of the societal mainstream.
Under this account, courts should not bend to such lawless behav..
ior: instead, elected officials ought to face up to their "·obligation·'
to treat Supreme Court decisions as law. Accordingly .. the current
system. where courts take social and political forces into account. is
seen as back wards.
To say that the current system is. well.. the current system does
not answer Alexander and Schauer's admittedly normative inquiry.
What if democratic government saw Supreme Court decisions as
whole loaf could not be obtainc:d. The: opposite is true so rar as the juditial process
was concerned. ").
"Bickel. supra note 91. at "'9.
.. Benjamin N. Cardozo. The Nature ofthe Judicial Process 168 (1921) .
., A number of studies explain how couns Ie nerally stay within the political
boundaries of their times. See supra nOles 72. 76.
... Murphy &: Tancnhaus. supra note 76. at 992. See also Tyler &. Mitchell. supra
nOle 75 (e"plaining that the public·s acceptance of the Coun's role: as interpreter of
the Constitution improvc$, the chances of the public accepting the Cour"s controversial decisions).
.. Alexandcr " Schauer. supra note 8. at 1382.
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definitive statements of the Constitution·s meaning? Would such a
system. as Alexander and Schauer contend~ "achieve a degree of
settlement and stabilityn and fot.remove a series of transcendent
questions from short-term majoritarian control?"'''··
Of course not. A strict bifurcation--centering constitutional interpretation in the courts while allocating other policy decisions to
nonjudicial actors-would put both sectors on widely divergent
paths. Policymakers would believe the Constitution to be irrele ..
vant . something to treat with indifference. Lawmakers would debate policy divorced from constitutional concerns. As a conse ..
quence~ the Constitution would diminish in value and stature. If
the Court viewed the Constitution as its exclusive domain. it would
not moderate its opinions to take account of social and political
forces. The two sectors would come to speak different languages.
with courts increasingly out of step with the political institutions.
Judicial exclusivity creates disincentives for the courts to function
within the governmental orbit and. as such. is destabilizing.
The failings of judicial exclusivity. we think" are best illustrated
by Dred Scott.11JI a heinous decision that demands disobedience. At
the time the case was to be decided. the Court was sufficiently confident in its .fohigh and independent character·" that lustice John
Catron advised President-elect James Buchanan that . in the matter
of Dred Scott. the Court would "decide & settle a controversy
which has so long and seriously agitated the country .•• 111: Buchana~
took the Court at its word: In his inaugural address . he assured the
nation that the issue of slaverv was before the Coun and would be
"speedily and finally settled...... lUl The judicial settlement was certainly speedy but not final. Two days later. the Court issued Dred
Scott.. propelling the nation into a bloody civil war that left. out of a
population of approximately 30 million .. more than 500. 000 dead
and another 300..000 wounded. II"

Id. at 1380.
Dred ScOIl v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
.,., LCller from John Calron to James Buchanan (Feb. 19. 1857). in 10 The Works or
James Buchanan 106 n.1 (John B. Moore: cd.• Antiquanan Press Ltd. 1960) (1908·11) .
&til

1M

... 6 Compilation. supra note 32. at 2962.
-The World Almanac and Book of FaclS 184,380 (Roben Famighclli ed .. 1997),
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Abraham Lincoln, through words and deeds, sought to countermand Dred SCOII. M What if Lincoln. applying Alexander and
Schauer~s logic, treated the decision as definitive vis-~-vis the Constitution? The answer comes as a surprise: Lincoln, while having
an "obligation to follow Dred Scott because of [the Supreme Court
as] its source .. tllift could have repudiated the decision through actions directly at odds with it,. say,. his issuance of 'the Emancipation
Proclamation. Court decisions. under Alexander and Schauer"s
view .. are ~~overridable obligations~-Iegally binding but appropriately subject to civil disobedience in times of crisis. IU)
Alexander and Schauer do not blink when making this argu·
mente In language critical to their analysis. they answer Uthe challenge of D red Scoct,,:IIJ. ~&Given the inadvisability of designing a decis' p edure around one case that might never be repeated. it
r to treat Dred Scott as aberrational, recognizing that offialways override judicial interpretations if necessary. espeare willing to suffer the political consequences. " lilt
as they might . it will not do to treat Dred Scott as aberraSupreme Court regularly confronts divisive, emotional
JSSILIeS where lawmakers and the public may well find overIID
Gtaes that warrant civil disobedience.
Moreover. if policy·
1 Supreme Coun rulings as final,. some outlet will have to
expressing discontent with the consequences of disfa__ • rulings. In panicular. knowing that they cannot engage
in co=::tiJlIlJlDIlal dialogues which challenge the underlying correctness
decisionmaking. policymakers may well engage in
civil
. nce. especially when the voting public disapproves of
U

o

,

...-.-. Court decisions were necessarily binding on the panies (Dred Scon
and
-, but could not bind the elected government to judiciallY-Imposed
poliq.!miiiEk.-,,_. 7 Compilation. supra nOle 32. at 3210.
.. AJI:::IIiDIdc.i- It. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1382.

....

. n a provocative: response: to Alexander &. Schauer. Emily Sherwin

aai:dlllt:dlC Cou n OUlht 10 have the last word on all questions of constitutional

ing slavery. See Emily Sherwin. Ducking

Dr~d SCOII:

A Re-

Ak::uJllder and Schauer. Const. Comm. (forthcoming [NEED DATE»

am.:z:zpl". _

on file with author).

·s.a:note 46 and accompanying lexl: infra nOles Ill-lIS and accompanying
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the Court. Rather than "aberrations." such chaJlenges may become
an important part of public life.
Consider, for example. the willingness of democratic institutions
to resist Court rulings on abortion. affirmative action. busing. child
labor. the death penalty. flag burning. gay marriage. the legislative
veto. school prayer. voting rights. and religious liberty.1I1 Today,
these challenges take place in the framework of give-and-take dialogues between the Court. elected officials. and the pubiic. Were
judicial supremacy to rule the day. however. some or aU of these
challenges might become "occasions for disobedience. "112 Indeed.
when Supreme Court decisions on the minimum wage. m abortion, ,... and religious libertyll~ already have been analogized to Dred
Scott. there is good reason to think that such challenges wilt in fact.
take place. Whether or not they succeed, it is difficult 10 see how
judicial exclusivity would either promote stability or nul . y m,ajoritarian control of transcendent questions.
Even if Dred Scotl is truly aberrational. judicial e
y IS
likely to marginalize the Coun and. with it. the Coa5bJDtion.
Democratic institutions will only take the Constitution
ly if
they have some sense of stake in it. Alexander and Schauer
not
'tical
disagree; for them. a virtue of judicial exclusivity is that
discussion "might be richer precisely for its lack of reliance
ritualistic incantations of constitutional provisions. nil. Yet by f
lng
out politicized constitutional discourse. the Courfs educati
tion will be severely limited as will the enduring values t
stitution itself. U7
y

Several of these episodes are discussed in Fisher &. Devins. supra note 6.
&. Schauer. supra note 8. at 1382.
III xe 4 Public Papers of Roosevelt. supra note 38. at 20S.
"' Sec Ronald Reagan. Abortion and lhe Conscience of the Nat '
21
(1984); see also Justice Scalia·s dissent in (AStJ.'. S05 U.S. at 984 (Scalia. J.
_)
(equaling the Supreme Court's reaffirmalion of aOOnion righlS with D,nt
.., See The Reli"fouS Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S. 2969
Senale Comm. on Ihe Judicial"\', I02d Cone. 42 (1993) (statement of ~
mas. General Counsel. Baptisl joint Commiitee on Public Affairs).
II" Alexander'" Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1385.
", •• At its beIC." che Supreme Court produces ··reasoned opinions l
claim to be che resident philosopher of the American constitutional 515&
Funslon. A Vital National Seminar: The Supreme Coun in American Pnln~:II
217 (1978). Sec: also Christopher L. Eisgruber. Is ahc Supreme Court
Institution? 67 N.v.U. L. Rey.961 (1992) (assening tRatlhe Supreme Colltt:__...
III

II: Alexander
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Alexander and Schauer are hardly troubled by this state of affairs. If anything, they think policymakers ought to steer clear of
a1l matters touched upon in Supreme Court rulings. In order to
"generate[] a single conception of what the Constitution require[s]:'1I1l for example, they would encourage lawmakers not to
expand constitutional protections beyond the floor set by the Supreme Coun. 1I1J By this jnterpretation, Alexander and Schauer
would then disapprove of legislation authorizing disparate impact
proofs in voting rights and employment discrimination legislation:
legislation and regulation authorizing the assignment of women to
combat aircrafts; ]egislation and regulation allowing federal employees.. including members of the armed services . to wear an item
of religious apparel on their clothing; and other initiatives launched
by democratic government in the face of Supreme Court decisions
limiting individual rights. lZlt
By stifling public discourse in this way ~ the Constitution becomes
less relevant. Constitutional arguments will no longer be used as a
roadblock to stymie progressive reforms or. alternatively.. to expand constitutional protections beyond the ··floor.... set by the Supreme Court. While Alexander and Schauer do not foreclose poJi.
cymaking on matters that implicate constitutional values. elected
officials are discouraged from doing so and .. when they do. they are
forbidden from discussing those fundamental values that underlie
the Constitution and.. with it . the United States itself. The vinues
of ·"settlement for settlemenfs sake"·':' pale in relation to these
costs.
These costs are particularly acute in two categories of cases that
are outside the radar of judicial supremacy proponents. One involves underenforced constitutional norms. that is. matters that for
limes uses hs educative function to orrer ··Iessons·· to inspire citizens): Eugene V.
Rostow. The Democratic Character of Judicial Review. 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193" :!08
(1952) (describing Court"s role in the discussion of problems. declaration of prine...
pies. and as an educational body).
u, Alexander II. Schauer. supra nOle S. at 1385.

"'Sec ide
"'See Fisher &. Devins. supra nOie 6. at 256-88 (discussing employment and vot·
in,). 3O,S·16 (discussin, women in ahe mililary): see also 10 U.s.C. § n~ (1994)
,.ddressinl reliJious apparel in military): Peler Baker. Workplace Religion Policy
Due. Wash. POSI. Aug.. 14. 1997. al AI (describing executive guidelines

reJi,iouJ expression in lhe fedenl workplace).
I" Aleunder " Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1385.
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one reason or another are not likely to make their way into court.I~~
Here, it is left to democratic government to defi ne the Constitution's meaning. Yet if elected government is discouraged from
thinking about the Constitution, it is unlikely that these matters
will receive serious treatment~ if any at all. I!.'
The second category involves instances in which e Court sees
itself as a partner with government in shaping co - utional values.
As a way of minimizing error, miscalculation..
dless con..
flicts with society and coequal branches .. the Co
times enation is a
lists the help of elected government. u " School
particularly telling example of this practice. M
a decade
after Brown, the percentage of African-Americ
en in allblack schools in the South stood at ninety
percenl. l~~
Through the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other fi
initiatives.
9

I:: The best treatment of this topic is Lawrence Gem~ Sager, F
eal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv.
Examples of underenforced constitutional norms include the
recess appointments. the incompatibility clause. war powers.
discussed in Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interprel3tio
18 Pepp. L Rev. 57 (1990) (ar!!uing that many separation of --~ cs.:.w::s
lied not in the courts. but through trade-orb and compromises ~r-c:a:
and Congress). See also William Michael Treanor. The Ori~
ndII~:m::d:m
the Takings Oause and the Political Process. 95 Colum. L.
(describing the property rights movement as illustrative of
give serious treatment to underenforced constitutional norms).
I!J Alexander and Schauer are wrong in presuming that the pab:tK:;;a;t:Jbr.;!IIIdIR::s~ ~ vt!r
give serious treatment to these maUers. See Mark V. Tushnet,
in Conslitutional Law. 81 Minn. L. Rev. t (1996) (discussin!! Imsl~:i-= a.l5adca
of the "emoluments clause:' 3 constitutional provision unlikely lO
the federal courts).
I:' The Court and Congress have acted jointly on many COIlSllIlCICS.m
Fisher. supra nute 6, at 247-51. An early example is Congress· r·~_r
Supreme Court ruling Lt!;sy ,'. Hard:n. )35 U.S. 100 (1890). In
me
COU" ruled that a stale's prohibition of intoxicating liquors co
to
"oriJinal packagc:s- or kegs. but qualified us opimon by sa~in ,
exclude incomin! articles -without congressional permis..\ion.,.
gress quickly overturned lhc decision by allowing statc:s. lhrou_
10 regulatc Incoming. liquor "in on!final packages or otherwise.Acr. ch. 728. 26 Stat. 3)3 (1890) (codified at27 U.S.C. § )21 (J
)..
example: is Congress's prohibition of newspaper searches. 42 U.s.c. I ...._ . , ; . !'II.....
wake of Z"rcher l'. SIDnlord Dail:~·. a decision upholding. SUCD 3IICID'd-=s
leltslallve efforts 10 proJect "against poSSIble abuses:' 436 U.s. s.l1.
further discussion. see Fisher It Dcvln5. supra note 6. at 3.
.
a=f Gary Orrield. Public School Desegregation in the United
. al 5
(1983).
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however, this figure had dropped to twenty-five percent in 1968.1:.
More significant, with the President, congressional leadership. and
the public committed to undoing Jim Crow laws, the Coun was
emboldened to attack discrimination and segregation ··root and
branch."m
Herein lies the real danger of judicial exclusivity. In rejecting
such constitutional decisionmaking by other branches, judicial exclusivity does ]jule to promote stability. It encourages acrimony.
not cooperation. Democratic government, rather than engage the
Court in a constitutional dialogue, will give shon shrift to the Court
and the Constitution. For its part, the Court will neither enlist
democratic government's help nor look to public opinion as a
measure of its legitimacy. No longer constrained by its responsibilities as educator (Why educate if populist constitutional discourse is not a public good?) and cenain of its status as final constitutional arbiter, the Coun will see little value in calibrating its
decisions against social and political forces. I!J( Indeed. any such
calibration would implicitly reject a decision making model that
equates stability with supremacy.
Pragmatism and statesmanship must temper abstract legal analysis. De T oqueville recognized in the 1830s that the judicial power
"is enormous, but it is the power of public opinion. (Judges] are
all-powerful as long as the people respect the law~ but they would
be impotent against popular neglect or contempt of the law..... ·="
Arguments to the contrary. that judicial exclusivity will have a stabilizing effect . won·t do~ To be stabilizing. court decisions must
command respect and be generally acceptable and understandable.

c.

Cont;nlling Colloquies

Law. as Morris Raphael Cohen wrote in 1933. is anything but a
"closed. independent system having nothing to do with economic.
political. social. or philosophical science .... 1'1. As this study reveals .

1:.ld.
'1'

Green y. County Sc:h. Bd... 391 U.S. 430. 438 (1968).

,=- On thiS point. see Eissrubcr. supra note 117.. at 1014-2 J•
•" 1 Alexis de Tocqucvillc. Ocmocracy in America lSI (Phillips Bradley cd .• 1945)•
•• Morris R. Cohen. Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy 380-81
n..86 C1933).
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courts cannot be separated from the social and political influences
that permeate all aspects of constitutional decisionmaking. The
question of whether three branch interpretation is qualitatively
better than judicial supremacy, however, remains. Alexander and
Schauer consider this question irrelevant to their analysis. Focusing on the stabilizing and coordinating functions of law they embrace judicial finality as the best and only means available to save
the Constitution from "interpretive anarchy. ,.114 We. of course.
disagree with this claim. Perhaps more fundamentally, we think
that the dialogue that takes place between the Court. e]ected government. and the American people is as constructive as it is inevitable and therefore more stable.
Constitutional decisionmaking is not well served by making
challenges to Supreme Court decisions "more difficult .., if not ,
"futile. nil! Complex social policy issues.. especiaJly those that implicate constitutional values. are best resolved through ·'the sweaty
intimacy of creatures locked in combat. t,B~ Judges and politicians
sometimes react differently to social and political forces. Congress .
for example, focuses its "energy mostly on the claims of large
populous interests" or on the claims of the wealthy and the powerful. since that tends to be the best route to re-election. 'ttl.'" Courts .
in contrast. are less affected by these pressures. for judges possess
life tenure. U~ Accordingly. because special interest group pressures
affect courts and elected officials in different ways. a full-ranging
consideration of the costs and benefits of different policy outcomes
is best accomplished by a government-wide decjsionmaking process. For this reason. couns and elected officials should both be activists in shaping constitutional values.
9

Alexander & Schauer. supra nOle 8. at 1379.
Id. at 1386.
,., Alexander M. Bickel. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
I"

•,z

Bar of Politics 261 (J962).
'''Sle~en
"~See id

G. Calabrese. Thayer"s Clear Mislake. 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269,273 (1993).
As 10 what jud!!es maximize. see Richard A. Posner. What Do Judges
and JUSbc:e5 Maximize'?: (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does). 3 Sup. Ct. Econ.
Rev. I (1993).
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No doubty this politicization of constitutional discourse win contribute to partisan y value-laden constitutional analysis.'~ Nevertheless, complex social policy issues are ill-suited to the winnertake-all nature of litigation. Emotionally charged and highly divisive issues are best resolved through political compromises that
yield middle-ground solutions. rather than through an absolutist.
and often rigid yjudicial pronouncement.
Judjcia~ supremacy yields unworkable solutions. not a more equitable world. M[G]ovemment by lawsuit," as Justice Robert Jackson warned. "leads to a final decision guided by the learning and
ym
limited by the understanding of a single profession-the law.·
Alexander Bickel puts the matter more directly-"doubt[ing] ...
the Court's capacity to develop '"durable principles'" and therefore
doubting '-that judicial supremacy can work and is tolerable .•y.~
Political realities and constitutional values require the judiciary
to share ,vith other political institutions and society at large the
complex task of interpreting the Constitution. Constitutions do not
govern by text alone or solely by judicial interpretation. They
draw their life from forces outside the courts: from ideas. customs,.
society" and statutes. Through this rich and dynamic political process. the Constitution is regularly adapted to seek a harmony between legal principles and the needs of a changing society. Bickel
described the couns as engaged in a "continuing colloquy with the
political institutions and with society at large.'" a process through
which constitutional principle has "'evolved conversationally not
perfected unilaterally."'"
III.

CONCLUSION

The chief alternative to judicial exclusivity is not .iinterpretive
anarchy" ", ••, with each public official at every level of government
making independent judgments of the Constitution. Nor is there
'''' Sec ,cnerally Louis Michael Seidman" Mark V. Tushnet. Remnants of Belief:
Contemporary Constitutional Issues (1996) (discussing the effect of political innuences on constitutional debates).
•n Roberl H. Jackson. The StrUBle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a CriSIS in
American Power Politics 291 (1941).
,. Alexander M. Bickel. The Supreme COU" and the Idea of Progress 99 (1970).
,.. Bickel. supra note 133. a124O. 244•
... A ..under " Schauer. supra note 8. at 1379.
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. any evjdence that the main. purpose of the Constitution was to vest
a final interpretive authority in a single branch. The overriding
value of the framers was a system of checks and balances that is antithetical to vesting in any branch a monopoly on' constitutional
values. The result, from the start, was "coordinate construction,".-.
with each branr:, capable of and willing to make independent constitutional interpretations. That system has endured for more than
two centuries without deteriorating into interpretive anarchy.
No single institution, including the judiciary, has the final word
on constitutional questions. It is this process of give and take and
mutual respect that pennits the unelected COUl! to function in a
democratic society. By agreeing to an open exchange among the
branches. all three institutions are able to expose weaknesses, hold
excesses in check. and gradually forge a consensus orl constitutional values. By participating in this process, the public has an
opportunity to add legitimacy, vitality, and meaning to what miSt'lt
otherwise be an alien and short-lived document. Therein lies true
stability.

H. See

FISher. supra nole 6. at 2J 1.
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